Jamieson Creek – a questionable first response to a lightning strike at the height of the summer bushfire threat

Dealing comprehensively with the Wye River–Separation Creek disaster is like eating an elephant, a small portion at a time.

Having reached the immediate area of the "inaccessible lighting strike" without any real difficulty, as covered in my posting "Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — fake news and alternative facts at play?" on 3 February 2017, I will discuss some of the issues left as food for thought in that posting:

• fourth paragraph beneath the heading "1.1 Observations – Fire control", page 3;

• "OBSERVATION 1 – INITIAL ATTACK", page 3;

• right side column beneath the concluding "RECOMMENDATION 3", page 4;

• third paragraph down in the right side column on page 5;

• right side column beneath the heading "Landscape and fire history" on page 11;

• left side column beneath the heading "Detection of the fire 19 December", particularly the third paragraph mention of a "complex gully system" on page 12;

• left side column beneath the heading "Resources increased 20 December", particularly the reference to committing "large air tankers (LATs) to suppress the fire" on page 13;

• beneath the heading "Backburning strategy 22–23 December" on page 14;

• beneath the heading "Use of aircraft", particularly the paragraph in the right side column "Helitacks are suited to the Otways terrain ... get close to the canopy. The long line and bucket capability ... extinguishing fire and hot spots" on page 21;

• beneath the heading "4.7 Firefighter safety" on page 21;

1.  Inaccessibility and vegetation density

Thinking more about what I wrote beneath this heading in my 3 February 2017 posting reminded me of the refashioning of the CFA following the 1962 fires, with the appointment of Brigadier R T 'Dick' Eason MC as the CFA's first permanent Chairman.

Dick Eason pulled the CFA up by its boot straps by bringing a military approach to fire control operations. I remember his first output was modifying the principles of war to be CFA'S Principles of Operations:

• MAINTENANCE OF THE AIM

• FORESIGHT

• SPEED

• FLEXIBILITY

• SECURITY

• ADMINISTRATION

• MORALE

• MOBILITY

• CONCENTRATION

• ECONOMY

• CO-OPERATION

• COMMUNICATION

The principles of operations were eventually enshrined in the CFA's 'little red book':

Application of the principles of operations was also included in the 'red book':

So, where did the failure to control the fire started by the lightning strike begin?

In the "Seven Cardinal Sins in Firefighting" (above) I've highlighted where I contend the failure began, and that failure began on 19 December 2015, being the initial response to the lightning strike.

It was drummed into me from my beginning at CFA that response to an outbreak of fire must be with "speed and concentration" to deal with the fire while it was small and still developing. Being "flexible" with that response to suit the circumstances can also be critical.

Known from the outset to be remote from vehicular access, "flexibility" of attack should have seen a DELWP helitack crew dispatched to the scene as a first responder, rather than wait until a bulldozer could construct a track.

Examination of the following would have shown to anyone with knowledge of map interpretation and terrain that a helicopter landing zone could have relatively quickly been constructed by a rappel crew lowered in and firefighting well advanced by the time the bulldozer arrived:

And, there was plenty of area available where a helipad could have been constructed, I parked my vehicle in one such area:

Next, we need to consider the principle of "concentration" or weight-of-attack. Weight-of-attack is the dispatch of sufficient firefighting resources to deal with an outbreak of fire.

In responding to an alarm of fire CFA and MFB always dispatch vehicles to match the task, be it bushfire, house fire, factory fire, hazardous materials incident, etc.

On a day such as 19 December 2015, a day warranting a total fire ban declaration covering the Jamieson Creek area, the CFA's immediate response would have been several tankers to an outbreak of bushfire and built up as the circumstance of the fire became known to warrant an increase of resources.

With the weather predicted the following day already known and to be another day of total fire ban, why was the initial response to the fire so limited in view of the eventual downstream consequences? But more about the downstream consequences later.

I consider the response to have been limited because of the information on the EMV 19 December 2015 briefing map below:

• People: 55

• Appliances:7

• Aircraft: 2

• Hectares: 0.5

Tankers with wings

From a weight-of-attack perspective the CFA recently described firebombing aircraft as "tankers with wings".

