Community lifelines and Telstra: outage due to lightning strike, true or false?

In emergency management jargon, "lifelines" are services or infrastructure essential to community well-being, such as the supply of electricity, water supplies, main transport corridors and telephonic communications and I would certainly include the emergency call facility Triple Zero (000).

My blog posting , "Wildfires caused by the electrical distribution system ... why?", 14 April 2018, was principally about the failure of electric supply in parts of Western Victoria that also caused fires resulting in serious loss in the community, particularly by those people directly impacted and why that was allowed to occur. My analysis of media photographs reveals that three (3) high voltage conductors were involved — see Plate 1 below.

Plate 1

Photo ABC News 22 March 2018

The size of the insulators on a steel cross arm is consistent with a 22,000 volt feeder line serving communities on a broad scale. So many people rely on electricity for many different purposes, and in recent times to maintain telephone services now supplied by the NBN where a supply of electric power to the modem is essential.

The electricity distribution network is clearly a "lifeline" for the community!

Telstra and the Triple Zero emergency call facility

Following the recent partial failure of the Triple Zero (000) emergency call facility and other services, I did some sleuthing to determine for myself if we were being told the full truth about the cause of damage to fibre optic cable between Bowral and Orange, NSW.

This video clip from the ABC News story posted below shows fire confined to the roadside, a remarkable aftermath of a lightning strike.

Quote: "The telco later tweeted a photo of the cable pit, between Bowral and Orange, which it said had "significant fire damage consistent with lightning strike".

But Telstra chief executive Andy Penn said he could not guarantee that was the case. According to the Bureau of Meteorology, the closest lightning strike at the time was about 200km west of Orange — 200 kilometres west of Orange!

Then, "All of our evidence suggests it is a lightning strike," Mr Penn said.

"There is physical damage and fire damage to the particular pit where the actual cable is, but obviously we can't prove that."

The ABC News story "Government to investigate Telstra triple-0 outage after emergency calls go unanswered", 4 May 2018, quoting the Telstra CEO.

The video posted above is very informative ... look closely, preferably on a large desktop screen, for a lightning strike there seems to be little damage to the pit and the cable consistent with the power of a lightning strike such as that which damaged the tree at the start of the Wye River-Separation Creek fire — Plates 2 and 3.

Plate 2

Plate 3

And, why would lightning seek out a fibre optic cable that from my research, and I stand to be corrected, has no metal in the cable, yet ignore the metal post indicators except for signs that they had been scorched by the burning grass around them?

Plate 4 Twitter: Telstra News

Or was it a case of the pit cover not being in place and a plastic cable joint cover was exposed to fire in the grass, and was heated to the point when it melted/burned exposing a cable joint?

To me, it seems innocuous roadside fuel reduction where the burning had confined to the road reserve, but concealed within the long grass was there an exposed cable joint? Begs the question, did the length of the burn cross other pits where the cable remained unscathed?

Surely this raises the question, how many other Telstra cable pits or related infrastructure are vulnerable to fire or other damaging influence? Here’s one:

Plate 5 Broken Telstra pillar exposing soft cable

Plate 6 Viewing this on a large screen will reveal the cable already
damaged where it rests against the broken metal edge

Plate 7 Unprotected conduit leading into the nearby cable pit

Plates 5, 6 and 7 were taken early in May this year in Sunbury Township with the situation clearly visible at the side of a main road and has been this way for months. If it is redundant then it should have been removed, but given it's one — Plate 8 — on a line further along that side of the road serving a large residential area I suspect it is still in service.

Plate 8

Particularly for Victorians, we should be aware of the potential vulnerability of "lifelines", with the recent failure of the electrical distribution in Western Victoria a prime example and bring to the attention of those with responsibility for monitoring the state of "lifelines" situations that should be a cause for concern.

This ought to be a concern for governments at every level, as not only Triple Zero is vulnerable, but possibly some cables feeding cellular telephone towers are vulnerable, too. Then there are fire alarms and people relying on personal medical alert systems.

Emergency Management Act 2013

Emergency Management Act 2013 No 73 of 2013 Part 7A - Critical infrastructure resilience Section 74C defines essential services. However, given the increasing reliance on various forms of communications, including the delivery of NBN by cable, the legislated definition needs amending to include "telephony and data transmission".

For those interested in accountability and resilience in emergency management the whole of Parts 7 and 7A Emergency Management Act 2013 is enlightening reading.

More paid firefighters and water bombing aircraft can only respond to fires and won't prevent pre-response damage to some essential infrastructure, such as the fibre optic cable mentioned above — what is needed is much more emphasis on PREVENTION and community involvement. That's a major step towards modernising a fire service!

