Original objective of this blog was to raise bushfire knowledge and assist Victorians seeking approval to build in a bushfire prone area. Lately, I’ve concluded that state government and some councils only reinforce bushfire mythology, neglect their fire prevention responsibilities and fail to implement a full PPRR risk management approach to mitigating bushfire, shortcomings proven in the devastation of Wye River–Separation Creek on Christmas Day 2015 and Yarloop, WA, on 7 January 2016.
When I posted the 23 November 2018 edition it was my intention to then look at a wildfire experience closer to home, the Christmas Day 2015 fire that engulfed a large part of Separation Creek and Wye River on the Otways coast.
To me, a major cause of property loss and associated loss of life in the California fires is a general lack of understanding of how fire crosses the land and mandatory evacuation orders. From what I've seen from the media and other videos I consider that the agencies are too response focused and need to involve the general public in active defence of their homes where the threat is ember or firebrand attack. What then are the lessons to be learned?
In recent times I’ve become aware of people who refer to the new normal or new abnormal and of course they’re referring to their perceptions climate change or global warming on wildfire. But we should consider the new normal or new abnormal is more than just climate change.
Plate 1
Graphic: The Australian, 22 January 2018
What's the graphic "Carnage Costs" have to do with wildfire?
On 22 January 2018 The Australian carried a story "Major city vigilance urged, with vehicle attacks the ‘new normal’
Causes me to wonder what the total suppression and recovery costs will be for Wye River‒Separation Creek. Could this money have been better spent on health and education in Victoria?
Preparing this posting during the afternoon of 7 December 2018 I listened to broadcast radio alerts to the communities in the Little River area concerning a wildfire — predominantly a grassfire albeit in stony country — with advice to the residents of Little River to evacuate.
From a story in The Age later in the afternoon "Little River fire: Blaze contained but homes still at risk"
Again the vexed question of evacuation, in this case an established township situated in open grasslands and having the benefit of a firebreak/control line in the form of a railway reserve aligned generally northeast southwest directly north of the closer settled part of the township.
Harking back to Dr Gordon's statement concerning the new normal, with global warming, be it short or long term its effect on the heavier fuels in our forests is a higher drought factor that leads to the heavier fuels more easily ignited and contributing to fire intensity that can in turn lead to pyrocumulus development above the fire.
Plate 2
Photo: Nicholson
Plate 2 shows pyrocumulus development above the Kilmore East fire. The photo was taken late afternoon on 7 February 2009 in Sunbury, which is approximately 50 kilometres west of where I estimate the location of the cloud. A lot of fuel is required to enable the development of a cloud of that size. Later into the evening it was producing lightning and light falls of rain towards its south-eastern end. Clearly a very hot fire.
Queensland fires spark federal inquiry
In a story in The Australian on 7 December 2018, concerning the recent wildfires in Queensland, Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk is quoted:
Climate change, Premier Palaszczuk? Begs the questions, what was your government doing to prepare for the effect of climate change? Were your government's agencies monitoring the increasing dryness of Queensland and modifying or adapting emergency management plans to take account of increasing vulnerability to wildfire? And what of preparing the people of Queensland? Nothing, I assume from the decision to evacuate 8,000 people from Gracemere to Rockhampton as one example.
It seems from the story that the federal parliamentary inquiry will have a relatively narrow focus:
Queenslanders, indeed all Australians deserve more and the inquiry should be expanded to consider the full gamut of factors that contributed to the fires and losses incurred, and the inquiry should not allow itself to be dominated by the emergency management agencies or their representatives. All wisdom concerning wildfire is not confined to the emergency services and the general public should be encouraged have input.
And again back to Dr Gordon's statement concerning the new normal.
With 50 firefighting vehicles reported as being committed to the Little River fire, where did they come from and were their home areas weakened in the event of other fires occurring? Would a trained and supported community have reduced the need to draw so many resources from other parts of Victoria?
Gracemere
Gracemere is a prime example of the need to seriously review wildfire management arrangements in Australia in today's environment.
Plate 3
Photo: Google Earth
Plate 3 is a Google Earth photo of Gracemere, Queensland. Take a stroll through and round the outskirts of the town using Google Earth Street View and determine for yourself its vulnerability to wildfire — comparable in size and surrounds with Hamilton or Horsham in Western Victoria and all surrounded predominantly by grassland.