Applying the CFA vernacular, as wheeled tankers were unable to reach the lightning strike until a bulldozer had constructed a track, a prompt and "foresightful" response should have seen "winged tankers" in number and capability to the task committed as first responders.

Response capability to match the threat environment

While the information on the EMV map states two aircraft, how many of those aircraft were capable of putting "wet stuff on the hot stuff"?

It's reasonable to assume that only one of those aircraft was capable of dropping water or retardant on the fire, the other aircraft would have been performing the "bird dog" or managing the drop role. So, one "tanker" where in country under the control of the CFA many tankers could have been expected to be involved.

If only one firebombing aircraft, what were the people in charge of this fire thinking, especially when they should have been aware of the weather conditions forecast for the next day???

And, what firebombing capability aircraft was involved? Is it correct that a Bell 212 helicopter with 1,400 litre belly tank was dispatched from Bendigo?

Photo from Kestrel

Why not more than one "tanker with wings" dispatched, particularly one of the high capability Erickson Skycranes with 7,500 litre tank that I understand was sitting idle in the Melbourne area?

Photo from SBS

The Skycrane is a strong aircraft that can fly in wind or turbulence exceeding the capability of the smaller helicopters. It also has the capability to fill its tank by lowering the scoop visible alongside the tank into the water while hover-taxiing forward, thereby forcing water into the tank more efficiently than the pump at the end of the suction hose, and there was an endless source of water, being the sea a short flight to the east.

Photo from Kestrel

On the vegetation being too thick for water or retardant dropped from a helicopter to penetrate.

It’s not hard to imagine the effect of a hovering Skycrane emptying its 7,500 litre tank — assuming that quantity of sea water is approximately 7.5 tonnes – as shown in the above photograph on fire burning on the ground around the lightning strike as shown in the following photographs, the leaves and finer limbs would likely be stripped from the trees as the water crashed to the ground, "drowning" the fire.

Clearly, much more to cover but I'll finish for now with the following:

Inquiry into Fire Season Preparedness and Transcript, City of Ballarat

Makes me wonder, is the very costly aircraft resource being used to maximum effectiveness?

Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — fake news and alternative facts at play?

On Christmas Day 2015 large areas of Wye River–Separation Creek were devastated by a fire that roared in from the adjoining forest — from a lightning strike that occurred in the forest to the north five days earlier — causing enormous emotional and financial pain and suffering that continues to this day.

The question must be why, to avoid it happening elsewhere in Victoria.

Those of you who've followed this blog will be aware that I'm yet to be convinced by the assertions of the Emergency Management Commissioner and Inspector-General for Emergency Management (IGEM) that the lightning strike that impacted just south of Jamieson Creek was "extremely difficult to access" and arguing that the vegetation was too dense to respond to the efforts of firebombing aircraft.

Concerning difficult terrain and effectiveness of water bombing, issues I will explore later in this posting, some parts of the IGEM's "Review of the initial response to the 2015 Wye River–Separation Creek Track fire" worth considering:

• fourth paragraph beneath the heading "1.1 Observations – Fire control", page 3;

• "OBSERVATION 1 – INITIAL ATTACK", page 3;

• right side column beneath the concluding "RECOMMENDATION 3", page 4;

• third paragraph down in the right side column on page 5;

• right side column beneath the heading "Landscape and fire history" on page 11;

• left side column beneath the heading "Detection of the fire 19 December", particularly the third paragraph mention of a "complex gully system" on page 12;

• left side column beneath the heading "Resources increased 20 December", particularly the reference to committing "large air tankers (LATs) to suppress the fire" on page 13;

• beneath the heading "Backburning strategy 22–23 December" on page 14;

• beneath the heading "Use of aircraft", particularly the paragraph in the right side column "Helitacks are suited to the Otways terrain ... get close to the canopy. The long line and bucket capability ... extinguishing fire and hot spots" on page 21;

• beneath the heading "4.7 Firefighter safety" on page 21;

The first of at least three basic issues I will now explore in this and following postings.

