Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — lightning strike and what to look for

My blog posting of 20 March 2017 "Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — in pursuit of the truth" includes a photograph showing the area where I believe the lightning struck. Included in the paragraph preceding the photograph is the following:

Note the large burnt stump visible at left in the photograph.

My objective was to illustrate that there was nothing difficult about the terrain in the general area of the lightning strike that would have prevented physically fit, experienced and safety conscious DELWP firefighters and also that the vegetation was not too dense to prevent effective use of suitable and properly tasked water bombing aircraft.

I've been seeking advice on lightning strikes and what to look for to be as sure of my facts as possible and provide the following examples, and there are many more, of what I've studied:

"Science Made Simple" that includes an informative video of the details of a lightning strike.

"National Geographic on Lightning" with another informative video.

Concerning the Jamieson Creek lightning strike, I find the following in the National Geographic discourse describes the situation found that I alluded to with my reference to the "large burnt stump":

Lightning's extreme heat will vaporize the water inside a tree, creating steam that may blow the tree apart.

This is the remains of the tree that I believe took the brunt of the lightning strike.

Plate 1

The burnt stump shown at left in the first photograph in this posting is at left in Plate 1. The fallen tree in the centre has separated from the stump. The damaged stump in the centre appears to have been damaged by the fallen tree to its left.

Note the severe burn isolated to the lower part of the tree. This deep, small area of burning is consistent with the intense heat from a lightning strike at or near the base of the erect living tree—lightning does not necessarily strike the top of a tree, it all depends on where the upwards moving positive charge “streamer” emanates from, and it could even be the ground alongside a tree or an isolated rocky outcrop.

Plate 2

Plate 2 is another view of the stump and its fallen top as indicated.

Plate 3

Plate 4

Plates 3 and 4 show the stump. Note the depth of the charring, particularly concentrated at the left side of the stump.

Plate 3 also shows the damage caused by a violent separation of the tree from the stump, almost as if the result an explosion.

Back to the tree; it was a living gum—EVC 201:Shrubby Wet Forest from Biodiversity Interactive Map - 3.2 indicates Mountain Grey Gum Eucalyptus cypellocarpa and checking Leon Costerman’s Native Trees and Shrubs of South-Eastern Australia satisfies me—containing moisture that would have required far more and prolonged exposure to heat of a level that's not associated with a fire moving across the ground to produce a burn of this depth.

I suspect it was a relatively mild fire for those first couple of day, as logs and larger stumps already on the ground in the area had suffered little more than superficial charring, as Plates 5, 6, 7 and 8 show.

Plate 5

Plate 6

Plate 7

Plate 8

An explanation for the seemingly burnt trees. Scattered within the area are Messmate Stringybark Eucalyptus obliqua that account for a few trees with blackened trunks, which is due to the fibrous bark but not the trunks burning. Plate 9 is an example of Messmate Stringybark from the Christmas Hills area.

Plate 9

Costerman describes the bark of the Mountain Grey Gum as:

Smooth, grey often with yellow and whitish patches, sheds [bark] in strips or plates; may be rough and darker at base.

Plate 10 shows the relatively easily ignitable roughness at the base of a Mountain Grey Gum (or very similar) and becoming plates or strips further up the trunk. Sufficiently dry and standing off from the trunk can see fire extend further up the trunk to involve this bark without igniting the trunk. The arrows indicate examples of the stages of bark from the ground up.

Plate 10

Plates 11 and 12 show the unburnt vegetation to the west and on the opposite side of the control line from the fire area, photographed at similar level to the lightning strike. 

Plate 12 shows bark renewing itself on Stringybarks following much earlier exposure to fire.  

Plate 11

Plate 12

Photos in this and recent postings show that there was nothing difficult about the area for fit and experienced DELWP firefighters to round up the initially small fire in the first couple of days, and to argue that the vegetation was to dense to respond to proper air attack is arrant nonsense if DELWP's use of water bombing aircraft in Gippsland in recent days is any guide.

The annotated Google Earth photo shows the way to where I believe the lightning struck: Position 11. Not difficult to find nor hard to reach on the ground, but always with an eye upwards at the trees above. And approximately 250 metres from a well-formed four wheel drive track.

Why then the failure to slay the Jamieson Creek beast in its infancy?

On page 27, third paragraph under the heading "Initial fire control strategy 19–21 December", in the "IGEM's Review of the initial response ..."

