Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — fake news and alternative facts at play?

On Christmas Day 2015 large areas of Wye River–Separation Creek were devastated by a fire that roared in from the adjoining forest — from a lightning strike that occurred in the forest to the north five days earlier — causing enormous emotional and financial pain and suffering that continues to this day.

The question must be why, to avoid it happening elsewhere in Victoria.

Those of you who've followed this blog will be aware that I'm yet to be convinced by the assertions of the Emergency Management Commissioner and Inspector-General for Emergency Management (IGEM) that the lightning strike that impacted just south of Jamieson Creek was "extremely difficult to access" and arguing that the vegetation was too dense to respond to the efforts of firebombing aircraft.

Concerning difficult terrain and effectiveness of water bombing, issues I will explore later in this posting, some parts of the IGEM's "Review of the initial response to the 2015 Wye River–Separation Creek Track fire" worth considering:

• fourth paragraph beneath the heading "1.1 Observations – Fire control", page 3;

• "OBSERVATION 1 – INITIAL ATTACK", page 3;

• right side column beneath the concluding "RECOMMENDATION 3", page 4;

• third paragraph down in the right side column on page 5;

• right side column beneath the heading "Landscape and fire history" on page 11;

• left side column beneath the heading "Detection of the fire 19 December", particularly the third paragraph mention of a "complex gully system" on page 12;

• left side column beneath the heading "Resources increased 20 December", particularly the reference to committing "large air tankers (LATs) to suppress the fire" on page 13;

• beneath the heading "Backburning strategy 22–23 December" on page 14;

• beneath the heading "Use of aircraft", particularly the paragraph in the right side column "Helitacks are suited to the Otways terrain ... get close to the canopy. The long line and bucket capability ... extinguishing fire and hot spots" on page 21;

• beneath the heading "4.7 Firefighter safety" on page 21;

The first of at least three basic issues I will now explore in this and following postings.

1.  Inaccessibility and vegetation density

In the above references to the IGEM's "Review of the initial response to the 2015 Wye River–Separation Creek Track fire" mention is made of "steep hills and complex gully systems that are topographically and geographically challenging and covered by dense, multi-canopied vegetation" and "extremely difficult to access", in the Otway Ranges. While there may be such areas in the Otways is that the situation in the immediate area of the lightning strike on 19 December 2015?

Having generally worked in and explored that part of the Otway Ranges, including studying contour maps and manipulated the professional version of Google Earth to show relief, I'm of the opinion that claims that the lightning strike was in a "gorge" and therefore inaccessible was at least questionable.

Questionable, because I believe that DELWP had the remote area firefighting capability and firefighting helitankers fitted with belly tanks or suspended buckets hovering above the fire while still small would have drowned it with the tree canopy involved no barrier to the release of a full load of water reaching the ground.

In my blog postings of Wednesday, 3 February 2016 and again on Sunday, 14 February 2016 with the best information available to me at the time I endeavoured to display the location of the growing fire. The earliest position I could find was timed at 6:08 PM on 21 December 2015

At this point note that all the photos and maps below are large so when clicked on will show considerable detail.

I've recently been provided with a photo of maps that I'm reliably informed were used by EMV at a community information briefing in January 2016.

Below is an enhanced copy of the photos that came to me on a single sheet. While the quality is somewhat marginal, it is useful in showing the fire locations commencing at 6:30 PM on 19 December 2016.

Next is what is reasonably assumed to be the 19 December map extracted from the above montage and enhanced a little more.

It shows a small fire perimeter in black where indicated by my red arrow. I have also labelled the gully immediately north of Jamieson Track, before the fire perimeter.

Now, correlating with the latest Google Earth Map of the area.

Positions 1, 2 and 3 were recorded with a GPS along a track bulldozed to reach or at least get close to the lightning strike. Position 3 is near where the bulldozed track leaves Wye Road between Jamieson Track and Curtis Track.

Position 2 is at a rough junction in the track with the signs painted on trees as shown in the following two photos.