Wildfires caused by the electrical distribution system ... why?

In my blog posting “Western District fires — history repeats itself, again”, Monday 19 March 2018, I mentioned the old adage "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" and that we’d experienced the outbreak of fires in virtually the same locations, at least one due to a failure of the electrical distribution system on Ash Wednesday 1983.

Plate 1

Photo The Australian 5 April 2018

By the time we are done milking at night we have to go to Terang and get our carbon monoxide levels tested.

Plate 2 shows the fires of 17–18 March 2018 in the Western District, Victoria, as shown on the Vic Emergency notification web site as at 1326 hrs on 20 March 2018.

Plate 2

Who then is responsible for the loss and inconvenience due to the peat fires near Cobrico and other fires in Western Victoria and might they have been avoided?

Cost Effective Fire Management

First, some important history.

The Country Fire Authority or CFA has its origin in the Stretton Report into the 1939 fires with many of Judge Stretton's recommendations forming the basis of the first Country Fire Authority Act 5040 1944.

As did Stretton, the government of the day clearly viewed prevention as important as fire suppression or response, as can be seen in the Second Reading for the proposed CFA Act 5040 to establish the CFA, including the following important inspectorial function:

Section 45 It shall be the duty of every Regional Officer, subject to the general direction and control of the Authority and the Chief Officer of rural brigades, to inspect regularly all rural districts within his region to ascertain whether the provisions of this Act are being properly and efficiently carried out and administered therein and to report to the Authority thereon at such times as are prescribed or as the Authority directs, and for the purposes of any such inspection any such Regional Officer may enter into and upon any land or premises whatever within any such rural district.

As the embryonic CFA began to find its feet and the initial urban and rural arms were amalgamated to create one CFA, the principal Act by then 6228 of 1958, and section 45 now section 44, was amended by Act 6956 December 1962 as follows:

12. (1) In section forty-four of the Principal Act— (a) for the words "all rural districts" there shall be substituted the words "all rural and urban districts "; and (6) for the words "rural district" there shall be substituted the words "rural or turban district".

Section 44 imposed a very significant responsibility on officers in charge of fire control regions as it was the first step in bringing fire prevention ‘concerns’ to the attention of the CFA Board and eventually the government for remedy, as envisaged by Judge Stretton.

In January and February 1977 several major wildfires occurred in Victoria, the worst being on 12 February and known as:

    1   Creswick fire
    2   Glenthompson fire ... also known as the Strathmore fire
    3   Merino fire
    4   North Byaduk fire
    5   Penshurst fire
    6   Tatyoon/Streatham fire
    7   The Pura Pura fire
    8   The Beeac fire
    9   The Cressy fire
  10   The Lismore fire
  11   The Waubra fire
  12   The Balliang East/Little River fire

These fires became the subject of a government appointed board of inquiry into the occurrence of bush and grass fires in Victoria conducted by Sir Edward Hamilton Esler Barber, Q.C., former Judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria.

From Barber’s report:

Of these the twelve fires, nine were caused primarily by a fault or failure of electrical equipment controlled by the SEC.

Of the nine fires in which electrical fault was the primary cause, five of them also involve the responsibility of other individuals or organisations — that is to say, the Glenthompson, Tatyoon/Streatham, Lismore, Waubra and Pura Pura fires. In regard to the fires at Merino, Beeac, Cressy and Balliang East, it is difficult to see that there is any responsibility other than that of of the SEC.”

The causes could generally be categorised as conductors or cables in contact with trees, fallen conductors and drop out hot fuse ends igniting dry vegetation on the ground.

Of the section 44 CFA Act inspection and reporting responsibilities of CFA Regional Officers, Barber had this to say:

It is clear that the regional officers in a number of regions which the Board investigated, failed to make a regular inspection as required by section 44 of the Act. And further that “this inspection has not been carried out on any systematic basis.

As the officers moved about on their normal duties, they automatically observed fire hazards which happened to become visible to them and no doubt, from time to time, inspected particular hazards brought to their attention by brigade captains or private individuals.

This however, was the limit of inspection. Not even the roads in the region were systematically inspected and this led to the existence of hazards which were dangerous as possible ignition points and made the roads useless as firebreaks.

The evidence of all the officers concerned was that this failure to carry out regular inspections on a systematic basis was due to lack of available time because of the pressure of other duties. For example, the regional officer of region 16 deposed that his residence was at the regional office, that he was available by telephone 24 hours a day and that he normally worked a 72 hour working week, for which no overtime is paid. There is no reason to doubt that this is correct or to feel that it is atypical of the usual situation in other regions.