Through the period 19 to late 21 December, the IC's [Incident Controller] broad strategy was to establish bare earth containment lines to limit the fire's spread within the area bounded by the Cumberland Track to the north, and Jamieson Track to the south.

As can be seen in the following annotated Google Earth photo, the area of land between Cumberland Track and Jamieson Track is huge compared to the size of the fire on 19 December.

Why this plan so early and probably before the Incident Control Team really knew what they had to contend with?

Inexperience, incompetence, panic, interference from above, budget restraint or was the Incident Controller 'marching to the beat of a different drummer' — sign found at the corner of Curtis Track and Cumberland Track on 9 January 2017?

Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — some personal agony

This time something different, a couple of personal accounts of the Wye River–Separation Creek Christmas 2015 bushfire and its aftermath.

The first an illustrated "story in rhyme" from Peter Jabobs, many years a permanent resident. Much food for thought here.

And the following sent to me by Andrey in response to my posting of Monday, 20 March 2017 with the important part reproduced verbatim except for the asterisks:

Your experience, analysis, and persistence in providing this information is the only relief I can embrace in the ongoing misery that sees me leaving my Wye River home of 15 years.

I can't afford to rebuild and adding insult to injury, I'm forced to spend tens of thousands of dollars on a "minor work order" to stabilise my land against erosion and slippage. This is money I don't have, nor will ever recoup. Alas, it is only money. What is more important is the subsequent breakdown of my relationship with my partner/kids and general well-being.

Whilst I realise it may be human nature to want to blame others for one's misfortune that will not return the life I had. I believe in being accountable for my actions and hope that lessons shall be learnt from this debacle.

The information you provide rekindles the thoughts and feelings I had very soon after that black christmas day, the same thoughts and feelings that ******* so expertly managed to politicise in the aftermath.

I know Peter Jacobs and am very happy to air his "rhyme". Andrey I do not know personally, but am satisfied that his is from the heart. I imagine there are many similar stories out there.

Finally, this posting is not about self-promotion but providing a platform for a few people to tell their stories—some of which I find heart-rending—people who unlike the government and its agencies can't whistle up the media whenever they choose.

Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — in pursuit of the truth

Continuing on from my 21 February posting "Jamieson Creek – a questionable first response to a lightning strike at the height of the summer bushfire threat" and the Inspector General for Emergency Management's response to a request from then Minister for Emergency Services Garrett to "report on the learnings to date from the Wye River - Jamieson Creek Track (sic) fire".

In pursuing the truth about a fire that's caused and continues to cause so much despair, disruption and cost to individuals and the public purse within and beyond Wye River–Separation Creek, to echo Minister Garett, "what are the learnings from this fire"?

Surely an important matter is how the Emergency Management Commissioner and DELWP decide on "inaccessibility" when it comes to fighting a fire in a forest.

In my blog posting of 3 February 2017 "Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — fake news and alternative facts at play?" I provided information to support my contesting the "assertions of the Emergency Management Commissioner and Inspector-General for Emergency Management (IGEM) that the lightning strike that impacted just south of Jamieson Creek was ʻextremely difficult to accessʼ and arguing that the vegetation was too dense to respond to the efforts of firebombing aircraft".

Included in that posting are a series of photographs taken on driving into what I then considered was in close proximity to where the lightning strike reached the ground on 19 December 2015 and demonstrating by my presence that the area would not have been difficult nor too dangerous for fit and experienced DELWP firefighters.

Also in the posting are an extract from the 1:30 000 Vicmap Topographic Map of the area and other relevant maps and drawings:

Having finished exploring further east along the bulldozed track from where my vehicle was parked, I then went back to explore what lay down the trail indicated by the sign painted on the tree below.

As I walked down the trail it seemed soon to become a hand-made control line that would have been taken down to "mineral earth" or bare ground. The objective of the control line would have been to prevent the spread of a surface fire or be used as a base for burning out the grass, leaves and twigs: surface fine fuel between the fire edge and control line. It's the surface fine fuel that normally carries the fire front.

The control line would have been constructed as close to the fire edge as safely possible to minimise the size of the fire.

From my walk down the trail I recorded a few points with my GPS and took photographs. Concerning the GPS recordings, it's important to understand that the forest canopy and positions recorded increasingly further down the northern slope probably shielded some of the satellites able to be read, which will result in a reduced accuracy of the recordings. Nevertheless, I’m satisfied that they are sufficiently close for my purposes.