The first sign points to the north and a “hand trail”. The second points to the continuation of the bulldozed track to Position 1 and beyond

The following Google Earth photo is an enlargement of the earlier photo. The arrows first indicate where I believe the hand trail leaves Position 2. The two arrows further north indicate where I believe work on the hand trail is apparent, but my confidence is reducing further north of the upper arrow.

Rotating online Google Earth to put south at the top of the screen and tilting the image seems to support the presence of the trail at my northern-most indicator. Beyond that indicator the trail seems to wander off to the east and maybe elsewhere.

I invite you to analyse for yourself, and I’m now regretting that time prevented me from exploring at least part of the trail — maybe that will please some.

Finally, when it comes to identifying the position of the lightning strike, the following is an extract from the 1:30 k topographical map covering that part of Victoria.

Why am I confident with the general area I’ve nominated? Because of the location information provided above and the extension of the bulldozed track further towards the northeast from Position 1.

This is Position 1 where I parked my vehicle.

The aerial photo was taken above Position 1, on 27 January 2017. It shows the bulldozed track extending further to the northeast at left in the photo.

Below are two photos of the bulldozed track extending further northeast from Position 1 as shown in the aerial photo above. The extension of the track shown at right of right of centre is shown in the lower photo.

The following two photos are views across the gully towards Jamieson Track from the southern side of the bulldozed track adjacent to the northeastern end of the clearing at Position 1.

The following photo was taken from a similar location to the preceding two, but back towards the southwest.

The following series of photos are very instructive. They were taken in both directions on the north-facing slope in the forest below the extension of the bulldozed track further northeast of Position 1.

As the ground continued to level felt I was very close to the creek. Certainly not consistent with the definition of a “gorge”.

Back towards the southwest and below Positions 1 and 2, with the hand trail through there somewhere.

Below, a few more pieces on the “inaccessible” Jamieson Creek lightning strike puzzle.

The first photo below is from above the tree canopy on the side of Jamieson Track, taken from above Position 4 on 9 January 2017. The view is across a gully to the area of the lightning strike and behind it the Jamieson Creek gully. Beyond the gully the land rises up again, with Cumberland Track generally along the top.

The next five were on taken 27 January 2017 from above Position 1 on the Google Earth photo.

The first from the drone rising up through the tree canopy with the camera facing towards the southwest. My vehicle is visible lower centre in the photo.

The second is above the tree canopy from the previous photo and again towards southwest, with the Jamieson Creek gully visible at right.

The third is generally northeast towards Lorne, which is hidden. The Jamieson Creek gully is visible at left and a sharp eye may pick up Cumberland Track at the top of the rising ground beyond the gully.

In the next the view is lower than the third photo and generally in the same direction, showing more of the ground and some canopy separation.

The final photo is towards the south and Jamieson Track just below the skyline.

Inaccessible “gorge"?

To me, the country I traversed in my vehicle, and walking around in the area generally northeast of Position 1 did not seem all that difficult or hazardous for fit, well trained and safety-conscious DELWP firefighters accustomed to dry firefighting, with water available from tankers on the bulldozed access track and utilising hose lines and possibly relay pumping to reach the fire, and supported by hovering helicopters fitted with belly tanks or suspended buckets capable of getting water through the canopy and onto the fire.

Having acquired considerable experience in the bush e.g. much of Gippsland, Grampians and North East; former Jungle Training Centre, Canungra and nearby Levers Plateau; southern Tasmania; Otway Ranges; Kokoda Track; and observed at first hand the forests in various parts of North America and the Baltic, there is nothing remarkably difficult about the canopy in the area of the lightning strike.

If a 71 year-old could do it, admittedly only 'scratching the surface', why couldn’t the DELWP people? From what I understand, a 'walk in the park' for DELWP Gippsland people. On the contrary, Barwon South West people soft or poorly managed or led? Maybe they were victims of a disastrous 'cockup', where at least three major headquarters above the actual fire could not get it right. Too many cooks?

Or did the Incident Controller 'march to the beat of a different drummer' — sign found at the corner of Curtis Track and Cumberland Track on 9 January 2017?

Unfortunately, a long posting, so I’ll leave it here for now.

Plenty of reading for those interested, particularly the IGEM’s report — see if you can find any anomalies identified in it.