Sunday 1 September 2024

The long, if not impossible, road back

“But in many minds, staying to defend your house is the Australian test of grit: it’s proof that you deserve to be living in the bush in the first place.”

Dwarfed by the 2009 Kilmore East and Murrindindi wildfires was a relatively smaller but horrifically deadly fire that occurred at Churchill in the Latrobe Valley, Victoria. Deadly in that this fire took 11 lives.

I recently came across another perspective of the fire in the form of a book: the arsonist A Mind on Fire, by Chloe Hooper, Penguin Random House Australia Pty Ltd, 2018.

I did some authenticity checking before committing to review this book and am satisfied that it’s genuinely heartfelt: a couple of relevant review comments by others:

‘A brilliant vignette in which one appalling incident illuminates a saga of social breakdown.’ Sarah Wheeler, The Times, and from the back cover

‘A gripping heart-stopping piece of true crime reportage … Deserves the widest possible audience.’ Brian Schofield, Sunday Times (UK)

Of course there are also reviews by Australians, but I chose these two given our somewhat hardened attitude to wildfire, or bushfire if you prefer, quickly forgetting and moving on to await the next occurrence having learned little.

The book basically addresses three issues: the investigating detectives; the lawyers; and the courtroom.

The author gets close to the investigating detectives assisted by a fire expert who were able to, using the effect of the fire on vegetation, determine the point of origin of the fire and its subsequent spread before the wind. Anyone looking for authoritative information on wildfire investigation would find this instructive.

The author also goes into some detail about the investigation leading to the arrest of the individual eventually convicted for lighting the two fires, including the importance of observations by locals who ultimately help lead investigating police to that individual.

The convicted fire lighter was recently released into the community.

Also in the book are accounts of personal experiences of involvement in the fire, those who were caught in the fire and some who drove into the fire to help family and friends. Some of these people would lose their lives. I found these accounts very moving and thought-provoking.

Volume 1: The Fires and the Fire-Related Deaths, 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, The Churchill Fire 17 provides official details of the circumstances of the loss of the 11 lives.

From a family preparing for the arrival of the fire:

“Throughout the afternoon, the family listen to the radio and check the websites of the Country Fire Authoity and the Department of Sustainability and Environment [now DEECA]. There are now blazes all around the state, although no specific warnings are issued for their area.”

Regardless of warnings and evacuation demands/advice issued by the emergency management agencies across Australia, some will still wish to remain with their homes.

Which brings me back to the quote at the beginning of this posting:

“But in many minds, staying to defend your house is the Australian test of grit: it’s proof that you deserve to be living in the bush in the first place.”

Causes me to wonder, are the responsible agencies ‘washing their hands’ of the community with their ‘everybody out’ approach? A long road back to restoring confidence in personal wildfire survival in a community continually subjected to what I consider to be evacuation scare tactics.

Reasonable to ask, are those agencies advocating a one-size-fits-all evacuation approach meeting the needs of those who choose to stay, in other words are those agencies fit for purpose in meeting the wildfire survival needs of the whole community?

I recommend this informative and easy to read book on a very complicated subject that should be available to borrow from the local library. Knowledge that could be life saving if it provokes curiosity in the reader.

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Tuesday 24 October 2023

Bushfire and terror

While keeping in touch with developments in the Israel-Gaza military conflict and aftermath of the Hamas raid into Southern Israel I heard a relatively brief opinion of “terror”.

I searched the web for terror-related information and finally settled on a definition in the Macquarie Dictionary, Fifth Edition:
   1. intense, sharp, overpowering fear: to be frantic with terror.
   2. a feeling, instance or cause of intense fear.

Started me thinking about meaning and forms of terror and how it may be created and used to advantage.

Within the definition there is also a reference to a political group using violence to maintain or achieve supremacy. A recent example was the activities of Hamas on the ground inside Southern Israel.

The definition of terror-stricken is relevant:
    - smitten with terror; terrified

No doubt many will have seen media coverage of people attending the music festival in Southern Israel running to escape the Hamas shooters.

As I write I'm hearing of a severe bushfire situation in Southern Queensland while the attention of our media is distracted by broader regional and economic situations affecting Australia.