Another officer in evidence said that to carry out the correct inspection required by the Act was "physically impossible".

Accepting this, it nevertheless remains that such an inspection, specifically required by section 44, is essential so that fire hazards may be detected and dealt with. [my emphasis]

There can be no doubt that the failure must have been known to the CFA command and to permit this state of affairs to continue constitutes a serious error.

The answer that lack of finance precludes additional staff and that there are insufficient trained personnel available may be an excuse for the past, but must be the subject of energetic reform for the future.

During the course of the Inquiry some “reform” commenced with the Commission (SEC), with the cooperation of the CFA, would welcome advice from local representatives of the CFA concerning any situation where SEC installations were a potential source of ignition of fires.

All CFA Assistant Chief Officers and Regional Officers were informed by letter of these new cooperative arrangements by the CFA Chief Officer Arthur Pitfield and that Regional Officers were to advise the volunteers to contact the local SEC district office or if there is difficulty, to advise the Regional Officer.

Barber commented further:

So far so good. Unfortunately, the evidence is quite clear that this letter was never followed up by the Chief Officer to ensure that the instructions contained in it were being carried out. In fact, they were not.

There is very little evidence, if any, to suggest that since 1969 to the present time, CFA officers made the necessary observations of SEC lines or, if they did, communicated with the local offices of the SEC seeking to have hazards removed.

Having regard to the fact that the SEC and the CFA were rightly subjected to criticism after the 1969 fires and that both organisations were well aware from that time of the danger, this omission is inexplicable and is something for which, in the first place, the CFA is to be censured. [my emphasis]

Considering the action taken following the release of Barber's report and recommendations, clearly CFA felt chastened by his censure of its poor fire prevention performance.

Enough for now with more to follow including the eventual fate of section 44, but bells already ringing for anyone yet?

Note that the coloured text indicates URLs to be clicked on.

The demise of good management of public land in Victoria — a glimpse of the goings-on in the back offices of government

Right now there is a fire known as the Tamboritha–Dingo Hill Track fire burning east of the Caledonia River in the Alpine National Park and has been burning since at least 28 February 2018. The southern end of the fire area is approximately 17 kilometres north of north-east of Licola.

I first became aware of the fire early on 28 February 2018 and posted the following at 1045 hrs on my Facebook account, "Caledonia area - a fire to watch in weather conditions such as today in remote and rugged mountain country when wind may limit/prevent water/retardant bombing by aircraft when most required." Later that day wind and slope affected the fire and it "took off".

Burning in very rugged and largely inaccessible terrain—in my youth did some bushwalking in this country and as recent as 19–20 January was relatively nearby in a 4 wheel drive—with very high fuel loads, making suppression very difficult. High fuel loads due to regrowth from severe fires in this area in the last 10 years.

The following were taken from the Emergency Victoria notifications web site at 0847 hrs on 20 March 2018. The fire was then in excess of 7,000 hectares.

Why the high fuel loads? Difficulties encountered by forest managers gaining approvals to undertake fuel reduction burning?

Here, I'm reminded of Premier Andrews, following the late 2015 Lancefield fire abandoning the recommendation of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission:

The State fund and commit to implementing a long-term program of prescribed burning based on an annual rolling target of 5 percent minimum of public land.

What replaced that target? I remember government utterances that a risk-based approach would determine future fuel reduction on public land. I'll come back to this, but for the remainder of this posting I'll relate a personal experience that I consider relevant.

I was recently engaged by a community group to vet a government proposal that directly affected people who are very concerned that it will increase the fire danger to their community.

On commencing I discovered an attitude within Parks Victoria/Department of Environment Land Water and Planning (DELWP) suggesting to me that the 'green' influence is strong in the 'backroom' with little or no regard for the broader community when it comes to community safety.

This is the report on the work I did for Yarra Waterways Group and the Executive Summary follows:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This executive summary is largely a critique of papers put forward by the government in support of a proposal to afforest Haining Farm adjacent to the Don Valley residential estate, ostensibly founded on an assertion that the bushfire threat will not be increased, and consideration of related matters sourced by me.

The assertion that the bushfire threat will not increase seems to be based on the results of the application of a bushfire behaviour model that predicts probability of house loss: PHOENIX RapidFire. Unfortunately, vegetation or bushfire fuel loads that is species and concentrations were not available from Parks Victoria/DELWP, the principal proponents of the afforestation of Haining Farm, when this report was finalised. And, I understand from Yarra Waterways Group, the project owner, it was not for want of requesting this information.

