Wednesday 22 November 2017

Victoria's fire management strategy — meeting the needs of the customer

For the first time I'm aware of, and that goes back as far as 1967, "Victorians have an opportunity to shape the future of fire management in Victoria by providing feedback to the Victorian Fire Management Strategy Discussion Paper.

"Released this week the paper aims to explore new and innovative ways to prevent fires in Victoria and reduce impacts on the community when fires occur.

"Emergency Management Commissioner Craig Lapsley said sector and community feedback was the first step in developing a holistic new strategy, which would include all aspects of fire."

The discussion paper can be reached by clicking on the label Plate 1 immediately below the photograph.

Plate 1

In the posting heading I've referred to the needs of the customer.

Who is the customer?

The Macquarie Dictionary Fifth Edition defines a customer as "someone who purchases goods from another; a buyer; a patron".

All Victorians are customers, indeed owners of the fire services through the fire service levy and other taxes we pay to establish and maintain these services: MFB, CFA and DELWP Forest Fire Management Victoria.

Who is a stakeholder?

Whilst there are many stakeholders: "someone who has a pecuniary interest in an enterprise, having contributed funds to it; someone who is affected by, is concerned with, etc., with an issue or enterprise", the customers must be considered the prime or paramount stakeholders and while the advice or recommendations of the lesser stakeholders should be considered, their sometimes self-serving needs or wants should never override the best interests of the owners of the fire services.

I imagine that most who read this posting will be aware to some extent of the Victorian government's push to rearrange our fire and emergency services and the supporting nonsense that's been promoted by various parties who should know better, and here I include the Emergency Management Commissioner and CFA Chief Officer.

The rationale or lack of it.

Apparently the so-called "modernising" of Victoria's fire services and I'll come back to this later, is founded on an enterprise bargaining agreement (EBA) that affects CFA paid personnel that the CFA Board refused to accept in its entirety. Having failed here, the government decided that it would split the CFA to in effect separate solely volunteer brigades from integrated brigades having a paid firefighter component.

Plate 2

Plate 3

And, it has not stopped there. CFA has released emergency response data that does not give any information on periods of a day involved. Unfortunately, this information is being cherry-picked by certain lesser stakeholders supporting the assertion that selected volunteer brigades don't meet the required response time, seemingly to frighten the communities they serve.

Don't be mislead, there will be integrated brigades out there capable of meeting the response times at night and weekends that don't require 24/7 paid firefighters. CFA management should be identifying on an individual brigade basis where volunteers can meet the response times and rather than having paid firefighters sleeping in fire stations reallocate some to stations that need "daytime staffing", hence avoiding an increase in costs.

Concerning costs, The Australian recently published information on rising public sector employment costs provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics

With the emphasis on emergency response, which currently seems to be the main argument about meeting the needs of the customer, the following are recent examples of the weakness or failure of strategies to protect life and property protection due to all the "eggs being in one basket":

Plate 4

Plate 5

Plate 6

Plate 7

Plate 8

Plate 9

Plate 10

Plate 11

In drawing attention to the above that I consider failures due to the loss of life involved, enormous loss of property and cost of recovery in all its forms, I'm certainly not being critical of firefighters involved, many of whom will have placed themselves in dangerous situations and deserve our thanks. The failure is at the executive management and political level in shirking vital prevention and preparedness measures to reduce the reliance on firefighter intervention.

Prevention

How do we avoid or reduce the impact of situations such as the above examples? Clearly by increasing the effort in the areas of prevention and community preparedness — and Lancefield is a prime example of an unprepared community with houses vulnerable to ember attack. And prevention must include better building construction regulation and emergency management planning for buildings, including emergency management wardens to organise the orderly evacuation of occupants.

This prevention and preparedness must extend into the family home to reduce reliance on emergency response — the fire brigade may be delayed for one reason or another or not even arrive. Smoke alarms in the family home are intended to alert the occupants so that they can safely leave the building.

There is more a fire service can be doing to protect life and property than just building up its response capability; that’s yesterday’s thinking.

