Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — lightning strike and what to look for

My blog posting of 20 March 2017 "Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — in pursuit of the truth" includes a photograph showing the area where I believe the lightning struck. Included in the paragraph preceding the photograph is the following:

Note the large burnt stump visible at left in the photograph.

My objective was to illustrate that there was nothing difficult about the terrain in the general area of the lightning strike that would have prevented physically fit, experienced and safety conscious DELWP firefighters and also that the vegetation was not too dense to prevent effective use of suitable and properly tasked water bombing aircraft.

I've been seeking advice on lightning strikes and what to look for to be as sure of my facts as possible and provide the following examples, and there are many more, of what I've studied:

"Science Made Simple" that includes an informative video of the details of a lightning strike.

"National Geographic on Lightning" with another informative video.

Concerning the Jamieson Creek lightning strike, I find the following in the National Geographic discourse describes the situation found that I alluded to with my reference to the "large burnt stump":

Lightning's extreme heat will vaporize the water inside a tree, creating steam that may blow the tree apart.

This is the remains of the tree that I believe took the brunt of the lightning strike.

Plate 1

The burnt stump shown at left in the first photograph in this posting is at left in Plate 1. The fallen tree in the centre has separated from the stump. The damaged stump in the centre appears to have been damaged by the fallen tree to its left.

Note the severe burn isolated to the lower part of the tree. This deep, small area of burning is consistent with the intense heat from a lightning strike at or near the base of the erect living tree—lightning does not necessarily strike the top of a tree, it all depends on where the upwards moving positive charge “streamer” emanates from, and it could even be the ground alongside a tree or an isolated rocky outcrop.

Plate 2

Plate 2 is another view of the stump and its fallen top as indicated.

Plate 3

Plate 4

Plates 3 and 4 show the stump. Note the depth of the charring, particularly concentrated at the left side of the stump.

Plate 3 also shows the damage caused by a violent separation of the tree from the stump, almost as if the result an explosion.

Back to the tree; it was a living gum—EVC 201:Shrubby Wet Forest from Biodiversity Interactive Map - 3.2 indicates Mountain Grey Gum Eucalyptus cypellocarpa and checking Leon Costerman’s Native Trees and Shrubs of South-Eastern Australia satisfies me—containing moisture that would have required far more and prolonged exposure to heat of a level that's not associated with a fire moving across the ground to produce a burn of this depth.

I suspect it was a relatively mild fire for those first couple of day, as logs and larger stumps already on the ground in the area had suffered little more than superficial charring, as Plates 5, 6, 7 and 8 show.

Plate 5

Plate 6

Plate 7

Plate 8

An explanation for the seemingly burnt trees. Scattered within the area are Messmate Stringybark Eucalyptus obliqua that account for a few trees with blackened trunks, which is due to the fibrous bark but not the trunks burning. Plate 9 is an example of Messmate Stringybark from the Christmas Hills area.

Plate 9

Costerman describes the bark of the Mountain Grey Gum as:

Smooth, grey often with yellow and whitish patches, sheds [bark] in strips or plates; may be rough and darker at base.

Plate 10 shows the relatively easily ignitable roughness at the base of a Mountain Grey Gum (or very similar) and becoming plates or strips further up the trunk. Sufficiently dry and standing off from the trunk can see fire extend further up the trunk to involve this bark without igniting the trunk. The arrows indicate examples of the stages of bark from the ground up.

Plate 10

Plates 11 and 12 show the unburnt vegetation to the west and on the opposite side of the control line from the fire area, photographed at similar level to the lightning strike. 

Plate 12 shows bark renewing itself on Stringybarks following much earlier exposure to fire.  

Plate 11

Plate 12

Photos in this and recent postings show that there was nothing difficult about the area for fit and experienced DELWP firefighters to round up the initially small fire in the first couple of days, and to argue that the vegetation was to dense to respond to proper air attack is arrant nonsense if DELWP's use of water bombing aircraft in Gippsland in recent days is any guide.