This causes me to think about Australians in areas threatened by bushfire being urged to leave their homes and businesses — some Australian states, but thankfully not Victoria, have mandatory evacuation legislation.

For several years, emergency management agencies have urging people to leave for an ostensibly safer place when bushfire reaches a certain level of threat. But, are we told why?

Urged or mandatory evacuations can create risk situations where unattended properties are lost to bushfire, why, because most building fire loss is due to ember or firebrand attack!

How then is a decision made to advise voluntary or mandatory evacuation?

At one level of the Australian Fire Danger Rating System (AFDRS) people are advised to leave, then only a few minutes later informed that it’s too late to leave and to shelter in place. This must be confusing, leading to unnecessary fear in some. How do those who wish to leave to now learn that it’s too late to leave cope with this? It must be unnerving and potentially result in injury or death for some unprepared individual.

Plate 1
From an ABC story "Sixteen homes lost in Tara as Queensland bushfire emergency continues", by Scout Wallen and Laura Cocks, 26 October 2023

To the uninitiated, media coverage of bushfires in Australia can only serve to frighten. While some will argue that it's informative this ABC story is typical of the sensationalist reporting of bushfire.

The AFDRS classification “catastrophic” is a prediction of a catastrophic fire, an outcome that may never occur. Serves only to further frighten, even panic some people.

Why then did Australasian Fire Authorities Council (AFAC) decide on “catastrophic”, by definition an outcome rather than a warning such as Code Red that had previously applied in Victoria and why did emergency management decision makers in Victoria abandon Code Red?

Plate 2

Did those who settled on “catastrophic” do so through lack of knowledge of the English language or was intended to avoid agency or individual responsibility for loss by outsourcing the decision to the individual? Was there any realisation that "catastrophic" as a warning or generally in the narrative was bound to add to the level of fear of fire in the broader community?

Referring again to sensationalism in the media, Vladimir Lenin, former Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, was well aware that use of the media was critical to him in seeking to control Russia: Control the media, control the people.

Plate 3
Painting of Lenin by Isaak Brodsky (Public Domain).

Do the emergency management agencies see the sensationalist media coverage of bushfire as assisting them in seeking to control rather than support the community to withstand bushfire and minimise loss?

How does AFAC and for that matter the NEMA see their roles in the community, working in partnership with the broader community to withstand bushfire or frightening it into running?

And, what of EMA in Victoria? It’s performance to date has been miserable e.g. Loch Sport, what was learned from the Wye River and Mallacoota experiences that I would argue saw the involved communities pushed aside, leaving town protection to fire brigade units, some of which travelled long long distances involving several hours.

And, on terror, "Wallangarra resident Bryce Wells told the ABC he was scared for his life as the fire raced towards his home."
"The wind just carried it all over here … the Sun was fiery orange, I was pretty terrified," he said.

To conclude, from the above story:

"Queensland Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk praised the collaborative efforts of firefighters from two states for saving the community, after winds blew the bushfire to the edges of the town late yesterday afternoon."

Has it ever occurred to Premier Palaszczuk to question Queenslanders responsible for emergency management how fires reached this stage, again?

Once again, Australia is indebted to legions of volunteer firefighters who leave the comfort and safety of home to go chase and round up the rampaging red steer.

As always, I would welcome your feedback.

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Friday 17 February 2023

Bushfire—and what of Homeland Defence?

Plate 1

A record of the Ash Wednesday 1983 fires produced by the Herald and Weekly Times Limited shows what remained of the main street of Macedon after the impact of the 1983 fire.

Today, the 40th Anniversary of the Ash Wednesday 1983 bushfires that took so many lives in Victoria and South Australia.

Some salient recollections

On that fateful day my involvement as CFA Regional Officer in Charge Region 14 commenced at 6.00 am with a telephone call from the Group Officer, Mount Macedon Group, informing me that there was a fire in unburnt bush at Cherokee in the Macedon Ranges and that it was "burning well".

At approximately 11.30 am I was informed that the Cherokee fire was "acting up" and that an additional six tankers had been despatched and that the Forests Commission were involved at the fire. By this time the day was warming up, with an already strong north wind.

At approximately 2.30 pm I received advice from the Forests Commission, Macedon office, that there was a fire at Trentham East and shortly after from the Daylesford office that the fire was heading south into the bush. The rest is history.