1.  Inaccessibility and vegetation density

In the above references to the IGEM's "Review of the initial response to the 2015 Wye River–Separation Creek Track fire" mention is made of "steep hills and complex gully systems that are topographically and geographically challenging and covered by dense, multi-canopied vegetation" and "extremely difficult to access", in the Otway Ranges. While there may be such areas in the Otways is that the situation in the immediate area of the lightning strike on 19 December 2015?

Having generally worked in and explored that part of the Otway Ranges, including studying contour maps and manipulated the professional version of Google Earth to show relief, I'm of the opinion that claims that the lightning strike was in a "gorge" and therefore inaccessible was at least questionable.

Questionable, because I believe that DELWP had the remote area firefighting capability and firefighting helitankers fitted with belly tanks or suspended buckets hovering above the fire while still small would have drowned it with the tree canopy involved no barrier to the release of a full load of water reaching the ground.

In my blog postings of Wednesday, 3 February 2016 and again on Sunday, 14 February 2016 with the best information available to me at the time I endeavoured to display the location of the growing fire. The earliest position I could find was timed at 6:08 PM on 21 December 2015

At this point note that all the photos and maps below are large so when clicked on will show considerable detail.

I've recently been provided with a photo of maps that I'm reliably informed were used by EMV at a community information briefing in January 2016.

Below is an enhanced copy of the photos that came to me on a single sheet. While the quality is somewhat marginal, it is useful in showing the fire locations commencing at 6:30 PM on 19 December 2016.

Next is what is reasonably assumed to be the 19 December map extracted from the above montage and enhanced a little more.

It shows a small fire perimeter in black where indicated by my red arrow. I have also labelled the gully immediately north of Jamieson Track, before the fire perimeter.

Now, correlating with the latest Google Earth Map of the area.

Positions 1, 2 and 3 were recorded with a GPS along a track bulldozed to reach or at least get close to the lightning strike. Position 3 is near where the bulldozed track leaves Wye Road between Jamieson Track and Curtis Track.

Position 2 is at a rough junction in the track with the signs painted on trees as shown in the following two photos.

The first sign points to the north and a “hand trail”. The second points to the continuation of the bulldozed track to Position 1 and beyond

The following Google Earth photo is an enlargement of the earlier photo. The arrows first indicate where I believe the hand trail leaves Position 2. The two arrows further north indicate where I believe work on the hand trail is apparent, but my confidence is reducing further north of the upper arrow.

Rotating online Google Earth to put south at the top of the screen and tilting the image seems to support the presence of the trail at my northern-most indicator. Beyond that indicator the trail seems to wander off to the east and maybe elsewhere.

I invite you to analyse for yourself, and I’m now regretting that time prevented me from exploring at least part of the trail — maybe that will please some.

Finally, when it comes to identifying the position of the lightning strike, the following is an extract from the 1:30 k topographical map covering that part of Victoria.

Why am I confident with the general area I’ve nominated? Because of the location information provided above and the extension of the bulldozed track further towards the northeast from Position 1.

This is Position 1 where I parked my vehicle.

The aerial photo was taken above Position 1, on 27 January 2017. It shows the bulldozed track extending further to the northeast at left in the photo.

Below are two photos of the bulldozed track extending further northeast from Position 1 as shown in the aerial photo above. The extension of the track shown at right of right of centre is shown in the lower photo.

The following two photos are views across the gully towards Jamieson Track from the southern side of the bulldozed track adjacent to the northeastern end of the clearing at Position 1.

The following photo was taken from a similar location to the preceding two, but back towards the southwest.

The following series of photos are very instructive. They were taken in both directions on the north-facing slope in the forest below the extension of the bulldozed track further northeast of Position 1.

As the ground continued to level felt I was very close to the creek. Certainly not consistent with the definition of a “gorge”.

Back towards the southwest and below Positions 1 and 2, with the hand trail through there somewhere.

Below, a few more pieces on the “inaccessible” Jamieson Creek lightning strike puzzle.