A questionable feature of the bushfire risk assessment is the uniform percentage housing loss across a relatively large study area, questionable because it seems not to take account of what could only be an increase in bushfire fuel load given a Greening Australia statement that “over 315,000 trees and shrubs will be planted next year [2018], along with 100 different types of understory plants …” [Greening Australia says 59 hectares]

Given the lack of information available on vegetation species and planting concentrations proposed for the afforestation — and data used in the PHOENIX RapidFire modeling (?) — I consider a statement from one of the independent experts supporting the proposal incredible: “I do not consider the revegetation on Haining Farm to significantly change the bushfire risk in the Yarra Valley around Don Valley”.

Also questionable is the factoring in of emergency response firefighting resources, including firebombing aircraft, as integral to reducing any bushfire threat associated with the afforestation. Anyone with a real knowledge of bushfire occurrence, suppression difficulty and concentration of such resources according to the risk exposures will know that this is a promise that may not be able to be delivered when most required. Passive protection rather than reliance on emergency response should be the focus of Parks Victoria/DELWP, particularly with the exposed Don Valley residential estate adjoining to the east.

Minimising the bushfire threat posed to the adjoining residential estate is critical to minimising the potential for loss of homes, and in this case a school, due to the government’s urging the “go early” approach on the community that leaves homes without people available to deal with ember attack to supplement any fire brigade attendance.

When researching current bushfire protection arrangements for the Don Valley residential estate I was disturbed to find that there was no current Yarra Ranges Municipal Fire Prevention Plan according to section 55A Country Fire Authority Act 1958. I’ve heard of excuses that section 55A has been overridden by the Emergency Management Act or that is to occur. However, section 55A remains in the Country Fire Authority Act and I cannot imagine the Office of the Chief Parliamentary Counsel Victoria allowing any conflict between Acts to remain, and to my knowledge other forms of instruction or advice do not override an Act of parliament.

From within the papers perused I have extracted the primary objectives for bushfire management on public land, including the statement “human life will be afforded priority over all other considerations”.

Having experienced the aftermath of several major bushfires, particularly the Trentham East–Macedon fire of Ash Wednesday 1983, Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires of 2009 and the Wye River–Separation Creek fire of 2015, it is reasonable to comment that very many people were hurt emotionally and/or financially through loss of homes, important and valuable possessions, including tools of trade, devastating to those affected — human life must be viewed more widely than just life loss or injury due to being caught in a fire.

Finally, the protection of the Helmeted Honeyeater and Leadbeater’s Possum should be able to be achieved without increasing the bushfire threat to the Don Valley residential estate and beyond.

And, harking back to the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, what's happening with this recommendation:

The Department of Sustainability and Environment [now Parks Victoria/DELWP] report annually on prescribed burning outcomes in a manner that meets public accountability objectives, including publishing details of targets, area burnt, funds expended on the program and impacts on biodiversity.

Finally, most concerning should be the failure to involve the residents directly affected in the planning and implementation of the Haining Farm proposal. Unfortunately, an omission not unique in Victoria.

Note that the coloured text indicates URLs to be clicked on.

Western District fires — history repeats itself, again

There's an old saying "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it", George Santayana.

This posting is a work in progress before I advertise its presence.

The fires of this last weekend 17–18 March 2018 in the Western District, Victoria, as shown on the Vic Emergency notification web site as at 1326 hrs on 20 March 2018.

We've been here before, notably Ash Wednesday 1983.

What did we learn? A lot from CFA's investigation of the major fires including Cudgee–Ballangeich and more about this as I develop this posting. Maybe it's more about what we've forgotten or has not been passed down through the years since.

Meantime, I'm happy to take any comments that may assist in developing this posting.

Note that the coloured text indicates URLs to be clicked on.

Bushfire threat - the cost of leaving before the fire. Part 2

Referring to my posting last Wednesday, 3 January, as of 4.30 PM this afternoon BOM is holding to its prediction for Saturday:

Weather Situation

A high pressure system over the Tasman Sea will move slowly eastwards today as a cold front enters the Bight. The front will move rapidly eastwards on Saturday, reaching the far southwest of the State during the early afternoon, central districts during the evening then weaken over the far northeast during the early hours of Sunday. A high pressure ridge will extend across Victoria during Sunday, while a low pressure trough develops over New South Wales. The trough will extend over northeastern Victoria on Monday while a high pressure system develops over the Bight. The trough will move away to the east on Tuesday as the high moves across Tasmania.

