Saturday, 25 January 2020

Wildfire management in Australia — how not to run a fire service

Been a disturbing but interesting wildfire situation in Australia during the last few weeks.

Before going any further I must say that my criticism is of governments and departmental executive management and not firefighters on the ground who work their guts out, in some cases put their safety at risk and sadly some make the supreme sacrifice to protect life and property.

Plate 1
Grenfell Tower Fire, 4 June 2018
Photo: Daily Mail Australia

First, going overseas to put the subject of this posting in context, I'm drawn to the Grenfell Tower fire in London early on 14 June 2017, where at least 70 people lost their lives in the tower.

From the Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 Report two issues stand out to me, the contribution of fuel to the spread of fire and the performance of the London Fire Brigade. If time-poor you can listen to a video statement on the Phase 1 report by the Inquiry Chairman: Sir Martin Moore-Bick.

It took the London Fire Brigade a short few hours to get it's emergency response sorted out, but in that time at least 71 people lost their lives. And, the flammability of the cladding and other structural faults contributed to the development and spread of the fire. Sound familiar?

There's another fire service much closer to home in my case that failed in its response to major fires and neglected reducing the wildfire threat due to fuel accumulation in National Parks and government administered forests in the State of Victoria. Here, I'm referring to the Department of Environment, Water, Land and Planning , otherwise known as DELWP, Victoria.

Within DELWP is Forest Fire Management . Now, I'll draw a parallel with the London Fire Brigade prior to the Grenfell Tower fire, the LFB response took a short few hours to get its response act together, whereas DELWP took days, and months to make a meaningful response to some of those outbreaks of fire, fire spread and suppression difficulty growing accordingly.

Fuel in the form of flammable cladding was very largely responsible for the intensity and spread of the Grenfell Tower fire. There are materials testing procedures and building design requirements to prevent a Grenfell Tower situation.

There can be no doubt that the intensity and spread of wildfire in Victoria alone is due to buildup of fuel in forests and National Parks and the threat it presents.

Plate 2
Dwellings on the southern side of Cassidy Drive, Kennett River
Photo: John Nicholson

Plate 3
Opposite or north of the dwellings in Plate 2
Photo: John Nicholson

Plate 4
From Kennett Road upslope towards the dwellings in Plate 2
Photo: John Nicholson

Though Plates 2, 3 and 4 were photographed in July 2017 I have revisited the sites as recently as September 2019 and am confident that the fuel hazard remains.

FUEL

Referring to the fire triangle (above), in both structural fire and wildfire environments the availability of fuel is the major contributor to fire intensity and spread. For wildfire, there is really only one practical and effective treatment, reduce the fuel!

Stay tuned.

As always, I would welcome your feedback.

Note that the coloured text indicates links to further information to be clicked on.

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