The first photo below is from above the tree canopy on the side of Jamieson Track, taken from above Position 4 on 9 January 2017. The view is across a gully to the area of the lightning strike and behind it the Jamieson Creek gully. Beyond the gully the land rises up again, with Cumberland Track generally along the top.

The next five were on taken 27 January 2017 from above Position 1 on the Google Earth photo.

The first from the drone rising up through the tree canopy with the camera facing towards the southwest. My vehicle is visible lower centre in the photo.

The second is above the tree canopy from the previous photo and again towards southwest, with the Jamieson Creek gully visible at right.

The third is generally northeast towards Lorne, which is hidden. The Jamieson Creek gully is visible at left and a sharp eye may pick up Cumberland Track at the top of the rising ground beyond the gully.

In the next the view is lower than the third photo and generally in the same direction, showing more of the ground and some canopy separation.

The final photo is towards the south and Jamieson Track just below the skyline.

Inaccessible “gorge"?

To me, the country I traversed in my vehicle, and walking around in the area generally northeast of Position 1 did not seem all that difficult or hazardous for fit, well trained and safety-conscious DELWP firefighters accustomed to dry firefighting, with water available from tankers on the bulldozed access track and utilising hose lines and possibly relay pumping to reach the fire, and supported by hovering helicopters fitted with belly tanks or suspended buckets capable of getting water through the canopy and onto the fire.

Having acquired considerable experience in the bush e.g. much of Gippsland, Grampians and North East; former Jungle Training Centre, Canungra and nearby Levers Plateau; southern Tasmania; Otway Ranges; Kokoda Track; and observed at first hand the forests in various parts of North America and the Baltic, there is nothing remarkably difficult about the canopy in the area of the lightning strike.

If a 71 year-old could do it, admittedly only 'scratching the surface', why couldn’t the DELWP people? From what I understand, a 'walk in the park' for DELWP Gippsland people. On the contrary, Barwon South West people soft or poorly managed or led? Maybe they were victims of a disastrous 'cockup', where at least three major headquarters above the actual fire could not get it right. Too many cooks?

Or did the Incident Controller 'march to the beat of a different drummer' — sign found at the corner of Curtis Track and Cumberland Track on 9 January 2017?

Unfortunately, a long posting, so I’ll leave it here for now.

Plenty of reading for those interested, particularly the IGEM’s report — see if you can find any anomalies identified in it.

Setting priorities - what's important and not so important to a Coroner

I'm preparing this posting being reminded that we are into the period between the Jamieson Creek fire that occurred on 19 December 2015 and eventually rampaged on to devastate parts of the residential areas of Wye River and Separation Creek on Christmas Day and afterwards kept the fire and emergency services occupied for days.

The cost to the people of both settlements has been enormous, both financially, and emotionally for some I'm told. Then there's the other costs to the broader community, such as reliability of the Great Ocean Road.

If the Colac Otway Shire and the CFA had met their statutory fire prevention responsibilities, DELWP had been serious about its fuel management responsibilities according to the Code of Practice for Bushfire Management on Public Land, 2012 and Vicroads had worked cooperatively and effectively within the Colac Otway Shire Municipal Emergency Planning Committee, surely the effect of wildfire in the forest abutting the Great Ocean Road on soil stability would have been a serious consideration. Or maybe I'm being too generous and the knowledge and commitment is lacking in Vicroads.

Add to this the adverse effect of large scale tree removal on soil stability on reconstruction in Wye River and Separation Creek.

Were the trees damaged by fire to such an extent that large scale removal was considered necessary? Who made that decision and what was the criteria?

From my observations shortly after the fire the extent of tree removal seems wildly excessive, but then so is the broad-brush approach to bushfire attack level (BAL) ratings.

Let's digress a little. The Code of Practice for Bushfire Management on Public Land, 2012 is worth reading, particularly:

page 1 – under the heading "Primary objectives for bushfire management on public land in Victoria", first dot point. The Great Ocean Road would fall in the category "essential infrastructure", also known as "lifelines".