Following is an annotated Google Earth photo with Positions 6, 7, 8, and 9 that I’m confident mark the bulldozed that becomes the hand constructed control line put in place early, probably 19 and early on the 20th. Positions 10 and 11 are inside the fire edge east of the control line. I consider Position 11 is the approximate location of the lightning strike. More about this later.

Next, part of the 1:30 000 topographical map where I have located Position 11 from my GPS recording. Position 1 is where I parked my motor vehicle Position 2 is the location of the sign on the tree pointing to the hand trail (above.

Now a few photographs down the control line. The first is near the head of the control line and close Position 2 on the map. The fire area is to the right of the line. The second is further down the control line. The uninvolved area is to the left of the line. Important to understand that when the line was constructed it would have been cleared to “mineral earth” (bare ground).

Next, a view of the fire area east of the control line part way down towards position 9 on the Google Earth photo.

And further into the burnt area from the immediately preceding photograph.

Another view similar to the preceding photograph inside the fire area as I made my way to Positions 10 and 11 from Position 9 on the Google Earth photo and eventually back to Position 2.

On fire behaviour on the 19th and probably the 20th, the three preceding photographs show unburnt heavier fuels laying on the ground, much of which was in place before the fire. This indicates to me that the fire was not all that hot and it just “trickled” around, probably not all that affected by wind experienced that far downslope.

Finally, a photograph towards the northeast across the area where I feel the lighting strike occurred. Note the large burnt stump visible at left in the photograph.

And, on accessibility and density of vegetation working against effective fire attack while the fire was still small, my photographs don’t seem to support the assertion that the lightning strike that impacted just south of Jamieson Creek was "extremely difficult to access" and argued that the vegetation was too dense to respond to the efforts of firebombing aircraft. But you be the judge, I have my opinion.

Photo from SBS

As we shall see later, the fire eventually became enormous and ultimately led to the Wye River–Separation Creek catastrophe.

Don't be misled by the "spinners" folks, regardless of where and how the fire that caused that catastrophe came from on Christmas Day, it was the failure to quickly control and extinguish the fire caused by the lightning strike during those first few hours that was the underlying cause of what is now the Wye River–Separation Creek misery.

The Quadrant story A Tale of Two Fires by Mark Poynter provides a different view to those expressed by the IGEM and the Emergency Management Commissioner. You can decide for yourselves on who is most qualified.

Finally for now, the penultimate paragraph in Minister Garrett’s request to the IGEM:

I understand that you and your staff were in attendance at this fire over a number of days conducting monitoring and evaluation functions as part of your legislative role and that a number of observations were made relative to those issues listed above.

Is this statement correct? Does the IGEM have people at the fires currently burning in National Park west of Dargo in eastern Victoria, and further east in National Park at Wulgulmerang? Does the IGEM have people appropriately qualified and experienced to undertake such important work?

There are important matters that should be pursued by the Coroner, if she ever gets around to it. For example are there still people in critical fire management positions who should have been removed?

Will it eventually be found that Minister Garrett and the people of Victoria have been misled?

Jamieson Creek – a questionable first response to a lightning strike at the height of the summer bushfire threat

Dealing comprehensively with the Wye River–Separation Creek disaster is like eating an elephant, a small portion at a time.

Having reached the immediate area of the "inaccessible lighting strike" without any real difficulty, as covered in my posting "Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — fake news and alternative facts at play?" on 3 February 2017, I will discuss some of the issues left as food for thought in that posting:

• fourth paragraph beneath the heading "1.1 Observations – Fire control", page 3;

• "OBSERVATION 1 – INITIAL ATTACK", page 3;

• right side column beneath the concluding "RECOMMENDATION 3", page 4;

• third paragraph down in the right side column on page 5;

• right side column beneath the heading "Landscape and fire history" on page 11;

• left side column beneath the heading "Detection of the fire 19 December", particularly the third paragraph mention of a "complex gully system" on page 12;

• left side column beneath the heading "Resources increased 20 December", particularly the reference to committing "large air tankers (LATs) to suppress the fire" on page 13;

• beneath the heading "Backburning strategy 22–23 December" on page 14;

• beneath the heading "Use of aircraft", particularly the paragraph in the right side column "Helitacks are suited to the Otways terrain ... get close to the canopy. The long line and bucket capability ... extinguishing fire and hot spots" on page 21;

• beneath the heading "4.7 Firefighter safety" on page 21;

1.  Inaccessibility and vegetation density

Thinking more about what I wrote beneath this heading in my 3 February 2017 posting reminded me of the refashioning of the CFA following the 1962 fires, with the appointment of Brigadier R T 'Dick' Eason MC as the CFA's first permanent Chairman.