Why then the decision to evacuate Gracemere?
Victoria fire model helped save Queensland town
From a story in The Australian, 29 November 2018, reasonably assumed to be from the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services:
Makes me wonder what the modelling actually predicted and who directed the evacuation.
The same questions could be asked concerning the advice to evacuate Little River Township.
This is what I wrote about in my last bushfire blog posting. How many homes, business, schools, etc, will be lost due there being no one there to extinguish embers as they begin to arrive, with homes, businesses and community infrastructure at risk far exceeding the availability of firefighting vehicles and firefighters to protect them?
In my blog posting SURVIVING BUSHFIRE, 26 October 2018, I mainly covered two issues:
• Lessons for Australia in recent fires in California
• Differences in wildfire fuel Victoria v California
In dealing with wildfire fuel I gave examples of how native trees in Victoria are involved in or respond to wildfire compared with trees in California.
Media coverage of the California fires in Australia is sure to unnerve many in our community and prompts the question, why are the fire management agencies not explaining the differences in fire behaviour due to the vegetation involved? Or does the media coverage serve to strengthen the "leave early" policy?
At this point I must stress that my criticisms are of fire and related emergency management policies, not firefighters who no doubt worked very hard and exposed to personal risk at times.
Out of the mouths of babes
There has been much criticism and mocking of US President Donald Trump for his comment about raking:
While raking the floor of the forest to remove the fine fuel is impractical, basically Trump is correct.
From the many graphic photographs and video clips posted by various media outlets it's quite apparent that extreme fire behaviour was occurring in the back country forests and being spurred along by chaparral and dry grassland. Add the effect of strong, dry Santa Ana wind notorious for driving wildfire in California and the result is fire behaviour shown in Plate 1.
What then of Mr Trump's raking the ground? Clearly, a failure to properly manage the wildland, regardless of who is responsible together with the effect of global warming, has led to the growing intensity of fires in recent years, which includes the loss of lives of 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots firefighters in Arizona in 2013.
But other factors leading to the life and property loss we are in witnessing in recent times includes a failure to educate communities at risk on what to actually expect and how to survive coupled with mandatory evacuation in the teeth of a fire.
While putting some at extreme risk, ordering people out also deprives the agency firefighters of the support of many with homes at risk, who with training and support from the firefighting agencies during the run of a fire could do much to reduce property loss and related loss of life.
Plate 2
Land Park, Redding, California.
Photo Axios 12 August 2018
And what of suppression and recovery costs compared to money needing to be spent on effective wildland management and township protection, I expect it would have been mind-numbing, particularly when the cost of air tankers are included.
Plate 3
CFA trialing a Bambi bucket beneath its light observation helicopter in the mid-80s
Photo Nicholson
Plate 4
Dromader agricultural aircraft being demonstrated as a fire bomber in the early 80s.
Photo Nicholson
And on air tankers, I'm a supporter of helitankers (Plate 3) and small fixed wing agricultural aircraft (Plate 4) for their ability to be very precise with the delivery of their suppressant when compared with heavy fixed wing aircraft such as the B737 taken on in NSW for this summer wildfire season.
This extract speaks on the limitations of air attack:
An extract on cost-effectiveness from MEGAFIRE The Race to Extinguish a Deadly Epidemic of Flame, Michael Kodas, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston and New York, 2017, under the chapter heading The Fire-Industrial Complex:
Weldon [George Weldon, former deputy director of fire and aviation for the Forest Service's northern region] cited air tankers, which he helped manage when he was fighting fires, as an example of how industry drives wildfire policy. "The [US] Forest Service is looking at spending $500 million [USD] to get new-generation air tankers," he said. "But there's never been a scientific study that demonstrates the effectiveness of large air tankers. If a study was ever done, in my opinion, they are not worth the money at all."
Weldon and other retired Forest Service firefighters cited estimates that air tankers are effective only about 30 percent of the time. "It's a prime example of how powerful the fire-industrial complex has become in a very short time," he said.
Referring to that posting, "For those interested in cost-effectiveness, and governments should be, the Bushfire CRC report "EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 10 TANKER AIR CARRIER DC-10 AIR TANKER, VICTORIA 2010" should be food for serious consideration. Whilst it may look impressive to the gullible masses, could the money have been better spent on prevention over the years prior to the fire?"