Forecast

Very hot and sunny with fresh and gusty north to northwesterly winds. A squally southwesterly cool change developing in the west in the afternoon reaching the central districts during the evening. Isolated showers possible over the southwest following the change. Areas of raised dust possible over the northwest near and following the change. "Early morning fog in Gippsland. Very hot and sunny with fresh and gusty north to northwesterly winds. A squally southwesterly cool change developing over the southwest during the afternoon, reaching central districts during the evening. Isolated showers possible over the southwest at night. Areas of raised dust possible over central and western districts near and following the change.

Fire Danger - Extreme in the west grading to Very High in the east.

And a fire weather warning has been issued by BOM.

Total Fire Ban

Acknowledging the BOM prediction a total fire ban is in force for the whole of Victoria for Saturday, 6 January 2018.

Will history be revisited tomorrow ... 6 January is two days short of the forty-eighth anniversary of the January 1969 fires in Western Victoria, including Lara where 17 people lost their lives due to being caught in a bushfire on the Melbourne–Geelong Freeway?

Since 1969 Victoria has come a long way with the management of bushfire and advice to the public, but as individuals we still need to exercise exceptional situational awareness when it comes to how we will deal with an outbreak of bushfire in our area.

Whether to leave early or stay to defend our homes and other important assets

By now those who follow my postings will be aware that I'm strongly opposed to the one-size-fits-all "leave early policy" — see my 12 January 2015 post — as it leads to the loss of homes and businesses that could be saved if someone was in attendance to deal with ember attack.

Ember Attack

In my posting of 16 April 2016 I explain ember attack and the role of firebrands in spreading bushfire. Very recent examples of the devastating effect of ember attack were the large number of houses and other buildings lost due to wildfire (bushfire) entering residential development in California, USA. No doubt in my mind that much of the loss was due to embers starting fires and then those fires spreading from building to building with assistance of wind and garden vegetation. Here are a selection of video clips from You Tube showing the effect of fire entering what are relatively cleared urban areas well removed from undeveloped land that carried the fire:

1.   Aerial view of homes burned in Fountain Grove

Note the unburnt vegetation, a reliable indicator that it was embers landing around and on the buildings that led to them igniting then spreading from building to building.

2.   Aerial view of fire damage in Santa Rosa (Los Angeles Times)

Again, the absence of damage to the majority of trees indicates that most of the embers and sparks probably came in horizontally under the influence of wind.

3.   Before and after aerial view of fire damage, Los Angeles

Ember attack and building to building spread.

4.   Aerial view of Sonoma burning (CBS)

Deserted and burning from house to house.

Last one but worth viewing

5.   Aerial view of winery destroyed by fire (CBS)

Note the unburnt vegetation around these buildings. I suspect the roof burning is due to bituminous or timber shingle roof cladding, possibly attacked by embers.

Could it happen here?

The following two photographs from Google Earth are of northwest then southeast of Eltham and the third the southern side of Lorne Township in Victoria.

If fire gets into these or similar areas and Daylesford–Hepburn and Macedon-Mount Macedon also come to mind, there's unlikely to be sufficient firefighting vehicles or water bombing aircaft to save all the houses at risk. It happened on Ash Wednesday in the forest west of Woodend–Macedon with firebrands starting fires around Melton and further south. Following a violent southwesterly wind change firebrands and embers were coming off a long fire front and traveling towards the northeast. The rest is unfortunate history.

If you are thinking about staying to defend your home then you should heed the CFA's advice on preparing for fire and and particularly defending the property during a fire.m

If you do decide to stay, it must certainly be on the understanding that direct flame contact will not reach the building you will shelter in — unless of course it’s properly designed and constructed to BAL-FZ according to AS 3959 —2009 Construction of buildings in bushfire-prone areas.

Then the problem becomes that of that ensuring radiant heat from the fire will not be sufficient to destroy windows and ignite flammable timbers, and protecting oneself from high level convective heat or hot air and fighting those damnable embers, and this may take hours if your home is in the bush.

If you're unaware of what's involved with the passing of a bushfire the experience of four people who defended their home at Anglers Rest in 2003 is worth watching and it's probably rare footage. Note how the fire spreads ahead of itself by ember ignition and no actual linear fire front, and the tree canopies don't burn.

Remember Peter Lang's fight:

“I use the big ‘we.’ Me and that hose. We are the we.”

And if your plan is to stay, you will need supplies of food, water and other essentials, as if there is a need to leave after the fire has died down you may not be allowed back for several days depending on the location and extent of the fire.

Country Fire Authority Act 1958 Section 31 Police to assist Chief Officer etc.

Subsection(4)

Nothing in this section or section 30 shall authorize the removal from any land building or premises of any person having any pecuniary interest therein or in any goods or valuables whatsoever thereon.