Dick Eason pulled the CFA up by its boot straps by bringing a military approach to fire control operations. I remember his first output was modifying the principles of war to be CFA'S Principles of Operations:

• MAINTENANCE OF THE AIM

• FORESIGHT

• SPEED

• FLEXIBILITY

• SECURITY

• ADMINISTRATION

• MORALE

• MOBILITY

• CONCENTRATION

• ECONOMY

• CO-OPERATION

• COMMUNICATION

The principles of operations were eventually enshrined in the CFA's 'little red book':

Application of the principles of operations was also included in the 'red book':

So, where did the failure to control the fire started by the lightning strike begin?

In the "Seven Cardinal Sins in Firefighting" (above) I've highlighted where I contend the failure began, and that failure began on 19 December 2015, being the initial response to the lightning strike.

It was drummed into me from my beginning at CFA that response to an outbreak of fire must be with "speed and concentration" to deal with the fire while it was small and still developing. Being "flexible" with that response to suit the circumstances can also be critical.

Known from the outset to be remote from vehicular access, "flexibility" of attack should have seen a DELWP helitack crew dispatched to the scene as a first responder, rather than wait until a bulldozer could construct a track.

Examination of the following would have shown to anyone with knowledge of map interpretation and terrain that a helicopter landing zone could have relatively quickly been constructed by a rappel crew lowered in and firefighting well advanced by the time the bulldozer arrived:

And, there was plenty of area available where a helipad could have been constructed, I parked my vehicle in one such area:

Next, we need to consider the principle of "concentration" or weight-of-attack. Weight-of-attack is the dispatch of sufficient firefighting resources to deal with an outbreak of fire.

In responding to an alarm of fire CFA and MFB always dispatch vehicles to match the task, be it bushfire, house fire, factory fire, hazardous materials incident, etc.

On a day such as 19 December 2015, a day warranting a total fire ban declaration covering the Jamieson Creek area, the CFA's immediate response would have been several tankers to an outbreak of bushfire and built up as the circumstance of the fire became known to warrant an increase of resources.

With the weather predicted the following day already known and to be another day of total fire ban, why was the initial response to the fire so limited in view of the eventual downstream consequences? But more about the downstream consequences later.

I consider the response to have been limited because of the information on the EMV 19 December 2015 briefing map below:

• People: 55

• Appliances:7

• Aircraft: 2

• Hectares: 0.5

Tankers with wings

From a weight-of-attack perspective the CFA recently described firebombing aircraft as "tankers with wings".

Applying the CFA vernacular, as wheeled tankers were unable to reach the lightning strike until a bulldozer had constructed a track, a prompt and "foresightful" response should have seen "winged tankers" in number and capability to the task committed as first responders.

Response capability to match the threat environment

While the information on the EMV map states two aircraft, how many of those aircraft were capable of putting "wet stuff on the hot stuff"?

It's reasonable to assume that only one of those aircraft was capable of dropping water or retardant on the fire, the other aircraft would have been performing the "bird dog" or managing the drop role. So, one "tanker" where in country under the control of the CFA many tankers could have been expected to be involved.

If only one firebombing aircraft, what were the people in charge of this fire thinking, especially when they should have been aware of the weather conditions forecast for the next day???

And, what firebombing capability aircraft was involved? Is it correct that a Bell 212 helicopter with 1,400 litre belly tank was dispatched from Bendigo?

Photo from Kestrel

Why not more than one "tanker with wings" dispatched, particularly one of the high capability Erickson Skycranes with 7,500 litre tank that I understand was sitting idle in the Melbourne area?

Photo from SBS

The Skycrane is a strong aircraft that can fly in wind or turbulence exceeding the capability of the smaller helicopters. It also has the capability to fill its tank by lowering the scoop visible alongside the tank into the water while hover-taxiing forward, thereby forcing water into the tank more efficiently than the pump at the end of the suction hose, and there was an endless source of water, being the sea a short flight to the east.

Photo from Kestrel

On the vegetation being too thick for water or retardant dropped from a helicopter to penetrate.

