Dealing comprehensively with the Wye River–Separation Creek disaster is like eating an elephant, a small portion at a time.
Having reached the immediate area of the "inaccessible lighting strike" without any real difficulty, as covered in my posting "Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — fake news and alternative facts at play?" on 3 February 2017, I will discuss some of the issues left as food for thought in that posting:
- fourth paragraph beneath the heading "1.1 Observations – Fire control", page 3;
- "OBSERVATION 1 – INITIAL ATTACK", page 3;
- right side column beneath the concluding "RECOMMENDATION 3", page 4;
- third paragraph down in the right side column on page 5;
- right side column beneath the heading "Landscape and fire history" on page 11;
- left side column beneath the heading "Detection of the fire 19 December", particularly the third paragraph mention of a "complex gully system" on page 12;
- left side column beneath the heading "Resources increased 20 December", particularly the reference to committing "large air tankers (LATs) to suppress the fire" on page 13;
- beneath the heading "Backburning strategy 22–23 December" on page 14;
- beneath the heading "Use of aircraft", particularly the paragraph in the right side column "Helitacks are suited to the Otways terrain ... get close to the canopy. The long line and bucket capability ... extinguishing fire and hot spots" on page 21;
- beneath the heading "4.7 Firefighter safety" on page 21;
1. Inaccessibility and vegetation density
Thinking more about what I wrote beneath this heading in my 3 February 2017 posting reminded me of the refashioning of the CFA following the 1962 fires, with the appointment of Brigadier R T 'Dick' Eason MC as the CFA's first permanent Chairman.
Dick Eason pulled the CFA up by its boot straps by bringing a military approach to fire control operations. I remember his first output was modifying the principles of war to be CFA'S Principles of Operations:
- MAINTENANCE OF THE AIM
- FORESIGHT
- SPEED
- FLEXIBILITY
- SECURITY
- ADMINISTRATION
- MORALE
- MOBILITY
- CONCENTRATION
- ECONOMY
- CO-OPERATION
- COMMUNICATION
The principles of operations were eventually enshrined in the CFA's 'little red book':
Application of the principles of operations was also included in the 'red book':
So, where did the failure to control the fire started by the lightning strike begin?
In the "Seven Cardinal Sins in Firefighting" (above) I've highlighted where I contend the failure began, and that failure began on 19 December 2015, being the initial response to the lightning strike.
It was drummed into me from my beginning at CFA that response to an outbreak of fire must be with "speed and concentration" to deal with the fire while it was small and still developing. Being "flexible" with that response to suit the circumstances can also be critical.
Known from the outset to be remote from vehicular access, "flexibility" of attack should have seen a DELWP helitack crew dispatched to the scene as a first responder, rather than wait until a bulldozer could construct a track.
Examination of the following would have shown to anyone with knowledge of map interpretation and terrain that a helicopter landing zone could have relatively quickly been constructed by a rappel crew lowered in and firefighting well advanced by the time the bulldozer arrived:
And, there was plenty of area available where a helipad could have been constructed, I parked my vehicle in one such area:
Next, we need to consider the principle of "concentration" or weight-of-attack. Weight-of-attack is the dispatch of sufficient firefighting resources to deal with an outbreak of fire.
In responding to an alarm of fire CFA and MFB always dispatch vehicles to match the task, be it bushfire, house fire, factory fire, hazardous materials incident, etc.
On a day such as 19 December 2015, a day warranting a total fire ban declaration covering the Jamieson Creek area, the CFA's immediate response would have been several tankers to an outbreak of bushfire and built up as the circumstance of the fire became known to warrant an increase of resources.
With the weather predicted the following day already known and to be another day of total fire ban, why was the initial response to the fire so limited in view of the eventual downstream consequences? But more about the downstream consequences later.
I consider the response to have been limited because of the information on the EMV 19 December 2015 briefing map below:
- People: 55
- Appliances:7
- Aircraft: 2
- Hectares: 0.5
Tankers with wings
From a weight-of-attack perspective the CFA recently described firebombing aircraft as "tankers with wings".
Applying the CFA vernacular, as wheeled tankers were unable to reach the lightning strike until a bulldozer had constructed a track, a prompt and "foresightful" response should have seen "winged tankers" in number and capability to the task committed as first responders.
Response capability to match the threat environment
While the information on the EMV map states two aircraft, how many of those aircraft were capable of putting "wet stuff on the hot stuff"?
It's reasonable to assume that only one of those aircraft was capable of dropping water or retardant on the fire, the other aircraft would have been performing the "bird dog" or managing the drop role. So, one "tanker" where in country under the control of the CFA many tankers could have been expected to be involved.
If only one firebombing aircraft, what were the people in charge of this fire thinking, especially when they should have been aware of the weather conditions forecast for the next day???
And, what firebombing capability aircraft was involved? Is it correct that a Bell 212 helicopter with 1,400 litre belly tank was dispatched from Bendigo?
Why not more than one "tanker with wings" dispatched, particularly one of the high capability Erickson Skycranes with 7,500 litre tank that I understand was sitting idle in the Melbourne area?
The Skycrane is a strong aircraft that can fly in wind or turbulence exceeding the capability of the smaller helicopters. It also has the capability to fill its tank by lowering the scoop visible alongside the tank into the water while hover-taxiing forward, thereby forcing water into the tank more efficiently than the pump at the end of the suction hose, and there was an endless source of water, being the sea a short flight to the east.
On the vegetation being too thick for water or retardant dropped from a helicopter to penetrate.
It’s not hard to imagine the effect of a hovering Skycrane emptying its 7,500 litre tank — assuming that quantity of sea water is approximately 7.5 tonnes – as shown in the above photograph on fire burning on the ground around the lightning strike as shown in the following photographs, the leaves and finer limbs would likely be stripped from the trees as the water crashed to the ground, "drowning" the fire.
Clearly, much more to cover but I'll finish for now with the following:
Inquiry into Fire Season Preparedness and Transcript, City of Ballarat
Makes me wonder, is the very costly aircraft resource being used to maximum effectiveness?