Responding to the experience of the Ash Wednesday bushfires in Victoria.

In the aftermath of the 1983 fires the CFA Board finally decided to address a statutory responsibility in the Country Fire Authority Act since its inception thirty-eight years ago — finally, an officer was appointed to establish a Fire Prevention Department. In those few years following the 1983 fires I consider CFA reached its short-lived zenith as it pushed Prevention at state and local government.

In the few years following Ash Wednesday considerable emphasis was placed on Prevention, but there was a lot of catching-up required and Suppression was always dominant when it came to the allocation of resources. For those holding the purse strings, there is much more kudos associated with the allocation of firefighting vehicles.

And what did we learn from Ash Wednesday 1983?

As a learning experiences Ash Wednesday and the major fires that have followed, and as recent as the Mallacoota fire of December 2019, Victoria continues to experience bushfire losses that indicate to me that little was learned from those fires.

Bushfire loss could be significantly reduced with better community understanding of bushfire and how to survive — it should be well understood in the fire agencies that the major cause of housing loss is ember or firebrand attack.

Some will remember a fire that occurred in the Lancefield area of Victoria in early October 2015 that spread from an earlier DELWP fuel reduction burn-off. Premier Andrews was quick for the government to accept responsibility for the fire and promised compensation for people who could have done more to protect their assets.

Here is one example of a house clearly lost from the effect of fire spreading from ember or firebrand attack:

Plate 2

Plate 3

Plate 4

Plate 5

Of the photographs Plate 2 is a dwelling on the north side of Three Chain Road, Lancefield prior to the fire; Plate 3 and 4 are the remains of same dwelling after the fire — look through the trees to see the green beyond and the only shrubs burnt were abutting the dwelling; and Plate 5 was typical of the adjoining the forest that showed no sign of crown fire.

With only small patches of dead grass and fallen leaves beneath trees burning, it was obvious that unprepared buildings and rubbish down the back yard succumbed to ember or firebrand attack.

No doubt a blanket one-size-all-approach to urging people to leave their homes adds to housing loss.

Lancefield, a fire that largely due to the fickleness of the weather escaped from a fuel reduction burn a few days after it was lit.

And what of homeland defence?

From The Australian today, 16 February 2023:

"[Prime Minister] Anthony Albanese has been handed a blue print to prepare Australia for a potential war with China, recommending a rapid boost to long-range strike capabilities, the urgent acquisition of killer drones, and a major increase in the nation's naval firepower".

It's not all that long ago that the Australian Defence Force needed to come to the rescue of people in Mallacoota in the aftermath of a fire that roared out of the bush and trapped holiday makers and residents in the town. Necessary due to the failure of a government agency managing land it was responsible for so that it did not endanger people and their assets.

With our military capability to be strengthened to keep an aggressor from our shores, what about our vulnerability onshore? Poorly managed tracts of public land, such as that which overwhelmed Mallacoota, must be assessed as to the risk they pose and treated accordingly. We can't afford to have our defence force being distracted to bail out a government shirking its statutory and moral responsibilities that ultimately place us at risk of fire by an evildoer behind the lines.

As always, I would welcome your feedback.

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Wednesday 3 November 2021

Crooks, cheats, swindlers, hallmarks of the Andrews government

When I commenced this blog in 2014 it was initially intended to help people dealing with the requirements of the Bushfire Management Overlay as part of a planning permit application that based on my experience could be difficult process due to bureaucracy involved in the referrals requirements.

I soon realised that there were related issues that needed to be addressed. Unlike a government I don't have access to publicly funded spin departments, and journalists or talking heads, most of whom flit from lightbulb to lightbulb like moths and can't be relied on to dig deep on an issue e.g. management — or should I say mismanagement — of the COVID pandemic across Australia. I do my own investigative research to endeavour to expose the truth and I'm not rushing to get subscriptions or suck up to a politician of any stripe.

Since my last posting on 3 August 2020 a lot has come along to raise my concern, but I'll first confine myself to Victoria.

Part of my preparation for this posting has been to gain a better understanding of the meaning or application of certain words: crook; crooked; cheat; dishonest; fraud; honest; and swindle, according to the MACQUARIE DICTIONARY FIFTH EDITION published in 2009.