Causes me to wonder, have we been seduced by the air tanker industry as they are not a panacea for preventing wildfire loss?
And on certain response comments to that blog posting, Karma at work?
The FOX 40 story is interesting, indeed inspiring as it shows how lay people with the support of a trained and experienced firefighter successfully defended a home:
Eventually, they ran into Paradise Fire Chief David Hawks.
"There’s a dog door here that one of the paramedics made access to it. We unlocked the garage, moved patients into this home and sheltered them in place," Hawks told FOX40.
What happened next was nothing short of amazing. Emergency medical technicians and nurses became stand-in firefighters, some getting on the roof of the home to clear gutters of brush sic [actually pine needles]. They hosed down the outer edge of the property.
They saved the home, all while their patients were kept safe inside.
"He said, 'You do this, you do this, you do this,'" Ferguson said. "All of us shifted our minds to what do we need to do for survival mode here."
"They followed directions," Hawks said. "They did exactly what I asked them to do."
Amid a neighborhood devastated by the Camp Fire, the Chloe Court home survived -- and so did all the patients and medical staff inside.
Listen to Chief Hawks in the video at the head of the FOX40 story (above) as he describes the action necessary to successfully defend that house, it's not rocket science.
Jamieson Creek fire rampaging towards the east on Christmas Day 2015 prior to the wind direction changing to push it into Wye River‒Separation Creek
Photo Stoios
Interesting the similarity between the scenes in Plate 1 and Plate 5. A fundamental difference between the two situations, the people under threat from the Camp Fire had a few short hours to take action compared with the people of Wye River-Separation Creek — it seems the Incident Controller had at least from 21 December 2015, four days, and that intelligence firmed up on 23 December, to organise the defence of those two communities with the participation of property owners prepared to assist. Why did this preparation not happen and it was left to well into Christmas Day before people were urged to leave?
Last Saturday, 27 October, I delivered a session at a Safe Healthy Summers Region Forum hosted by Nillumbik Shire Council, at Eltham:
Plate 1
First page from my PowerPoint presentation
The brief was to present my views on the recent wildfires (bushfires) that ravaged parts of California, USA; Algarve, Portugal; and around Athens, Greece and what we might learn from those fires.
In doing so I sought to mention a broader context of loss due to wildfire:
• human life
• pets and other domesticated animals
• family home
• sources of income e.g. tools of trade, farm animals, crops
• consequential effect on relationships in the family suffering loss
• consequential medical issues associated with suffering loss
Since Saturday while research wildfire information from the US I've added two more, important issues for another day:
• deleterious effect on the natural environment
• avoidable impost on the public purse
Recent fires in North America, Portugal and Greece … what lessons for Australia?
Having the benefit of spending time with forestry and fire agencies in Canada and the USA and being a long term student of fire behaviour and community responses generally I do have some understanding of wildfires and their impact in North America.
Concerning the fires in Algarve and Greece, in places the vegetation is similar to South-eastern Australia and the wildfire problem is similar to ours.
Currently we Victorians have the potential benefit of the following to mitigate wildfire loss:
• A “pecuniary interest” clause in the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 (CFA Act) that prevents people being forced to evacuate in the event wildfire does or may threaten their home;
• A provision in the CFA Act that enables the serving of “fire prevention notices” to abate fire hazards on private land;
• A provision in the CFA Act that places fire prevention or mitigation responsibilities on municipalities and public authorities;
• An Australian Standard for construction in wildfdire-prone areas: AS 3959; and
• CFA volunteer brigades embedded in much of the urban/rural interface and beyond enabling actual community involvement in emergency management.
Lessons for us?
The folly of widespread evacuation, be it voluntary or mandatory evacuation orders issued.
Plate 2
Land Park, Redding, California.
Photo Axios 12 August 2018
Plate 3
Swasey Drive, Redding, California.
Photo Axios 12 August 2018
Why folly? See what remains unburnt and not even scorched in Plates 2 and 3 and I’m referring to the vegetation.
The vegetation that remains undamaged is due to it being beyond flame contact and radiant heat sufficient to scorch that vegetation.