Fire Service Modernisation

The Victorian government claims to want to modernise the Country Fire Authority, but it was a very modern Authority and well in advance of its time when it came into being in 1945:

Section 6 Appointment of Country Fire Authority

(1) For the more effective control of the prevention and suppression of fires in the country area of Victoria there shall be an Authority appointed by the Governor in Council to be called the "Country Fire Authority".

(2) By such name such Authority shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and shall be capable in law of suing and of being sued and of taking purchasing holding exchanging leasing and disposing of real and personal property.

That’s right, as it states in the current CFA Act an Authority not a fire service or fire brigade!

Section 6F Recognition of Authority as a volunteer-based organisation

The Parliament recognises that the Authority is first and foremost a volunteer-based organisation, in which volunteer officers and members are supported by employees in a fully integrated manner..

That was the original intention, an Authority that is “first and foremost a volunteer-based organisation” that still stands in the current Country Fire Authority Act — not a fire brigade or fire service as is the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Brigade (MFB).

Section 14 Control of the prevention and suppression of fires in the country area

The control of the prevention and suppression of fires in the country area of Victoria is, subject to this Act, vested in the Authority.

In recent times CFA management seems to have more concentrated more on being a fire brigade than addressing its full role as an Authority and neglecting its fire prevention responsibilities:

Over time governments have helped with the downgrading of the CFA for example the revocation of CFA’s section 44 inspection responsibility. How this was handled is a shameful story for another day.

And back to the subject of so-called modernising the CFA and community involvement generally, with the apparently growing threat to the community through terrorism or other Malicious acts that can constitute a broad-scale threat beyond the capability of our emergency responders, both paid and volunteer, it’s not in the best interests of the customer for the government to allow/participate in denigration of volunteers as a lesser class of firefighter and have them marginalised.

On volunteers being labelled by some as "unprofessional" that's tripe, as CFA volunteers are required to be trained, assessed and qualified for whatever roles they perform. Consequently, was it appropriate for a government that should be working in Victoria's best interests to allow denigration of volunteers to be publicly canvassed in the Melbourne CBD? As a volunteer myself, I found it extremely offensive and needing a response.

Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning

Plate 12

DELWP, another government agency failing its customers:

Referring to Minister Merlino's statement in the final paragraph of Mayor Clarke in the Diamond Valley Leader story concerning preparedness for the coming fire season, a record $29.4 million in Victoria's biggest ever firefighting aircraft fleet", is Minister Merlino unaware that the very day when aircraft are most required weather conditions usually prevent or at least severely restrict their use e.g. they were of little or no help in preventing the losses at Wye River–Separation Creek on Christmas Day 2015. Makes me wonder, is Minister Merlino seeking to "snow" us, or has he been mislead by his advisors?

Finally, for the benefit of Minister Melino and those who feel that to be a professional requires being paid to do the job, here’s a fire and rescue department worth spending some time looking into Fairfax Country Fire and Rescue Department, Virginia, adjoining Washington DC.

HERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR EVERYONE TO HAVE INPUT TO FUTURE FIRE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR VICTORIA AND I URGE EVERYONE AS THE TRUE CUSTOMERS TO HAVE THEIR SAY, BUT TIME IS SHORT.

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Monday 25 September 2017

Improving bushfire management — a missed opportunity Part 1

Approximately 21 months after the fire Victorian Coroner Judge Sara Hinchey has ruled not to hold an inquest into the Wye River–Separation Creek Christmas 2015 bushfire.

Disturbing reading, as Coroner Hinchey seems to accept the reports, etc, from DELWP, Inspector General for Emergency Management (IGEM) and Emergency Management Commissioner as suitable and sufficient evidence on which to determine that an Inquest into the fire was not required.

For a fire that caused, and continues to cause enormous personal financial and emotional hardship to those who lost homes, and cost to the broader community to ostensibly make Wye River–Separation Creek safe in the aftermath of the fire, including works to prevent landslip closing the Great Ocean Road, reading much of the Decision I'm reminded of the adage "caesar judging caesar". In this case the Coroner appears to endorse "caesar's" conclusions.

One example:

In the introduction on page 1 Her Honour draws on the IGEM's description of the land involved. Did she test this herself?