Then there is the need to be able recharge mobile phones and maybe tablets. A generator may be useful for keeping the fridge and freezer going.

However any decision to stay and fight is yours, I'm merely trying to provide you with information to help you with the decision. If you have doubts on your level of preparedness and personal strength to take on what can be a very physical and emotionally challenging task, then go early and before you are likely to be caught in a fire.

Why am I making this posting? I'm doing it because the government and its agencies should be doing more to make us aware of how fire will arrive and how to deal with it, they should be encouraging the development of a firefighting partnership and allocating their — actually ours — resources to work in-conjunction with well prepared residents instead of encouraging everyone to leave the day before days such as that predicted tomorrow. Had this been done in the several days lead-up to the Wye River–Separation Creek fire no doubt the number of homes lost would have been reduced and the horrendous reestablishment red tape and excessive costs being experienced by people simply wanting to rebuild avoided.

I wonder how many homes across Victoria will be empty tonight?

What also worries me are those people who leave it to the last minute and are ultimately advised to "shelter-in-place" having previously been informed that they should "leave early". With no information on what to expect how will they respond when the fire comes over the back fence, run and die outside?

Note that the coloured text indicates URLs to be clicked on.

Bushfire threat — be wary of warnings that can amount to 'crying wolf'. Part 1

Victoria has entered the bushfire season and we can now expect warnings from the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM), Emergency Management Victoria (EMV) and the fire agencies.

Every year presents a challenge to BOM, EMV, etc., on how to warn us of bad or "spike" bushfire potential days without overdoing it.

To help avoid us being turned off by bushfire threat warnings we need to understand the relationship between weather and the quantity and dryness of bushfire fuel.

Currently, next Saturday, 6 January 2018, is shaping up as a day we should be wary of predicts the BOM:

"Very hot and sunny day with fresh north to northwesterly winds, gusty at times. Winds tending fresh and squally southwesterly from the west in the afternoon with a cool change, reaching the central districts during the evening."

Yesterday, bushfire scientist David Packham provided the following advice concerning the bushfire threat anticipated for next Saturday. I have highlighted in red the parts that convey the message. Remember, ember attack is the main cause of fire spread, clearly obvious from the extent that fire reached into the settled areas of California a short time ago.

“In a paper discussing bushfire conditions published in Geophysical Research Letters ( American Geophysical Union, 19 Feb 2015), Prof Michael Reeder (Monash Uni), Thomas Spengler (Uni of Bergen) and Ruth Musgrave ( Scripps Inst. Oceanography, Uni of California) showed a connection between extreme bushfire weather and the breaking of the Rosby waves as indicated by extreme cold fronts.

“There is an average of 1.4 extreme cold fronts per year. Extreme cold fronts are defined as a difference of more than 17 deg C between the max temperature before the cold front and the max temperature on the day after. The most extreme cold front between 1979 and 2010 was 24.3deg C and the most extreme on record (13 Dec 1924(which was 24.9 deg). So much for "earlier than ever" fright speak.

“Reeder, Spengler and Musgrave summarises as "most of the catastrophic fires in the State of Victoria have been associated with the passage of extreme cold fronts".

“Saturday next (6 Jan 2018) is one of those days with a forecast temperature difference of 41- 20 =21 degrees. It is a very extreme cold front indeed.

“My estimate for the Forest Fire Danger Index is 48 for Melbourne Airport which is just in the "Extreme" category (Black Saturday 2009 was about 135). We can expect 1.5 kph rates of spread, non-survival crown fire and spot fire up to 5km ahead of a forest fire in the 25-30 tonne per hectare forest fuels.

“Because our catastrophic fires are associated with an extreme front does NOT mean that every extreme cold front has a major fire attache, fuel and dryness are as important.

There is the highest levels of fuel now available for thousands of years now that prescribed burning has just about ceased. What will save us next Saturday is the early season moisture. The Keetch-Byram Index (KBDI) for Melbourne airport (a good surrogate for all Victoria) is only15mm out of a max. of 200mm and not of concern until greater than 100mm. My "average" for Victoria (except the Mallee) is 36mm and with average drying the concerning level of 100mm will not be reached until the middle of March as the bushfire season finishes. So far the KBDI is showing a "normal" seasonal increase.

“So for next Saturday I can see very hot winds, heaps of fuel and damaging fires but not catastrophic due to residual moisture in the bush.

“There will be fires and some damage but it is too early and moist in this season for a catastrophe.”

I’ve known David Packham for many years and respect his opinion on bushfire (wildfire) and consequently provide the above as a useful item of intelligence to assist our planning for next Saturday.