How wildfire travels across the landscape
Basically, fire travels across the landscape by igniting the fine fuel or vegetation such as dry grass, fallen dead leaves and twigs up to pencil size. Depending on the dryness of the heavier fuels such as dead-and-down tree limbs the fine fuel acts as “kindling” for the heavier fuels.
Nature of the fuel or vegetation in California compared with South-eastern Australia
The vegetation where the recent fires have occurred can be broadly described as grassland, chaparral and conifer forests i.e. pine and cypress trees.
Plate 4
An example of chaparral in California.
Photo: California Chaparral Institute
Plate 5
Chaparral fire in California.
Photo: East County Magazine, San Diego, California
Heath land in Victoria, such as that shown in the following two photographs, is similar to chaparral:
Plate 6
Heath at Anglesea, Victoria.
Photo: John Nicholson
Plate 7
Heath and low level scrub at Fairhaven, Victoria.
Photo: John Nicholson
Plate 8
Chaparral, cypress and pines in California.
Photo: FireScape, Arizona, USA
Plate 9
Mendocino Complex Fire in pines, California, USA.
Photo: Redhead Blackbelt, Northern California, USA
Plate 10
Young pine plantation near Harrietville, Victoria.
Photo: John Nicholson
Plate 10 is included to show the difference between pines and our native eucalypt trees. As shown in Plate 9 pines burn vigorously when ignited and like eucalypt species contain volatiles. However, unlike eucalypt canopies that tend to have significant gaps between the canopy and surface fine fuels or "kindling", pine and cypress tree canopies tend to be closer to the ground and compact compared to eucalypts.
Following are a series of photographs I've taken over the years following fires that have involved trees and shrubs in Victoria.
Plate 11
Photo: John Nicholson
Plate 11 is a view of Firth Park in the Lerderderg State Park a few days after the "Ash Wednesday 1983" fire showing an absence of "crown" or tree canopy fire in the forest in the background. Note the singed trees or shrubs in the foreground.
Plates 12 and 13 are further south from Firth Park towards Bacchus Marsh.
Plate 12
Photo: John Nicholson
Plate 13
Photo: John Nicholson
What is particularly significant about Plates 12 and 13 apart from the lack of crown fire? The unburnt shrubs/suckers at the base of the trees!
Below from my blog posting of 22 June 2014 are two examples of trees and shrubs in the path of the 9 February 2014 Gisborne fire as it travelled northeast towards Riddells Creek after the wind change.
The fire weather conditions this day were described as being the worst since 7 February 2009 (Black Saturday). Again, observe the vegetation close to the ground left unburnt when the fast moving grass fire passed.
Plate 14
Photo: John Nicholson
Plate 15
Photo: John Nicholson
Plate 15 is particularly significant in that cypress trees along the fence line were only scorched.
Plate 16
Skyline Road, Christmas Hills, post 7 January 2009
Photo: Bell
The arrow in Plate 16 points to a gap in the tree canopy that reveals undamaged eucalypt tree canopies in the background that were certainly in the path of the fire. Those eucalypts are on one of the higher points on the western side of Skyline Road.
Apart from heath and low scrub, the evidence is that crown fire is a relatively rare occurrence in the Victorian wildfire environment compared with how fire moves across the landscape in California. Unfortunately, the fires in California, Algarve and Greece featured large in Australian media and undoubtedly served to frighten lay people — counterproductive to building a wildfire resistant community.
Why then the loss of dwellings?
Plates 2 and 3 show unburnt vegetation around the remains of dwellings, and far more numerous than shown here. The unburnt vegetation tells us that consistent flames and radiant heat sufficient to ignite did not reach these dwellings.
The evidence suggests they were ignited by windborne embers from fire further distant. The reason for this ignition can vary, but one cause may have been embers landing on easily ignited bituminous roofing tiles preheated by the heat of the day plus hot air from the fire. Another cause may have been embers landing in vegetative mulch and igniting flammable vegetation close to windows, the glass eventually breaking and allowing fire to reach inside the dwelling.
This fire had also developed into what some may refer to as a "fire storm" with wind so strong as to damage the dwellings and allow ember penetration.
Plate 17
Land Park, Redding, California.