Paragraph 41 on page 8:

... for the purpose of investigating the fire and determining whether to hold an Inquest, I have received additional materials from Emergency Management Victoria (EMV) and DELWP. I also toured by vehicle, on foot and in the air, the area in which the fire ignited and subsequently burned.

Did Her Honour actually walk in the area where the fire started on 19 December 2015 identified in my blog postings of 20 March "Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — in pursuit of the truth" and 28 March 2017 "Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — lightning strike and what to look for"? I had no difficulty reaching and walking around in that area.

Maybe Her Honour was never taken to the area of the lightning strike.

I'll leave it to the reader to find other examples.

Surely the people directly involved and all Victorians for that matter deserve better, if for no other reason than to avoid a similar situation at some future time. The vulnerability of Kennett River just down the road from Wye River comes to mind.

The following three photos from my blog posting of 21 February 2016 "Obfuscation, sanitising, cabinet-in-confidence documents, burying, leaking — examples of some of the processes of government" are before and after the Christmas Day fire. The dwelling 'was' on the north-eastern side of Dunoon Road, Wye River. Plate 2 shows the vegetation on private land below this and other dwellings lost in that area.

In that posting I mentioned the 'tools' available to at least reduce the threat to exposed buildings along Dunoon Road. Add to those 'tools' the provisions of sections 225, 226, 227 and 227A Local Government Act 1989. Disturbingly fascinating how this has been ignored in the re-establishment of Wye River–Separation Creek at great and unnecessary cost to those seeking to rebuild that could be avoided if council, the CFA Board and Chief Officer effectively addressed their fire prevention responsibilities.

Plate 1

Plate 2

Plate 3

Now, 'kicking the bushfire management or should I say bushfire mismanagement can' a bit further down the road to Kennett River. The first four photographs are of dwellings on the southern side of Cassidy Drive.

Nothing remarkable about these and other dwellings along Cassidy Drive and they are as vulnerable to bushfire attack as were those lost along Dunoon Road and elsewhere in Wye River–Separation Creek. However, there is one significant difference in the environments — the land on the other or northern side of Cassidy Drive is zoned PUBLIC CONSERVATION AND RESOURCE ZONE (PCRZ) in the Colac Otway Planning Scheme, thus the responsibility of DELWP.

Plate 4

Plate 5

Plate 6

Plate 7

Plates 8-10 show the bushfire fuel along the northern side of Cassidy Drive on 7 July 2017 and it's not hard to imagine the loss of dwellings across the other side of Cassidy Drive and deeper into Kennett River as fire runs towards them under weather conditions similar to Christmas Day 2015.

Plate 8

Plate 9

Plate 10

Earlier this year DELWP conducted a fuel reduction in the forest between Wye River and Kennett River. Part of the results of that burn photographed from Cassidy Drive is visible through the trees in Plate 11.

Plate 11

Plate 12 is the view generally west along Kennett Road, which is the next road towards Wye River from Cassidy Drive. Also photographed on 7 July 2017, visible at right of the road is the result of the fuel reduction burn. At the left side of the road the vegetation remained untouched up to Cassidy Drive in the area of land shown in Plates 8-10.

Plate 12

Plate 13 brings the Cassidy Drive photos together on a Google Earth photo of the broader area.

Plate 13

DELWP's Code of practice for bushfire management on public land places a high priority on asset protection, obviously being neglected at Cassidy Drive. And what does the Colac Otway Municipal Fire Prevention Plan say about this part of Kennett River or is the shire ignoring the loss potential and willing to abandon the people involved to the same fate as Wye River–Separation Creek?

More than one way to fuel reduce for example brushcutters and cart away, community participation from those at risk. Seems to be something seriously amiss with fire management on public land in this part of Victoria. Maybe DELWP should look at this situation on the ground rather than rely on computer fire-modelling.

ROLE OF THE CORONER

In my next posting Improving bushfire management ... a missed opportunity Part 2 I will discuss the role of the Coroner. Some preparation for those interested Coroners Act 2008.