Clearly, the government through its agency DELWP failed miserably to meet the requirements of the "Code of Practice for Bushfire Management on Public Land, 2012" when it came to helping protect Wye River–Separation Creek and the strategically important Great Ocean Road. And here's an outcome that could have been avoided or at least substantially reduced if those responsible had done their jobs. It's known as "prevention" and it's far less costly than emergency response and recovery.

Some will remember a fire that occurred in the Lancefield area of Victoria that spread from an earlier DELWP fuel reduction burn-off. Premier Andrews was quick for the government to accept responsibility for the fire and promised compensation for people who could have done more to protect their homes. Here is one example of a house clearly lost from the effect of fire spreading from ember attack:

Lancefield, a fire that due to the fickleness of the weather and limited available resources a few days later escaped from a fuel reduction burn intended to protect those properties in the path of that fire.

Just imagine if later that year under different circumstances there had been no effort to reduce the fuel on the public land and a fire occurred from other causes, taking out those same unprepared properties. Would they have been eligible for compensation? Would the owners have been critical of DELWP for not fuel reducing the public land? Probably. Regardless, "a number of times Mr Fennessy [DELWP Secretary] said sorry to locals over the fire".

An obviously worried government commissioned inquiries that ultimately led to Premier Andrews departing from a recommendation of the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission concerning a fuel reduction burning target. Any connection with a recent statement from EMC Lapsley concerning the failure to reach the fuel reduction burning target this year? A story in itself!

Shock and horror for the government, approximately 15 weeks later on 19 December 2015 lightning started a fire in the forest a relatively short distance southwest of Lorne, and the rest is very sad history for many people directly and indirectly affected.

No apology from the DELWP Secretary this time, just government 'spin' and cover-up at a high level.

Some health and safety and incident management considerations.

After telling us that aircraft were ineffective on the fire burning in a "gorge", as the fire was entering Wye River–Separation Creek I'm reliably informed that this large aircraft, the DC10 shown at the bottom in the following photograph, arrived overhead and dropped red fire retardant presumed to be Phos-Chek on a house in Stanway Drive, and possibly houses in the nearby Harrington and Sarsfield Streets, and maybe elsewhere in Separation Creek.

Though there was some cleaning and tank water replacement at the Stanway Drive house, are there houses nearby where people unknowingly drank, washed dishes, showered, etc, using contaminated tank water? Should this be worrying having regard to the concern being expressed over firefighting chemicals contaminating land around some defence establishments?

Lots of information available on firefighting foam and similar on the web. Four examples:

Bushfire CRC File Note

ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISK OF THE USE OF RETARDANTS TO ASSIST IN WILDFIRE CONTROL IN VICTORIA

EFFECTS OF WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION CHEMICALS ON PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT - A REVIEW

Fire retardants and health

A response from the government when questioned on the use of Phos-Chek over the settled area seems to disagree with what actually happened. Note that it lacks a date, possibly due to it being drafted by another and taking time to get before the signatory who, no doubt under some pressure at the time, accepted what was put before him and inadvertently neglected to date stamp it?

I'm not opposed to the use of safe additives to enhance the efficiency of water dropped from aircraft, but it must be done more judiciously than appears to be the case of the DC10 over Separation Creek during Christmas Day 2015.

QUESTIONS THAT DESERVE HONEST ANSWERS

Deployment of the DC10 Air Tanker

On deployment of this large aircraft to the fire that was already in the Separation Creek area, who made the decision to use it, was it the Incident Controller, was it under the direction of an accompanying Air Attack Supervisor or Birddog aircraft?

If under the direction of an Air Attack Supervisor or Birddog aircraft, why the decision to drop on a house amongst other houses when there could have been people present defending their homes?

I understand that this aircraft deployed direct from Sydney, dropped its load and returned to Sydney. If I'm correct, why at such a late stage in the day? Why was it not deployed when the fire first began to run or did the fire catch everyone 'napping'?

Expensive exercise committing that DC10 aircraft, was it cost-effective as a firefighting tool or was that not a consideration and the aircraft deployed from a level above the Incident Controller as a desperate last-gasp PR exercise?