Maybe I should be a little more charitable and add "not fit for purpose" when calling out senior management and responsible Ministers.

I commenced my 13 July 2016 posting "The nature of bushfire Part 3 ... how fire moves across the land" with a discourse on a then recent visit to Berlin to learn about the rise and fall of the Wall or as the now defunct East German government or GDR named it, the "Anti-Fascist Protective Wall":

While in Berlin I also t:ok the opportunity to visit the Stasi Museum, formerly the Stasi headquarters. Stasi was the GDR's very secretive security organisation that had wives spying on husbands and vice versa, etc, etc and virtually everyone reporting on someone.

Chilling in many respects and I can relate the behaviour of the dictator Eric Honecker and his predecessors and their unelected functionaries to the behaviour of some “public servants” back home, but maybe a little more about this later. However, I imagine there are “victims” of Victoria’s Bushfire Management Overlay (BMO) and other aspects of wildfire management or I should say mismanagement in various areas of Australia, who would see some connection.

Never did I imagine that I'd see myself living behind a Wall, in fact two Walls: one around Greater Melbourne and the other around the State of Victoria, but that's what happened to Victorians for much of 2020-21.

Plate 1
Photo: Nicholson

Plate 2
Photo: Nicholson

Plate 1 shows a remnant of the Berlin Wall that divided people and set one against the other in the former East Berlin, just like in Victoria. Plate 2 a contemporary view of controlled entry into and exit from Victoria at Wodonga from the NSW side, with due respect to Victoria Police members only following the CHO's orders.

Fed up with the failure of emergency management to prevent or at least minimise loss in a number of areas on 3 August 2020 I posted "Why people die from wildfire — failure to learn and adapt" . A now very relevant extract from that posting:

COVID-19

With EMV involved with COVID-19 in Victoria, is attention also being given to planning for the next wildfire season taking into account lessons that should have been learned from the 2019/20 fires?

As I understand the role, the Emergency Management Commissioner has overall responsibility for emergency management in Victoria, be it wildfire or a dead whale that attracts sharks to a beach, which brings me to the COVID-19 pandemic.

With the EMV "Victorian action plan for influenza pandemic" published in August 2015 I find this disturbing:

1.8 Review The action plan is current at the time of publication [August 2015] and remains in effect until modified or superseded.

The action plan will be reviewed and updated every three years or sooner if it is applied in a major emergency or exercise, or if there is a change to relevant legislation or arrangements. [my emphasis]

Almost two years to the day a review is overdue. Were there no lessons to be learned from pandemics, etc e.g. Ebola that occurred elsewhere that we could have learned from? Or relevant lessons to be learned from management of wildfire in Victoria since 2009? Note that the responsible minister is Lisa Neville.

Sub-part 3.3 Consequence management is worth reading, too. Considering the scrambling to cope with rising case numbers and deaths suggests that Department of Health & Human Services Victoria has questions to answer. A deathly dereliction of duty? Note that the responsible minister is Jenny Mikakos.

Mikakos has gone, her fate described by some as having been "thrown under a bus". How long before a bus with the Honourable Lisa Neville's name on it comes along or maybe she'll live up to her Honourable title and resign, though little chance of that I suspect.

Plate 3
Photo: Nicholson

Taken at the 11th hour on 11 November 2008, the Cobbers statue at the WW1 Fromelles Memorial Park.

On the eve of Red Poppy Day in Australia, genuine Australians did not go to their deaths for a crooked government willing to do anything to remain in office in Victoria!

As always, I would welcome your feedback.

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Monday 3 August 2020

Why people die from wildfire — failure to learn and adapt

Failure to learn from past experience e.g. the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission and adapt emergency management arrangements accordingly continues to plague Victorians, most recently the 2019/20 wildfires.

Wye River-Separation Creek, Christmas 2015

And it’s not only wildfire, examples of failure to be aware of hazardous situations, take speedy appropriate remedial action and ensure it does not occur again are legion in Victoria.

Now we have the devastating COVID-19 in Australia with its ground zero in Victoria.

I understand Emergency Management Victoria was established to lead and coordinate emergency management but now question, has it failed us?