It’s not hard to imagine the effect of a hovering Skycrane emptying its 7,500 litre tank — assuming that quantity of sea water is approximately 7.5 tonnes – as shown in the above photograph on fire burning on the ground around the lightning strike as shown in the following photographs, the leaves and finer limbs would likely be stripped from the trees as the water crashed to the ground, "drowning" the fire.

Clearly, much more to cover but I'll finish for now with the following:

Inquiry into Fire Season Preparedness and Transcript, City of Ballarat

Makes me wonder, is the very costly aircraft resource being used to maximum effectiveness?

Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — fake news and alternative facts at play?

On Christmas Day 2015 large areas of Wye River–Separation Creek were devastated by a fire that roared in from the adjoining forest — from a lightning strike that occurred in the forest to the north five days earlier — causing enormous emotional and financial pain and suffering that continues to this day.

The question must be why, to avoid it happening elsewhere in Victoria.

Those of you who've followed this blog will be aware that I'm yet to be convinced by the assertions of the Emergency Management Commissioner and Inspector-General for Emergency Management (IGEM) that the lightning strike that impacted just south of Jamieson Creek was "extremely difficult to access" and arguing that the vegetation was too dense to respond to the efforts of firebombing aircraft.

Concerning difficult terrain and effectiveness of water bombing, issues I will explore later in this posting, some parts of the IGEM's "Review of the initial response to the 2015 Wye River–Separation Creek Track fire" worth considering:

• fourth paragraph beneath the heading "1.1 Observations – Fire control", page 3;

• "OBSERVATION 1 – INITIAL ATTACK", page 3;

• right side column beneath the concluding "RECOMMENDATION 3", page 4;

• third paragraph down in the right side column on page 5;

• right side column beneath the heading "Landscape and fire history" on page 11;

• left side column beneath the heading "Detection of the fire 19 December", particularly the third paragraph mention of a "complex gully system" on page 12;

• left side column beneath the heading "Resources increased 20 December", particularly the reference to committing "large air tankers (LATs) to suppress the fire" on page 13;

• beneath the heading "Backburning strategy 22–23 December" on page 14;

• beneath the heading "Use of aircraft", particularly the paragraph in the right side column "Helitacks are suited to the Otways terrain ... get close to the canopy. The long line and bucket capability ... extinguishing fire and hot spots" on page 21;

• beneath the heading "4.7 Firefighter safety" on page 21;

The first of at least three basic issues I will now explore in this and following postings.

1.  Inaccessibility and vegetation density

In the above references to the IGEM's "Review of the initial response to the 2015 Wye River–Separation Creek Track fire" mention is made of "steep hills and complex gully systems that are topographically and geographically challenging and covered by dense, multi-canopied vegetation" and "extremely difficult to access", in the Otway Ranges. While there may be such areas in the Otways is that the situation in the immediate area of the lightning strike on 19 December 2015?

Having generally worked in and explored that part of the Otway Ranges, including studying contour maps and manipulated the professional version of Google Earth to show relief, I'm of the opinion that claims that the lightning strike was in a "gorge" and therefore inaccessible was at least questionable.

Questionable, because I believe that DELWP had the remote area firefighting capability and firefighting helitankers fitted with belly tanks or suspended buckets hovering above the fire while still small would have drowned it with the tree canopy involved no barrier to the release of a full load of water reaching the ground.

In my blog postings of Wednesday, 3 February 2016 and again on Sunday, 14 February 2016 with the best information available to me at the time I endeavoured to display the location of the growing fire. The earliest position I could find was timed at 6:08 PM on 21 December 2015

At this point note that all the photos and maps below are large so when clicked on will show considerable detail.

I've recently been provided with a photo of maps that I'm reliably informed were used by EMV at a community information briefing in January 2016.

Below is an enhanced copy of the photos that came to me on a single sheet. While the quality is somewhat marginal, it is useful in showing the fire locations commencing at 6:30 PM on 19 December 2016.

Next is what is reasonably assumed to be the 19 December map extracted from the above montage and enhanced a little more.

It shows a small fire perimeter in black where indicated by my red arrow. I have also labelled the gully immediately north of Jamieson Track, before the fire perimeter.

Now, correlating with the latest Google Earth Map of the area.

Positions 1, 2 and 3 were recorded with a GPS along a track bulldozed to reach or at least get close to the lightning strike. Position 3 is near where the bulldozed track leaves Wye Road between Jamieson Track and Curtis Track.