The annotated Google Earth photo shows the way to where I believe the lightning struck: Position 11. Not difficult to find nor hard to reach on the ground, but always with an eye upwards at the trees above. And approximately 250 metres from a well-formed four wheel drive track.

Why then the failure to slay the Jamieson Creek beast in its infancy?

On page 27, third paragraph under the heading "Initial fire control strategy 19–21 December", in the "IGEM's Review of the initial response ..."

Through the period 19 to late 21 December, the IC's [Incident Controller] broad strategy was to establish bare earth containment lines to limit the fire's spread within the area bounded by the Cumberland Track to the north, and Jamieson Track to the south.

As can be seen in the following annotated Google Earth photo, the area of land between Cumberland Track and Jamieson Track is huge compared to the size of the fire on 19 December.

Why this plan so early and probably before the Incident Control Team really knew what they had to contend with?

Inexperience, incompetence, panic, interference from above, budget restraint or was the Incident Controller 'marching to the beat of a different drummer' — sign found at the corner of Curtis Track and Cumberland Track on 9 January 2017?

Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — some personal agony

This time something different, a couple of personal accounts of the Wye River–Separation Creek Christmas 2015 bushfire and its aftermath.

The first an illustrated "story in rhyme" from Peter Jabobs, many years a permanent resident. Much food for thought here.

And the following sent to me by Andrey in response to my posting of Monday, 20 March 2017 with the important part reproduced verbatim except for the asterisks:

Your experience, analysis, and persistence in providing this information is the only relief I can embrace in the ongoing misery that sees me leaving my Wye River home of 15 years.

I can't afford to rebuild and adding insult to injury, I'm forced to spend tens of thousands of dollars on a "minor work order" to stabilise my land against erosion and slippage. This is money I don't have, nor will ever recoup. Alas, it is only money. What is more important is the subsequent breakdown of my relationship with my partner/kids and general well-being.

Whilst I realise it may be human nature to want to blame others for one's misfortune that will not return the life I had. I believe in being accountable for my actions and hope that lessons shall be learnt from this debacle.

The information you provide rekindles the thoughts and feelings I had very soon after that black christmas day, the same thoughts and feelings that ******* so expertly managed to politicise in the aftermath.

I know Peter Jacobs and am very happy to air his "rhyme". Andrey I do not know personally, but am satisfied that his is from the heart. I imagine there are many similar stories out there.

Finally, this posting is not about self-promotion but providing a platform for a few people to tell their stories—some of which I find heart-rending—people who unlike the government and its agencies can't whistle up the media whenever they choose.

Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — in pursuit of the truth

Continuing on from my 21 February posting "Jamieson Creek – a questionable first response to a lightning strike at the height of the summer bushfire threat" and the Inspector General for Emergency Management's response to a request from then Minister for Emergency Services Garrett to "report on the learnings to date from the Wye River - Jamieson Creek Track (sic) fire".

In pursuing the truth about a fire that's caused and continues to cause so much despair, disruption and cost to individuals and the public purse within and beyond Wye River–Separation Creek, to echo Minister Garett, "what are the learnings from this fire"?

Surely an important matter is how the Emergency Management Commissioner and DELWP decide on "inaccessibility" when it comes to fighting a fire in a forest.

In my blog posting of 3 February 2017 "Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — fake news and alternative facts at play?" I provided information to support my contesting the "assertions of the Emergency Management Commissioner and Inspector-General for Emergency Management (IGEM) that the lightning strike that impacted just south of Jamieson Creek was ʻextremely difficult to accessʼ and arguing that the vegetation was too dense to respond to the efforts of firebombing aircraft".

Included in that posting are a series of photographs taken on driving into what I then considered was in close proximity to where the lightning strike reached the ground on 19 December 2015 and demonstrating by my presence that the area would not have been difficult nor too dangerous for fit and experienced DELWP firefighters.