Listening to Phillip Adams on his program Late Night Live, broadcast on Radio National on 23 June 2020, interviewing John Keane about his new book The New Despotism, I increasingly likened it to what’s occurring in Australia, particularly the 2019/20 wildfires and COVID-19 virus in Victoria.

An extract from a review by LSE Review of Books:

Grand infrastructure projects remind me of railway level crossing replacement and railway tunnels in Victoria. Political capital, currently being eroded and not only in Victoria.

In my opinion the state Premiers are all despots, some worse than others and all seeking to demonstrate to their ‘subjects’ they are looking after their best interests. But whose best interests?

Balkanising of Australia

Those who offend me the most are McGowan, WA for his rudeness and Palaszczuk, Queensland generally for on her on-again-off-again fence around Queensland and apparent disregard for businesses affected. Both of them are leading the charge to Balkanise Australia by turning their subjects against other Australians, notably Victorians. They remind me of the Pied Piper leading the rats to oblivion — they appeal to the baser instincts of us humans unable to think for ourselves and see past spin.

While the rats may not literally drown as did the Piper’s rats, we should all expect to drown in a somewhat avoidable sea of health and economic disaster. No doubt in my mind that McGowan and Palaszczuk are more interested in scoring political points rather than the best interests of all Australians. True despots of the modern era and these two are not alone.

A few notable comments from the Late Night Live recording that runs for 20 minutes for those interested:
•  At approximately 3 minutes – Adams “I've seen a bit of that around in Australia"
•  At approximately 7 minutes 30 seconds – “top down systems of power”
•  At approximately 12 minutes 40 seconds – why people in lock down shop
•  At approximately 12 minutes 55 seconds – "people complain endlessly but do nothing"

A long recording but worth listening to as Keane says things that we may recognise in ourselves or those around us.

Wildfire management

Sticking with my blog commitment to better wildfire management but acknowledging the measures necessary to contain/eliminate COVID-19, whatever, how will wildfire be managed this approaching season in Victoria to avoid a Mallacoota catastrophe elsewhere? What planning is going into dealing with:
•  Reduced availability of firefighters from interstate and overseas?
•  Reduced availability of firefighting aircraft from interstate and overseas?
•  Restricted movement of ICC people across Victoria?

Evacuation

The vexed question of evacuation, a particularly important consideration given people are currently being urged to isolate in their homes and may be reluctant to leave ... some may actually get caught and die. Then there's the potential for many to protect their homes and businesses where ember attack is the main threat, particularly in towns and settlements, but this would require a shift by the fire and emergency services from their perceived ownership of the wildfire problem. From an earlier posting, "Evacuation is the easy option, we can and must do better at protecting human life."

"BANNING, Calif. — Thousands of people were under evacuation orders Sunday after a wildfire in mountains east of Los Angeles exploded in size as crews battled flames in triple-digit heat." Large scale evacuation in a US state with a record number of coronavirus deaths for one day at 30 July 2020. Source The Washington Post.

COVID-19

With EMV involved with COVID-19 in Victoria, is attention also being given to planning for the next wildfire season taking into account lessons that should have been learned from the 2019/20 fires?

As I understand the role, the Emergency Management Commissioner has overall responsibility for emergency management in Victoria, be it wildfire or a dead whale that attracts sharks to a beach, which brings me to the COVID-19 pandemic.

With the EMV "Victorian action plan for influenza pandemic" published in August 2015 I find this disturbing:

1.8 Review The action plan is current at the time of publication [August 2015] and remains in effect until modified or superseded.

The action plan will be reviewed and updated every three years or sooner if it is applied in a major emergency or exercise, or if there is a change to relevant legislation or arrangements. [my emphasis]

Almost two years to the day a review is overdue. Were there no lessons to be learned from pandemics, etc e.g. Ebola that occurred elsewhere that we could have learned from? Or relevant lessons to be learned from management of wildfire in Victoria since 2009? Note that the responsible minister is Lisa Neville.

Sub-part 3.3 Consequence management is worth reading, too. Considering the scrambling to cope with rising case numbers and deaths suggests that Department of Health & Human Services Victoria has questions to answer. A deathly dereliction of duty? Note that the responsible minister is Jenny Mikakos.