Photo: Google Earth 28 June 2016
Plate 17 is the current pre-fire photo of the land shown in Plate 2. There is nothing dramatic about the vegetation shown and if nothing had changed there was vegetation removal at the rear of the western side of the development and a much broader clearing to the north to inhibit flame contact and dangerous radiant heat reaching the dwellings.
The two yellow arrows point to backyard swimming pools that are points of reference for those who want to go exploring with Google Street View — views towards the west from further north along Buenaventura Boulevard show the vegetation involved.
How wildfire arrives
Windborne embers and firebrands are the major method of fire spread by igniting fresh fuel ahead of the main fire front. This process is known “spotting”, as in the lighting of “spot fires” or fires starting in separated spots ahead of the fire front. To be a threat, this burning material must be sufficiently light in weight to be carried by wind while continuing to flame or smoulder sufficiently long enough to ignite fresh fuel.
I categorise “spotting” as follows:
Embers
The transmission of light burning or smouldering material generally horizontally above ground out to a distance of 100 metres and usually in the form of burning dead eucalypt leaves and other material of a similar weight picked up off the ground, and possibly the larger forms of grass seed heads or burning stringybark from tree trunks.
Stringybark eucalypts, where the bark has not been given a recent “haircut” — singed by fire leaving the bark tight against the trunk with little or no fine fibres available to be ignited — will shed sparks and embers as fire travels up the bark. In strong wind stringybarks can be a prolific source of embers over a relatively short distance until all the fibrous aerated bark has been consumed.
Firebrands
Long distance spotting commonly involves the bark from gum species eucalypts, some of which shed their bark in the form of long ribbons that are susceptible to being carried aloft in the convection column or updraft above the fire. These ribbons of bark are generally aerodynamically shaped and consequently carry further in the upper wind. Due to their size they can remain alight for some time before falling to the ground and starting new fires, sometimes several kilometres downwind from the main fire. Plate 18 shows examples of gum bark ribbons.
Plate 18
Examples of gum bark indicated by the arrows.
Photo: John Nicholson
Wye River–Separation Creek, Christmas Day 2015
Plate 19
Wye River, Victoria, Christmas Day 201.
Photo: Stoios
Plate 19 shows spot fires burning under the influence of upslope in the absence of wind. The spots were due to gum bark firebrands further north following the break-out of the Jamieson Creek fire that occurred on 19 December 2015.
Plate 20
Wye River, Victoria, 11 February 2016
Photo: John Nicholson
Plate 20 shows the aftermath of the Christmas Day fire, with scorched tree canopies and virtually no true "crowning", but 116 houses lost in Wye River–Separation Creek. Plate 21 show the effect of the fire on vegetation on the high side of Karingal Drive where there were many houses lost.
Plate 21
Wye River, Victoria, 11 February 2016
Photo: John Nicholson
Why only scorching as shown in Plates 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 21? My opinion is that there was insufficient surface fine fuel or "kindling" under those trees and shrubs to provide sufficient heat to dry the foliage to the stage where it would actually burn.
Anglers Rest, Victoria, 2003
Here is an example of how fire crosses the land in an under-story fuel reduced environment. The video was recorded at Anglers Rest north of Omeo in January 2003 when the building was directly threatened — may take time to load but worth waiting. It shows some well prepared people protecting the building from fire in very windy conditions. The video shows fire moving past as "spot fires" that eventually join, but much of the fuel has been consumed by the time the "spots" join. Also note no "crowning".
Between 12 minutes and 17 minutes running time the podcast covers wildfire in California, USA, earlier this year and the believed impact of global warming, and note the comment "perpetual fire season" — some are referring to this as the "new normal".
Some photos and comments on the Carr fire here
3. Evacuation
What does this mean for Australia? Given the early onset of fires in Eastern Victoria this year it seriously questions the appropriateness of the one-size-fits-all leave early message if life loss is to be prevented and property loss minimised.
Photo: John Nicholson
Works in progress
There is more I would like to add, but this post is already too long. Consequently, I will follow this with another in the near future. Feel free to use the "following" facility in the side margin if you want to receive future posts.
Finally, please make your own inquiries about how much defensive space you need to have around your home or out-buildings, as individual circumstances vary according to slope aspect, vegetation type/s and the building's fire resistance capability. Also obtain CFA's literature dealing with bushfire survival, property preparation and leaving early.