Again, remember that ember attack is the main cause of fire spread. Many homes have been lost because of the "leave early" policy and many lives lost because people left it too late to leave or did not know to shelter until the fire front had passed.

The photo is from an on-line story by KTLA 5 TV News and is of "several homes destroyed in the Thomas Fire are seen on Dec. 5, 2017" and is worth looking at. To me, the question must be, how many of the homes lost would still be there if the residents had stayed to deal with ember attack?

One person's fight

Having heard the owner, Peter Lang, interviewed on a recent podcast I went hunting.

Owner of Safari West, Peter Lang's inspirational story published on-line in SFGate, San Francisco, but unfortunately you'll need to pick your way through the advertisements.

To me, one of Peter's comments stands out:

“We were able to extinguish that,” he said. “I use the big ‘we.’ Me and that hose. We are the we.”

Finally, remember we are looking at Saturday and the weather can be fickle.

It will be interesting how the agencies handle advice to the public.

Victoria's fire management strategy — meeting the needs of the customer

For the first time I'm aware of, and that goes back as far as 1967, "Victorians have an opportunity to shape the future of fire management in Victoria by providing feedback to the Victorian Fire Management Strategy Discussion Paper.

"Released this week the paper aims to explore new and innovative ways to prevent fires in Victoria and reduce impacts on the community when fires occur.

"Emergency Management Commissioner Craig Lapsley said sector and community feedback was the first step in developing a holistic new strategy, which would include all aspects of fire."

The discussion paper can be reached by clicking on the label Plate 1 immediately below the photograph.

Plate 1

In the posting heading I've referred to the needs of the customer.

Who is the customer?

The Macquarie Dictionary Fifth Edition defines a customer as "someone who purchases goods from another; a buyer; a patron".

All Victorians are customers, indeed owners of the fire services through the fire service levy and other taxes we pay to establish and maintain these services: MFB, CFA and DELWP Forest Fire Management Victoria.

Who is a stakeholder?

Whilst there are many stakeholders: "someone who has a pecuniary interest in an enterprise, having contributed funds to it; someone who is affected by, is concerned with, etc., with an issue or enterprise", the customers must be considered the prime or paramount stakeholders and while the advice or recommendations of the lesser stakeholders should be considered, their sometimes self-serving needs or wants should never override the best interests of the owners of the fire services.

I imagine that most who read this posting will be aware to some extent of the Victorian government's push to rearrange our fire and emergency services and the supporting nonsense that's been promoted by various parties who should know better, and here I include the Emergency Management Commissioner and CFA Chief Officer.

The rationale or lack of it.

Apparently the so-called "modernising" of Victoria's fire services and I'll come back to this later, is founded on an enterprise bargaining agreement (EBA) that affects CFA paid personnel that the CFA Board refused to accept in its entirety. Having failed here, the government decided that it would split the CFA to in effect separate solely volunteer brigades from integrated brigades having a paid firefighter component.

Plate 2

Plate 3

And, it has not stopped there. CFA has released emergency response data that does not give any information on periods of a day involved. Unfortunately, this information is being cherry-picked by certain lesser stakeholders supporting the assertion that selected volunteer brigades don't meet the required response time, seemingly to frighten the communities they serve.

Don't be mislead, there will be integrated brigades out there capable of meeting the response times at night and weekends that don't require 24/7 paid firefighters. CFA management should be identifying on an individual brigade basis where volunteers can meet the response times and rather than having paid firefighters sleeping in fire stations reallocate some to stations that need "daytime staffing", hence avoiding an increase in costs.

Concerning costs, The Australian recently published information on rising public sector employment costs provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics

With the emphasis on emergency response, which currently seems to be the main argument about meeting the needs of the customer, the following are recent examples of the weakness or failure of strategies to protect life and property protection due to all the "eggs being in one basket":

London's Grenfell Tower fire

Plate 4

California wildfires 2017

Plate 5

Docklands building burns: Hundreds evacuated after fire breaks out

Plate 6

Wye River–Separation Creek, Christmas 2015

Plate 7

Hazelwood mine fire

Plate 8

Lancefield fire 2015

Plate 9

Plate 10

Plate 11

In drawing attention to the above that I consider failures due to the loss of life involved, enormous loss of property and cost of recovery in all its forms, I'm certainly not being critical of firefighters involved, many of whom will have placed themselves in dangerous situations and deserve our thanks. The failure is at the executive management and political level in shirking vital prevention and preparedness measures to reduce the reliance on firefighter intervention.