For those interested in cost-effectiveness, and governments should be, the Bushfire CRC report "EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 10 TANKER AIR CARRIER DC-10 AIR TANKER, VICTORIA 2010" should be food for serious consideration. Whilst it may look impressive to the gullible masses, could the money have been better spent on prevention over the years prior to the fire?

Appreciation of the situation

Firefighter health and safety

A critical concern that should have been on the mind of the Incident Controller and above at the Regional Controller level was the health and safety of firefighters who, in the event of the fire getting away from its control line, would need to be deployed into Wye River and Separation Creek to save houses.

Due to the age and standard of construction of some buildings, there would have been vulnerable old buildings clad with asbestos fibre cement sheet. While a risk to CFA firefighters, would DELWP firefighters have been trained and equipped with the appropriate protective apparel to become involved with numerous burning houses in a residential environment the nature of those two settlements?

And what of the pathogens associated with old septic systems? Did any of the firefighters become directly exposed to systems damaged by the fire as they fought to save houses?

In conducting an early broad appreciation of the situation — if that was actually done — on which to base a suppression strategy and regularly review and update it as required, would the Incident Controller have been made aware of the failure of the Colac Otway Shire and the CFA to effectively address their statutory fire prevention responsibilities for both settlements hence their extreme vulnerability?

Would the Incident Controller also have been aware of the failure of DELWP to meet its fuel reduction burning plans for the forest between Lorne and Separation Creek, and the consequent critical need to 'pull all stops out' to extinguish the Jamieson Creek lightning strike before the wind increased later in the week?

Incident Management Arrangements

In establishing the Incident Management Team for this fire, was there 'churn' early on before an Incident Controller was settled on and if so why?

Concerning the Incident Controllers appointed to manage this fire, were they Level 3 qualified AND have the knowledge and on-the-ground forest firefighting experience required to successfully manage a forest fire in such a location as this to be able to recognise the appropriateness or otherwise of Incident Action Plans developed for his/her approval?

What arrangements, if any, were in place to assess ongoing effectiveness of Incident Action Plans and adjust accordingly?

Were there any financial, environmental or political limits imposed on the firefight?

Fuel reduction burn off

To me, it is beyond comprehension that this fire was not contained and made safe in the first couple of days.

It begs the question, was the failure to make this fire safe due to DELWP using it as an opportunity to undertake some fuel reduction burning off that had previously been denied it for 'political reasons' in the recent past?

That the forest burned so vigorously surely must question the government's statements that the forest had been to damp to fuel reduce.

Coronial investigation

To conclude, there are numerous questions around the failure to extinguish the lightning strike before it eventually took off to devastate Wye River–Separation Creek.

Towards the end of January, State Coroner, Judge Sarah Hinchey "determined that it was in the public interest to investigate the fire". Since then, nothing from Coroner Hinchey, except for a response from the Coroners Court to an inquiry from me early last week: "Unfortunately I cannot provide any time frames as to when the investigation will be complete."

Far be it from me to suggest what should be important and not so important to a Coroner setting work priorities, but given the requests for an investigation or inquiry, including one from the United Fire Fighters Union that I imagine would have known of firefighter health and safety concerns, I'm surprised that there's "no time frames as to when the investigation will be complete".

Given the time that has elapsed the evidence will be 'cold' and memories dimming, I'm beginning to wonder, was the Coroner influenced by the government — no doubt concerned over the potential for compensation claims — to give the investigation a low priority in the hope that it would go away?

Or is the Coroner the victim of a 'snow job' in the form of mountains of paper presenting the government's position?

Coronial Inquiry

As a concerned stakeholder citizen of Victoria I respectfully urge the Coroner conduct an open Inquiry and subpoena key players at all levels to give evidence and be able to be cross-examined for this shameful episode in our history to be fully transparent, if for no other reason that it must not be allowed to happen again.

Finally, there are 'key players' out there patting themselves on their backs that this was a very successful operation. On the contrary it was and is an ongoing disaster for many who put their trust in the emergency services, particularly the CFA that relies on community support to function.