References
While speaking about fire behavior I mentioned Bushfires in Australia, R.H. Luke and A.G. McArthur.
My copy is old: Department of Primary Industry,Forestry and Timber Bureau, CSIRO Division of Forest Research, AGPS, Canberra, 1978. It is still current and I consider it a preeminent textbook for those wanting to learn about wildfire in Australia. It should still be available somewhere.
Meantime, if you have a question or comment please use the facility at the foot of this posting.
Note that the coloured text indicates links to further information to be clicked on.
I have taken the liberty of using photographs that are not mine and have endeavoured to acknowledge the owners or copyright holders. The photos are used for educational purposes. If anyone is troubled by this please let me know via the comments facility at the bottom of this posting
In recent times Victorians have seen serious fires involving a high rise residential building at Docklands, a waste storage facility at Coolaroo and the St Patrick's Day fires in Western Victoria.
In every case I will argue that there are government agencies, both local and state, that have prevention responsibilities both statutory and/or moral to mitigate the risk of fire in such environments. These agencies and government officers include the fire services, EPA, municipal councils, Emergency Management Commissioner and Inspector General for Emergency Management (IGEM).
Each of these fires disrupted communities and cost a fortune to make safe. Then there is the cost we all carry in helping affected people recover.
The Grenfell Tower fire in London, for which the fire brigade has received some criticism, interests me as it should the fire agencies in Australia — there are important lessons to be learned as there are parallels in Victoria, indeed Australia.
One may well ask why these avoidable losses are increasingly occurring when it should be the opposite. It's because governments and their senior public sector minions allocate the bulk of financial resources into fire suppression and cover the losses when they inevitably occur, losses that can be enormous in both financial costs across the whole community and particularly by those who suffer directly and in many cases are affected emotionally.
An example of finances increasingly being directed to suppression is the Emergency Management Commissioner fostering the use of helicopters to fight fires at night, when he knows that the time air attack is most required is when weather conditions ground these aircraft, day or night. And all the while people are being encouraged to leave their homes undefended and risk losing them. There's more to providing leadership in emergency management than promoting air attack, which comes at considerable cost and is not a panacea.
Probably the most recent example of a very costly failure of wildfire risk management are the St Patrick's Day 2018 fires in Western Victoria that I began to cover in my blog posting on Saturday, 14 April 2018 "Wildfires caused by the electrical distribution system ... why?
Plate 1
Pole supporting 22,000 volt conductors at The Sisters
responsible for one of the St Patrick's Day fires.
Photo The [Warrnambool] Standard 27 March 2018
Towards the end of the posting "Wildfires caused by the electrical distribution system ... why?" I referred to the Government appointed board of inquiry into the occurrence of bush and grass fires in Victoria in 1977 conducted by Sir Edward Hamilton Esler Barber, Q.C., former judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria and concluded with the final two comments:
Considering the action taken following the release of Barber's report and recommendations, clearly CFA felt chastened by his censure of its poor fire prevention performance.
Enough for now with more to follow including the eventual fate of section 44, but bells already ringing for anyone yet?
First, on CFA feeling chastened by Barber's censure.
The Regional Officer in Charge
Shortly after being transferred from Region Nine, Warragul, to Region 14, Sunbury, in late 1977, CFA directed officers in charge of fire control regions that reports according to section 44 CFA Act and listing issues to be covered were to be submitted regularly, regardless of whether a fire hazard was detected or not.
As I remember that was either late 1977 or early 1978 and the first time I can recall section 44 was to be addressed, and I commenced working in fire control regions in late 1967.
At that time regions had an officer in charge and a deputy and one transport vehicle. To get us both out on the road inspecting, CFA provided an additional vehicle to each region. Though years late it was.
I can remember driving with one eye on the road and the other on power lines and trees likely in contact and long spans where spreaders to prevent conductor clash should be considered.
Plate 2
Another view of the fallen pole at The Sisters shown in Plate 1
Photo ABC News 22 March 2018
Plate 3
Close up of the braced base of the pole shown in Plate 2
Photo ABC News 22 March 2018
Over time my interest extended to tired, cracked old timber poles, timber poles with flammable vegetation around them, braced poles that should have been replaced and suspect timber cross arms.
The parts of the pole shown in Plates 2 and 3 show that it was braced, braced because a pole inspector considered it was at risk of falling over.
