Plate 2 shows the fires of 17–18 March 2018 in the Western District, Victoria, as shown on the Vic Emergency notification web site as at 1326 hrs on 20 March 2018.
Who then is responsible for the loss and inconvenience due to the peat fires near Cobrico and other fires in Western Victoria and might they have been avoided?
Cost Effective Fire Management
First, some important history.
The Country Fire Authority or CFA has its origin in the Stretton Report into the 1939 fires with many of Judge Stretton's recommendations forming the basis of the first Country Fire Authority Act 5040 1944.
As did Stretton, the government of the day clearly viewed prevention as important as fire suppression or response, as can be seen in the Second Reading for the proposed CFA Act 5040 to establish the CFA, including the following important inspectorial function:
Section 45 It shall be the duty of every Regional Officer, subject to the general direction and control of the Authority and the Chief Officer of rural brigades, to inspect regularly all rural districts within his region to ascertain whether the provisions of this Act are being properly and efficiently carried out and administered therein and to report to the Authority thereon at such times as are prescribed or as the Authority directs, and for the purposes of any such inspection any such Regional Officer may enter into and upon any land or premises whatever within any such rural district.
As the embryonic CFA began to find its feet and the initial urban and rural arms were amalgamated to create one CFA, the principal Act by then 6228 of 1958, and section 45 now section 44, was amended by Act 6956 December 1962 as follows:
12. (1) In section forty-four of the Principal Act— (a) for the words "all rural districts" there shall be substituted the words "all rural and urban districts "; and (6) for the words "rural district" there shall be substituted the words "rural or turban district".
Section 44 imposed a very significant responsibility on officers in charge of fire control regions as it was the first step in bringing fire prevention ‘concerns’ to the attention of the CFA Board and eventually the government for remedy, as envisaged by Judge Stretton.
In January and February 1977 several major wildfires occurred in Victoria, the worst being on 12 February and known as:
1 Creswick fire
2 Glenthompson fire ... also known as the Strathmore fire
3 Merino fire
4 North Byaduk fire
5 Penshurst fire
6 Tatyoon/Streatham fire
7 The Pura Pura fire
8 The Beeac fire
9 The Cressy fire
10 The Lismore fire
11 The Waubra fire
12 The Balliang East/Little River fire
These fires became the subject of a government appointed board of inquiry into the occurrence of bush and grass fires in Victoria conducted by Sir Edward Hamilton Esler Barber, Q.C., former Judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria.
Of these the twelve fires, nine were caused primarily by a fault or failure of electrical equipment controlled by the SEC.
Of the nine fires in which electrical fault was the primary cause, five of them also involve the responsibility of other individuals or organisations — that is to say, the Glenthompson, Tatyoon/Streatham, Lismore, Waubra and Pura Pura fires. In regard to the fires at Merino, Beeac, Cressy and Balliang East, it is difficult to see that there is any responsibility other than that of of the SEC.”
The causes could generally be categorised as conductors or cables in contact with trees, fallen conductors and drop out hot fuse ends igniting dry vegetation on the ground.
Of the section 44 CFA Act inspection and reporting responsibilities of CFA Regional Officers, Barber had this to say:
It is clear that the regional officers in a number of regions which the Board investigated, failed to make a regular inspection as required by section 44 of the Act. And further that “this inspection has not been carried out on any systematic basis.
As the officers moved about on their normal duties, they automatically observed fire hazards which happened to become visible to them and no doubt, from time to time, inspected particular hazards brought to their attention by brigade captains or private individuals.
This however, was the limit of inspection. Not even the roads in the region were systematically inspected and this led to the existence of hazards which were dangerous as possible ignition points and made the roads useless as firebreaks.
The evidence of all the officers concerned was that this failure to carry out regular inspections on a systematic basis was due to lack of available time because of the pressure of other duties. For example, the regional officer of region 16 deposed that his residence was at the regional office, that he was available by telephone 24 hours a day and that he normally worked a 72 hour working week, for which no overtime is paid. There is no reason to doubt that this is correct or to feel that it is atypical of the usual situation in other regions.
Another officer in evidence said that to carry out the correct inspection required by the Act was "physically impossible".
Accepting this, it nevertheless remains that such an inspection, specifically required by section 44, is essential so that fire hazards may be detected and dealt with. [my emphasis]
There can be no doubt that the failure must have been known to the CFA command and to permit this state of affairs to continue constitutes a serious error.
The answer that lack of finance precludes additional staff and that there are insufficient trained personnel available may be an excuse for the past, but must be the subject of energetic reform for the future.
During the course of the Inquiry some “reform” commenced with the Commission (SEC), with the cooperation of the CFA, would welcome advice from local representatives of the CFA concerning any situation where SEC installations were a potential source of ignition of fires.
All CFA Assistant Chief Officers and Regional Officers were informed by letter of these new cooperative arrangements by the CFA Chief Officer Arthur Pitfield and that Regional Officers were to advise the volunteers to contact the local SEC district office or if there is difficulty, to advise the Regional Officer.
Barber commented further:
There is very little evidence, if any, to suggest that since 1969 to the present time, CFA officers made the necessary observations of SEC lines or, if they did, communicated with the local offices of the SEC seeking to have hazards removed.
Having regard to the fact that the SEC and the CFA were rightly subjected to criticism after the 1969 fires and that both organisations were well aware from that time of the danger, this omission is inexplicable and is something for which, in the first place, the CFA is to be censured. [my emphasis]
Considering the action taken following the release of Barber's report and recommendations, clearly CFA felt chastened by his censure of its poor fire prevention performance.
Enough for now with more to follow including the eventual fate of section 44, but bells already ringing for anyone yet?
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Reading with much interest.
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