Position 2 is at a rough junction in the track with the signs painted on trees as shown in the following two photos.

The first sign points to the north and a “hand trail”. The second points to the continuation of the bulldozed track to Position 1 and beyond

The following Google Earth photo is an enlargement of the earlier photo. The arrows first indicate where I believe the hand trail leaves Position 2. The two arrows further north indicate where I believe work on the hand trail is apparent, but my confidence is reducing further north of the upper arrow.

Rotating online Google Earth to put south at the top of the screen and tilting the image seems to support the presence of the trail at my northern-most indicator. Beyond that indicator the trail seems to wander off to the east and maybe elsewhere.

I invite you to analyse for yourself, and I’m now regretting that time prevented me from exploring at least part of the trail — maybe that will please some.

Finally, when it comes to identifying the position of the lightning strike, the following is an extract from the 1:30 k topographical map covering that part of Victoria.

Why am I confident with the general area I’ve nominated? Because of the location information provided above and the extension of the bulldozed track further towards the northeast from Position 1.

This is Position 1 where I parked my vehicle.

The aerial photo was taken above Position 1, on 27 January 2017. It shows the bulldozed track extending further to the northeast at left in the photo.

Below are two photos of the bulldozed track extending further northeast from Position 1 as shown in the aerial photo above. The extension of the track shown at right of right of centre is shown in the lower photo.

The following two photos are views across the gully towards Jamieson Track from the southern side of the bulldozed track adjacent to the northeastern end of the clearing at Position 1.

The following photo was taken from a similar location to the preceding two, but back towards the southwest.

The following series of photos are very instructive. They were taken in both directions on the north-facing slope in the forest below the extension of the bulldozed track further northeast of Position 1.

As the ground continued to level felt I was very close to the creek. Certainly not consistent with the definition of a “gorge”.

Back towards the southwest and below Positions 1 and 2, with the hand trail through there somewhere.

Below, a few more pieces on the “inaccessible” Jamieson Creek lightning strike puzzle.

The first photo below is from above the tree canopy on the side of Jamieson Track, taken from above Position 4 on 9 January 2017. The view is across a gully to the area of the lightning strike and behind it the Jamieson Creek gully. Beyond the gully the land rises up again, with Cumberland Track generally along the top.

The next five were on taken 27 January 2017 from above Position 1 on the Google Earth photo.

The first from the drone rising up through the tree canopy with the camera facing towards the southwest. My vehicle is visible lower centre in the photo.

The second is above the tree canopy from the previous photo and again towards southwest, with the Jamieson Creek gully visible at right.

The third is generally northeast towards Lorne, which is hidden. The Jamieson Creek gully is visible at left and a sharp eye may pick up Cumberland Track at the top of the rising ground beyond the gully.

In the next the view is lower than the third photo and generally in the same direction, showing more of the ground and some canopy separation.

The final photo is towards the south and Jamieson Track just below the skyline.

Inaccessible “gorge"?

To me, the country I traversed in my vehicle, and walking around in the area generally northeast of Position 1 did not seem all that difficult or hazardous for fit, well trained and safety-conscious DELWP firefighters accustomed to dry firefighting, with water available from tankers on the bulldozed access track and utilising hose lines and possibly relay pumping to reach the fire, and supported by hovering helicopters fitted with belly tanks or suspended buckets capable of getting water through the canopy and onto the fire.

Having acquired considerable experience in the bush e.g. much of Gippsland, Grampians and North East; former Jungle Training Centre, Canungra and nearby Levers Plateau; southern Tasmania; Otway Ranges; Kokoda Track; and observed at first hand the forests in various parts of North America and the Baltic, there is nothing remarkably difficult about the canopy in the area of the lightning strike.

If a 71 year-old could do it, admittedly only 'scratching the surface', why couldn’t the DELWP people? From what I understand, a 'walk in the park' for DELWP Gippsland people. On the contrary, Barwon South West people soft or poorly managed or led? Maybe they were victims of a disastrous 'cockup', where at least three major headquarters above the actual fire could not get it right. Too many cooks?

Or did the Incident Controller 'march to the beat of a different drummer' — sign found at the corner of Curtis Track and Cumberland Track on 9 January 2017?

Unfortunately, a long posting, so I’ll leave it here for now.

Plenty of reading for those interested, particularly the IGEM’s report — see if you can find any anomalies identified in it.