Distractions

Another distraction for EMV, the type that can take people lower on Maslow's hierarchy of needs? From The Australian, 4 August 2020 "Coronavirus: Hotel quarantine inquiry a lawyers’ picnic". Why the lawyers, do those called to appear, including EMV, have something to hide or worry that they’ll end up in a dog-eat-dog inquiry and someone may be 'thrown under a bus' by a failed responsible minister running for cover?

What then of planning for the approaching wildfire season?

Capability test, can the Emergency Management Commissioner simultaneously walk and chew gum?

As always, I would welcome your feedback.

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Monday 17 February 2020

Wildfire management in Australia — The Howitt Society formed to bring attention to the need to deal with the "here and now"

Hello all

There are groups and governments and their responsible agencies, particularly some responsible for managing public land that are either mischievously using the wildfires earlier this year to promote climate change as the reason for the fires or using it as a cover for failing to adapt to properly address fire management — see my post " "Wildfire management in Australia — how not to run a fire service", 25 January 2020.

In an endeavor to provide a forum for those with an interest a group of concerned individuals recently formed The Howitt Society .

Briefly, The Howitt Society is a group of experienced land and fire management practitioners; scientists, foresters, anthropologists, historians, and past and current stake-holders who all share one passion – caring for country. The website is our public forum on which to post information, discuss topics and stay informed on important issues regarding land management.

To my knowledge The Howitt Society is one of very few groups presenting a contrary view to those ignoring or denying the importance of fuel reduction to mitigate the effect of wildfire on social, environmental and economic values in Australia. We have a lot of catching up to do.

For those interested the Society recently launched a Facebook public group to facilitate the exchange of relevant information and ideas.

As always, I would welcome your feedback.

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Saturday 25 January 2020

Wildfire management in Australia — how not to run a fire service

Been a disturbing but interesting wildfire situation in Australia during the last few weeks.

Before going any further I must say that my criticism is of governments and departmental executive management and not firefighters on the ground who work their guts out, in some cases put their safety at risk and sadly some make the supreme sacrifice to protect life and property.

Plate 1
Grenfell Tower Fire, 4 June 2018
Photo: Daily Mail Australia

First, going overseas to put the subject of this posting in context, I'm drawn to the Grenfell Tower fire in London early on 14 June 2017, where at least 70 people lost their lives in the tower.

From the Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 Report two issues stand out to me, the contribution of fuel to the spread of fire and the performance of the London Fire Brigade. If time-poor you can listen to a video statement on the Phase 1 report by the Inquiry Chairman: Sir Martin Moore-Bick.

It took the London Fire Brigade a short few hours to get it's emergency response sorted out, but in that time at least 71 people lost their lives. And, the flammability of the cladding and other structural faults contributed to the development and spread of the fire. Sound familiar?

There's another fire service much closer to home in my case that failed in its response to major fires and neglected reducing the wildfire threat due to fuel accumulation in National Parks and government administered forests in the State of Victoria. Here, I'm referring to the Department of Environment, Water, Land and Planning , otherwise known as DELWP, Victoria.

Within DELWP is Forest Fire Management . Now, I'll draw a parallel with the London Fire Brigade prior to the Grenfell Tower fire, the LFB response took a short few hours to get its response act together, whereas DELWP took days, and months to make a meaningful response to some of those outbreaks of fire, fire spread and suppression difficulty growing accordingly.

Fuel in the form of flammable cladding was very largely responsible for the intensity and spread of the Grenfell Tower fire. There are materials testing procedures and building design requirements to prevent a Grenfell Tower situation.

There can be no doubt that the intensity and spread of wildfire in Victoria alone is due to buildup of fuel in forests and National Parks and the threat it presents.

Plate 2
Dwellings on the southern side of Cassidy Drive, Kennett River
Photo: John Nicholson

Plate 3
Opposite or north of the dwellings in Plate 2
Photo: John Nicholson

Plate 4
From Kennett Road upslope towards the dwellings in Plate 2
Photo: John Nicholson

Though Plates 2, 3 and 4 were photographed in July 2017 I have revisited the sites as recently as September 2019 and am confident that the fuel hazard remains.

FUEL

Referring to the fire triangle (above), in both structural fire and wildfire environments the availability of fuel is the major contributor to fire intensity and spread. For wildfire, there is really only one practical and effective treatment, reduce the fuel!

Stay tuned.

As always, I would welcome your feedback.

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