Prevention

How do we avoid or reduce the impact of situations such as the above examples? Clearly by increasing the effort in the areas of prevention and community preparedness — and Lancefield is a prime example of an unprepared community with houses vulnerable to ember attack. And prevention must include better building construction regulation and emergency management planning for buildings, including emergency management wardens to organise the orderly evacuation of occupants.

This prevention and preparedness must extend into the family home to reduce reliance on emergency response — the fire brigade may be delayed for one reason or another or not even arrive. Smoke alarms in the family home are intended to alert the occupants so that they can safely leave the building.

There is more a fire service can be doing to protect life and property than just building up its response capability; that’s yesterday’s thinking.

Fire Service Modernisation

The Victorian government claims to want to modernise the Country Fire Authority, but it was a very modern Authority and well in advance of its time when it came into being in 1945:

COUNTRY FIRE AUTHORITY ACT

Section 6 Appointment of Country Fire Authority

(1) For the more effective control of the prevention and suppression of fires in the country area of Victoria there shall be an Authority appointed by the Governor in Council to be called the "Country Fire Authority".

(2) By such name such Authority shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and shall be capable in law of suing and of being sued and of taking purchasing holding exchanging leasing and disposing of real and personal property.

That’s right, as it states in the current CFA Act an Authority not a fire service or fire brigade!

Section 6F Recognition of Authority as a volunteer-based organisation

The Parliament recognises that the Authority is first and foremost a volunteer-based organisation, in which volunteer officers and members are supported by employees in a fully integrated manner..

That was the original intention, an Authority that is “first and foremost a volunteer-based organisation” that still stands in the current Country Fire Authority Act — not a fire brigade or fire service as is the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Brigade (MFB).

Section 14 Control of the prevention and suppression of fires in the country area

The control of the prevention and suppression of fires in the country area of Victoria is, subject to this Act, vested in the Authority.

In recent times CFA management seems to have more concentrated more on being a fire brigade than addressing its full role as an Authority and neglecting its fire prevention responsibilities:

Prior to the current bushfire season did the Municipal Fire Prevention Officer or the CFA Chief Officer — in fairness to the current CO who has only been in that position for a relatively short time, I’m referring to his predecessor — address the vegetation hazard utilising section 41 Country Fire Authority Act 1958?

Did the IGEM inquire if Emergency Management Victoria had any concerns about township protection in the context of a total PPRR (prevention, preparedness, response and recovery) approach to the protection of life and property at Wye River–Separation Creek?

Over time governments have helped with the downgrading of the CFA for example the revocation of CFA’s section 44 inspection responsibility. How this was handled is a shameful story for another day.

And back to the subject of so-called modernising the CFA and community involvement generally, with the apparently growing threat to the community through terrorism or other Malicious acts that can constitute a broad-scale threat beyond the capability of our emergency responders, both paid and volunteer, it’s not in the best interests of the customer for the government to allow/participate in denigration of volunteers as a lesser class of firefighter and have them marginalised.

On volunteers being labelled by some as "unprofessional" that's tripe, as CFA volunteers are required to be trained, assessed and qualified for whatever roles they perform. Consequently, was it appropriate for a government that should be working in Victoria's best interests to allow denigration of volunteers to be publicly canvassed in the Melbourne CBD? As a volunteer myself, I found it extremely offensive and needing a response.

Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning

Plate 12

DELWP, another government agency failing its customers:

DELWP's Code of practice for bushfire management on public land places a high priority on asset protection, obviously being neglected at Cassidy Drive. And what does the Colac Otway Municipal Fire Prevention Plan say about this part of Kennett River or is the shire ignoring the loss potential and willing to abandon the people involved to the same fate as Wye River–Separation Creek?

Referring to Minister Merlino's statement in the final paragraph of Mayor Clarke in the Diamond Valley Leader story concerning preparedness for the coming fire season, a record $29.4 million in Victoria's biggest ever firefighting aircraft fleet", is Minister Merlino unaware that the very day when aircraft are most required weather conditions usually prevent or at least severely restrict their use e.g. they were of little or no help in preventing the losses at Wye River–Separation Creek on Christmas Day 2015. Makes me wonder, is Minister Merlino seeking to "snow" us, or has he been mislead by his advisors?

Finally, for the benefit of Minister Melino and those who feel that to be a professional requires being paid to do the job, here’s a fire and rescue department worth spending some time looking into Fairfax Country Fire and Rescue Department, Virginia, adjoining Washington DC.

HERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR EVERYONE TO HAVE INPUT TO FUTURE FIRE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR VICTORIA AND I URGE EVERYONE AS THE TRUE CUSTOMERS TO HAVE THEIR SAY, BUT TIME IS SHORT.