Also in the posting are an extract from the 1:30 000 Vicmap Topographic Map of the area and other relevant maps and drawings:

Having finished exploring further east along the bulldozed track from where my vehicle was parked, I then went back to explore what lay down the trail indicated by the sign painted on the tree below.

As I walked down the trail it seemed soon to become a hand-made control line that would have been taken down to "mineral earth" or bare ground. The objective of the control line would have been to prevent the spread of a surface fire or be used as a base for burning out the grass, leaves and twigs: surface fine fuel between the fire edge and control line. It's the surface fine fuel that normally carries the fire front.

The control line would have been constructed as close to the fire edge as safely possible to minimise the size of the fire.

From my walk down the trail I recorded a few points with my GPS and took photographs. Concerning the GPS recordings, it's important to understand that the forest canopy and positions recorded increasingly further down the northern slope probably shielded some of the satellites able to be read, which will result in a reduced accuracy of the recordings. Nevertheless, I’m satisfied that they are sufficiently close for my purposes.

Following is an annotated Google Earth photo with Positions 6, 7, 8, and 9 that I’m confident mark the bulldozed that becomes the hand constructed control line put in place early, probably 19 and early on the 20th. Positions 10 and 11 are inside the fire edge east of the control line. I consider Position 11 is the approximate location of the lightning strike. More about this later.

Next, part of the 1:30 000 topographical map where I have located Position 11 from my GPS recording. Position 1 is where I parked my motor vehicle Position 2 is the location of the sign on the tree pointing to the hand trail (above.

Now a few photographs down the control line. The first is near the head of the control line and close Position 2 on the map. The fire area is to the right of the line. The second is further down the control line. The uninvolved area is to the left of the line. Important to understand that when the line was constructed it would have been cleared to “mineral earth” (bare ground).

Next, a view of the fire area east of the control line part way down towards position 9 on the Google Earth photo.

And further into the burnt area from the immediately preceding photograph.

Another view similar to the preceding photograph inside the fire area as I made my way to Positions 10 and 11 from Position 9 on the Google Earth photo and eventually back to Position 2.

On fire behaviour on the 19th and probably the 20th, the three preceding photographs show unburnt heavier fuels laying on the ground, much of which was in place before the fire. This indicates to me that the fire was not all that hot and it just “trickled” around, probably not all that affected by wind experienced that far downslope.

Finally, a photograph towards the northeast across the area where I feel the lighting strike occurred. Note the large burnt stump visible at left in the photograph.

And, on accessibility and density of vegetation working against effective fire attack while the fire was still small, my photographs don’t seem to support the assertion that the lightning strike that impacted just south of Jamieson Creek was "extremely difficult to access" and argued that the vegetation was too dense to respond to the efforts of firebombing aircraft. But you be the judge, I have my opinion.

Photo from SBS

As we shall see later, the fire eventually became enormous and ultimately led to the Wye River–Separation Creek catastrophe.

Don't be misled by the "spinners" folks, regardless of where and how the fire that caused that catastrophe came from on Christmas Day, it was the failure to quickly control and extinguish the fire caused by the lightning strike during those first few hours that was the underlying cause of what is now the Wye River–Separation Creek misery.

The Quadrant story A Tale of Two Fires by Mark Poynter provides a different view to those expressed by the IGEM and the Emergency Management Commissioner. You can decide for yourselves on who is most qualified.

Finally for now, the penultimate paragraph in Minister Garrett’s request to the IGEM:

I understand that you and your staff were in attendance at this fire over a number of days conducting monitoring and evaluation functions as part of your legislative role and that a number of observations were made relative to those issues listed above.

Is this statement correct? Does the IGEM have people at the fires currently burning in National Park west of Dargo in eastern Victoria, and further east in National Park at Wulgulmerang? Does the IGEM have people appropriately qualified and experienced to undertake such important work?

There are important matters that should be pursued by the Coroner, if she ever gets around to it. For example are there still people in critical fire management positions who should have been removed?

Will it eventually be found that Minister Garrett and the people of Victoria have been misled?