I first became aware of the fire early on 28 February 2018 and posted the following at 1045 hrs on my Facebook account, "Caledonia area - a fire to watch in weather conditions such as today in remote and rugged mountain country when wind may limit/prevent water/retardant bombing by aircraft when most required." Later that day wind and slope affected the fire and it "took off".
Burning in very rugged and largely inaccessible terrain—in my youth did some bushwalking in this country and as recent as 19–20 January was relatively nearby in a 4 wheel drive—with very high fuel loads, making suppression very difficult. High fuel loads due to regrowth from severe fires in this area in the last 10 years.
The following were taken from the Emergency Victoria notifications web site at 0847 hrs on 20 March 2018. The fire was then in excess of 7,000 hectares.
Why the high fuel loads? Difficulties encountered by forest managers gaining approvals to undertake fuel reduction burning?
Here, I'm reminded of Premier Andrews, following the late 2015 Lancefield fire abandoning the recommendation of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission:
The State fund and commit to implementing a long-term program of prescribed burning based on an annual rolling target of 5 percent minimum of public land.
What replaced that target? I remember government utterances that a risk-based approach would determine future fuel reduction on public land. I'll come back to this, but for the remainder of this posting I'll relate a personal experience that I consider relevant.
I was recently engaged by a community group to vet a government proposal that directly affected people who are very concerned that it will increase the fire danger to their community.
On commencing I discovered an attitude within Parks Victoria/Department of Environment Land Water and Planning (DELWP) suggesting to me that the 'green' influence is strong in the 'backroom' with little or no regard for the broader community when it comes to community safety.
This is the report on the work I did for Yarra Waterways Group and the Executive Summary follows:
This executive summary is largely a critique of papers put forward by the government in support of a proposal to afforest Haining Farm adjacent to the Don Valley residential estate, ostensibly founded on an assertion that the bushfire threat will not be increased, and consideration of related matters sourced by me.
The assertion that the bushfire threat will not increase seems to be based on the results of the application of a bushfire behaviour model that predicts probability of house loss: PHOENIX RapidFire. Unfortunately, vegetation or bushfire fuel loads that is species and concentrations were not available from Parks Victoria/DELWP, the principal proponents of the afforestation of Haining Farm, when this report was finalised. And, I understand from Yarra Waterways Group, the project owner, it was not for want of requesting this information.
A questionable feature of the bushfire risk assessment is the uniform percentage housing loss across a relatively large study area, questionable because it seems not to take account of what could only be an increase in bushfire fuel load given a Greening Australia statement that “over 315,000 trees and shrubs will be planted next year [2018], along with 100 different types of understory plants …” [Greening Australia says 59 hectares]
Given the lack of information available on vegetation species and planting concentrations proposed for the afforestation — and data used in the PHOENIX RapidFire modeling (?) — I consider a statement from one of the independent experts supporting the proposal incredible: “I do not consider the revegetation on Haining Farm to significantly change the bushfire risk in the Yarra Valley around Don Valley”.
Also questionable is the factoring in of emergency response firefighting resources, including firebombing aircraft, as integral to reducing any bushfire threat associated with the afforestation. Anyone with a real knowledge of bushfire occurrence, suppression difficulty and concentration of such resources according to the risk exposures will know that this is a promise that may not be able to be delivered when most required. Passive protection rather than reliance on emergency response should be the focus of Parks Victoria/DELWP, particularly with the exposed Don Valley residential estate adjoining to the east.
Minimising the bushfire threat posed to the adjoining residential estate is critical to minimising the potential for loss of homes, and in this case a school, due to the government’s urging the “go early” approach on the community that leaves homes without people available to deal with ember attack to supplement any fire brigade attendance.
When researching current bushfire protection arrangements for the Don Valley residential estate I was disturbed to find that there was no current Yarra Ranges Municipal Fire Prevention Plan according to section 55A Country Fire Authority Act 1958. I’ve heard of excuses that section 55A has been overridden by the Emergency Management Act or that is to occur. However, section 55A remains in the Country Fire Authority Act and I cannot imagine the Office of the Chief Parliamentary Counsel Victoria allowing any conflict between Acts to remain, and to my knowledge other forms of instruction or advice do not override an Act of parliament.
From within the papers perused I have extracted the primary objectives for bushfire management on public land, including the statement “human life will be afforded priority over all other considerations”.
Having experienced the aftermath of several major bushfires, particularly the Trentham East–Macedon fire of Ash Wednesday 1983, Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires of 2009 and the Wye River–Separation Creek fire of 2015, it is reasonable to comment that very many people were hurt emotionally and/or financially through loss of homes, important and valuable possessions, including tools of trade, devastating to those affected — human life must be viewed more widely than just life loss or injury due to being caught in a fire.
Finally, the protection of the Helmeted Honeyeater and Leadbeater’s Possum should be able to be achieved without increasing the bushfire threat to the Don Valley residential estate and beyond.
And, harking back to the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, what's happening with this recommendation:
The Department of Sustainability and Environment [now Parks Victoria/DELWP] report annually on prescribed burning outcomes in a manner that meets public accountability objectives, including publishing details of targets, area burnt, funds expended on the program and impacts on biodiversity.
Finally, most concerning should be the failure to involve the residents directly affected in the planning and implementation of the Haining Farm proposal. Unfortunately, an omission not unique in Victoria.
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