Food for thought the preamble in the Coroners Act:

The coronial system of Victoria plays an important role in Victorian society. That role involves the independent investigation of deaths and fires for the purpose of finding the causes of those deaths and fires and to contribute to the reduction of the number of preventable deaths and fires and the promotion of public health and safety and the administration of justice.

This role will be enhanced by creating a Coroners Court and setting out the role of the Coroners Court and the coronial system and the procedures for coronial investigations.

Question is, has the Coroner failed Victorians with her ruling?


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Monday 17 April 2017

Jamieson Creek bushfire — marketing a myth; a hypothetical

Following on from my Tuesday, 28 March 2017 posting "Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — lightning strike and what to look for", where would one take an independent investigator to stand at the top of a “gorge” to demonstrate “inaccessibility” and point out the scene of a lightning strike through tree canopies that are very largely unaffected by a fire?

If one wanted to point out a “gorge” one would drive along the relatively sedate Cumberland Track off Wye Road via Curtis Track or maybe come in from the Lorne end if that’s not too rough. It’s certainly a very steep drop down off the southern side of Cumberland Track in places.

Relevant maps, etc, from my posting of Monday, 20 March 2017 "Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — in pursuit of the truth"

Or maybe drive along the relatively sedate Jamieson Track off Wye Road to impress with a steep, to some, drop off from the northern side of that track.

Below are two photos of the northern side of Jamieson Track near where the drone was flown.

One would hardly have the investigator bounce along a steep in a couple places and dusty bulldozed track to show a gorge that does not exist on the southern side of Jamieson Creek. A track that leaves Wye Road in the condition as shown in the following photograph.

And further along that track to where I parked my vehicle, and from where easy access to the site of the lightning strike as shown in my posting on Tuesday, 28 March 2017 "Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — lightning strike and what to look for" can be achieved on foot. Photographs in that posting show the slope that I've calculated from the 1:30 000 topographical map to be approximately 15 degrees down towards the north and north of northwest and Jamieson Creek at the foot of the slope.

And further on towards the northeast from where my vehicle is parked.

If one had access to a helicopter the investigator could be flown over the whole fire area to impress, while avoiding providing access to enable the investigator to actually ‘walk the ground’ around the lightning strike.

The government's position on inaccessibility, fact or fiction? Fiction!

A case of operational dysfunction?

I've recently seen an email from DELWP to a citizen who suffered loss from the Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire that includes the following statement: "as they [EMV] were the lead control agency of the Wye River-Jamieson Track fire".

Raises questions of competence and the possibility of operational dysfunction right from the beginning of the lightning strike. And opportunism?

Clearly a need to re-examine the IGEM's "Review of the initial response to the 2015 Wye River–Jamieson Track fire" in the light of DELWP's stated position.

Finally, what drives me? Costs involved with bushfire continuing to rise due to emphasis on response and recovery rather than prevention by governments at all levels, as covered in this story in the 12 April 2017 edition of The Australian.

Wye River–Separation Creek is a prime example of governments and supine politicians failing us, as covered in my Sunday, 21 February 2016 posting "Obfuscation, sanitising, cabinet-in-confidence documents, burying, leaking — examples of some of the processes of government".

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Tuesday 28 March 2017

Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — lightning strike and what to look for

My blog posting of 20 March 2017 "Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — in pursuit of the truth" includes a photograph showing the area where I believe the lightning struck. Included in the paragraph preceding the photograph is the following:

Note the large burnt stump visible at left in the photograph.

My objective was to illustrate that there was nothing difficult about the terrain in the general area of the lightning strike that would have prevented physically fit, experienced and safety conscious DELWP firefighters and also that the vegetation was not too dense to prevent effective use of suitable and properly tasked water bombing aircraft.

I've been seeking advice on lightning strikes and what to look for to be as sure of my facts as possible and provide the following examples, and there are many more, of what I've studied:

"Science Made Simple" that includes an informative video of the details of a lightning strike.

"National Geographic on Lightning" with another informative video.

Concerning the Jamieson Creek lightning strike, I find the following in the National Geographic discourse describes the situation found that I alluded to with my reference to the "large burnt stump":

Lightning's extreme heat will vaporize the water inside a tree, creating steam that may blow the tree apart.