Braced for 20 years is one estimate I've heard, but happy to be corrected if provided with proof that I'm wrong.
Plate 4
Photo: John Nicholson
Plate 4 shows a 22,000 volt line on the eastern side of the Geelong–Bacchus Marsh Road, approximately 2,000 metres north of the Geelong Ring Road. Plate 5 shows this pole braced on one side.
It also shows how exposed it is to wind from the northwest to southwest. If this pole was to be be subjected to strong wind in circumstances similar to that experienced by the pole shown in Plates 1 and 2 would it remain upright?
Food for thought as to where a fire caused by the conductors in contact with the ground would head.
Plate 5
Photo: John Nicholson
Plate 5 shows the brace bolted to the north side of the pole. A recessed nut is just visible on the southern side of the pole. Plate 6 is a view of a recessed nut on the southern side of the pole.
Plate 6
Photo: John Nicholson
Plate 7
Photo: John Nicholson
Very 'tired' poles are sometimes braced on both sides as shown in Plate 7, obviously needed to provide restraint superior to a nut on the end of a bolt. Is that what happened with the pole shown in Plates 1 and 2, was it only braced on one side?
The yellow arrow in Plate 3 indicates the length of brace below ground level. To me the butt or base of the pole seems intact or undamaged, with the barely visible green pole at the right hand right side of Plate 2 suggesting that the pole did not fall but snapped off at some point along the brace, with the old pole base removed by the power company to enable the same hole to be used for the new pole. The remains of the pole shown in Plate 1 tend to support this theory.
Maybe someone has photos that reveal more of the fallen pole they could send me, with anonymity guaranteed.
Plate 8
Photo: John Nicholson
Plate 8 shows the base of the pole shown in Plate 4. What does the condition of the pole at ground level suggest? Remember, it's only braced on one side. The plugs are part of the pole inspection process and in the past were part of pole preservation measures.
Plate 9
Photo: John Nicholson
Plate 9 is here to show a severely compromised pole that I found in a suburban street in Ruthven. It's only braced on the left side.
Plate 10
Photo: John Nicholson
Plate 10 shows the mark of the pole inspector for 2017 on the colour plate that seems to be standard for that year. I'm really curious to learn if the pole inspector had been to The Sisters pole prior to it coming down.
Vigilance required of all of us
I urge everyone to keep an eye on the poles and wires in their area and report any concerns to the CFA office in their part of Victoria to help the Chief Officer meet the section 24(d) CFA Act responsibility or MFB fire station if the concern is within the metropolitan fire district, and do it in writing.
Now, what of the fate of section 44 CFA Act?
During my last few years with CFA as Director Risk Management I was responsible for taking section 44 reports to the CFA Board, reports that were taken very seriously and issues that I was expected to know inside out and recommend solutions —challenging, some of those Board meetings. However, at that time CFA had a Board that understood the full extent of its responsibility for both prevention and suppression!
Then, in early 2012 Section 44 was revoked! And, who was it who introduced the Amendment Bill and who was Premier of Victoria at that time? A National Party member who would no doubt have claimed to represent the interests and welfare of country people and a Premier with a largely rural electorate: South West Coast and veterinarian who surely would have understood the effect of wildfire on farm animals.
Clause 34 repeals section 44 of the CFA Act as the requirement for “every officer in charge of a fire control region” to undertake regular inspections within his or her region and report whether the provisions of the CFA Act are being properly and efficiently carried out and administered has been in the CFA Act since 1945 and duplicates other investigative, monitoring and reporting functions undertaken by CFA to the CFA Board and
Government. This is an inefficient use of CFA resources.
"an inefficient use of CFA resources"!!!
"duplicates other investigative, monitoring and reporting functions undertaken by CFA to the CFA Board"
Other investigative, monitoring and reporting functions, what were they? None, if any, that matched the importance of section 44.
What were these people who were supposed to be acting in our best interests thinking when they repealed section 44?
How did this happen? Was it driven from within the CFA and if so why? What prompted and supported this irresponsible weakening of Victoria's protection from loss due to wildfire?
Regardless, it's reasonable to conclude that those who shepherded this repeal through the Parliament ultimately have some culpability for the fires caused by the failure of the electrical distribution network on St Patrick's Day.