This is the remains of the tree that I believe took the brunt of the lightning strike.

Plate 1

The burnt stump shown at left in the first photograph in this posting is at left in Plate 1. The fallen tree in the centre has separated from the stump. The damaged stump in the centre appears to have been damaged by the fallen tree to its left.

Note the severe burn isolated to the lower part of the tree. This deep, small area of burning is consistent with the intense heat from a lightning strike at or near the base of the erect living tree—lightning does not necessarily strike the top of a tree, it all depends on where the upwards moving positive charge “streamer” emanates from, and it could even be the ground alongside a tree or an isolated rocky outcrop.

Plate 2

Plate 2 is another view of the stump and its fallen top as indicated.

Plate 3

Plate 4

Plates 3 and 4 show the stump. Note the depth of the charring, particularly concentrated at the left side of the stump.

Plate 3 also shows the damage caused by a violent separation of the tree from the stump, almost as if the result an explosion.

Back to the tree; it was a living gum—EVC 201:Shrubby Wet Forest from Biodiversity Interactive Map - 3.2 indicates Mountain Grey Gum Eucalyptus cypellocarpa and checking Leon Costerman’s Native Trees and Shrubs of South-Eastern Australia satisfies me—containing moisture that would have required far more and prolonged exposure to heat of a level that's not associated with a fire moving across the ground to produce a burn of this depth.

I suspect it was a relatively mild fire for those first couple of day, as logs and larger stumps already on the ground in the area had suffered little more than superficial charring, as Plates 5, 6, 7 and 8 show.

Plate 5

Plate 6

Plate 7

Plate 8

An explanation for the seemingly burnt trees. Scattered within the area are Messmate Stringybark Eucalyptus obliqua that account for a few trees with blackened trunks, which is due to the fibrous bark but not the trunks burning. Plate 9 is an example of Messmate Stringybark from the Christmas Hills area.

Plate 9

Costerman describes the bark of the Mountain Grey Gum as:

Smooth, grey often with yellow and whitish patches, sheds [bark] in strips or plates; may be rough and darker at base.

Plate 10 shows the relatively easily ignitable roughness at the base of a Mountain Grey Gum (or very similar) and becoming plates or strips further up the trunk. Sufficiently dry and standing off from the trunk can see fire extend further up the trunk to involve this bark without igniting the trunk. The arrows indicate examples of the stages of bark from the ground up.

Plate 10

Plates 11 and 12 show the unburnt vegetation to the west and on the opposite side of the control line from the fire area, photographed at similar level to the lightning strike. 

Plate 12 shows bark renewing itself on Stringybarks following much earlier exposure to fire.  

Plate 11

Plate 12

Photos in this and recent postings show that there was nothing difficult about the area for fit and experienced DELWP firefighters to round up the initially small fire in the first couple of days, and to argue that the vegetation was to dense to respond to proper air attack is arrant nonsense if DELWP's use of water bombing aircraft in Gippsland in recent days is any guide.

The annotated Google Earth photo shows the way to where I believe the lightning struck: Position 11. Not difficult to find nor hard to reach on the ground, but always with an eye upwards at the trees above. And approximately 250 metres from a well-formed four wheel drive track.

Why then the failure to slay the Jamieson Creek beast in its infancy?

On page 27, third paragraph under the heading "Initial fire control strategy 19–21 December", in the "IGEM's Review of the initial response ..."

Through the period 19 to late 21 December, the IC's [Incident Controller] broad strategy was to establish bare earth containment lines to limit the fire's spread within the area bounded by the Cumberland Track to the north, and Jamieson Track to the south.

As can be seen in the following annotated Google Earth photo, the area of land between Cumberland Track and Jamieson Track is huge compared to the size of the fire on 19 December.

Why this plan so early and probably before the Incident Control Team really knew what they had to contend with?

Inexperience, incompetence, panic, interference from above, budget restraint or was the Incident Controller 'marching to the beat of a different drummer' — sign found at the corner of Curtis Track and Cumberland Track on 9 January 2017?