Review of the initial response to the 2015 Wye River-Jamieson Track fire — the potential folly of judging a book by its cover

On Thursday, 25 February, I posted the link to the Inspector–General for Emergency Management’s “Review of the initial response to the 2015 Wye River-Jamieson Track fire" (click here) with the comment that I was going to study it before commenting.

One of my interests is military history of certain eras and there are books I see from their covers that attract my attention. However, before I spend money and time on a book, I always check on the author and the reliability of the critics.

Before getting too deeply into the IGEMs review, I decided to check on the bona fides of the author and the reliability of the critics.

The review document

What knowledge and experience, particularly on-the-ground hands-on firefighting experience, should be expected of the author of such a review? Does the reviewer have that knowledge and experience?

How did the reviewer gather the information on which to base the work? Were all the "key players" interviewed and down to what level in the hierarchy of management did the review reach? Was the reviewer satisfied that the contributors spoke freely or openly or did they exhibit signs that they felt themselves constrained by concerns over career prospects or felt vulnerable when looking back over their actions and advice they gave during the firefight?

The critics

From their utterances reported in the media the Minister for Emergency Services and the Emergency Management Commissioner are leading critics of the review document.

What actual knowledge and hands-on experience of the subject do they possess — there seems to be some some confusion over the difference between steeply sloping terrain and a “gorge”, fire intensity Christmas Day and gaps in the knowledge of the availability of specialist on-the-ground firefighting capability in Victoria and across Australia (click here)?

Reference material

To learn more about the Office of the IGEM I’ve begun to study its web page (click here), including some of its reports (click here) and the Emergency Management Act (click here).

To date, analysing the reference materials is leading me to conclude that the government has a narrow view of bushfire emergency management in Victoria. For example, who monitors the performance of municipalities in satisfactorily meeting their town and settlement bushfire protection obligations and the performance of the CFA in meeting its fire prevention responsibilities? So far from my brief examination of the work of the Office of the IGEM that does not seem high on its agenda.

PPRR

Whatever happened to a risk assessment based approach to fully integrated Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery to bushfire emergency management?

Attempting to calm the the citizens of Victoria, many now unnerved because of the "leave and lose" bushfire survival policy, government boasts an armada of 53 aircraft to protect us. The reliance on so many aircraft at the response stage of a PPRR approach is an indicator of failure at the prevention and community preparedness stages of emergency management.

Fifty-three aircraft, up to the size of a McDonnell Douglas DC 10 that UPS uses for its international airfreight service! Yet, the Minister for Emergency Services, Emergency Management Commissioner and the Inspector–General for Emergency Management are all adamant that air attack was of little value as part of the initial response to the lightning strike due to the fire being in a "gorge" and dense tree canopy preventing the suppressing agent reaching the ground.

Does the Victorian government understand the limitations on air attack in Victoria?

Considering the retaining and flying costs involved with the large fixed wing aircraft alone, and consequently the enormous sum of money expended, would redirection of some of this money to risk assessment based bushfire “prevention” — including a full-time fire service responsible for specialist fire management on public land that would include year round readiness to undertake fuel reduction burning as the many “windows of opportunity” present on a daily basis somewhere in Victoria — and community “preparedness” achieve a better return on investment? I believe it would.

Some examples of the work done post Ash Wednesday 1983 that recommended a shift to what we now know as PPRR and preceding the 2009 Victorian bushfires and those that followed, including the devastation of Wye River–Separation Creek on Christmas Day 2015.

The first speaks for itself with two recommendations relating to “mitigation and preparedness" (click here).

The following should have been the start of a significant step forward into risk assessment based PPRR, with Foreword by Alan Hodges, AM, Director General, Emergency Management Australia (click here).

Finally, a national bushfire preparedness strategy, again with Foreword by Alan Hodges, AM, Director General, Emergency Management Australia (click here).

The first dot point on page 3 of the Executive Summary (click here) is worth noting when considering the efficacy of the current bushfire “leave and lose” policy of the Victorian government in a broader loss reduction context.

Incidentally, the cover photograph is a bushfire near Esperense, WA, February 1991. Has anything changed there?

Having considered the role and responsibilities of the Office of Inspector–General for Emergency Management and some of its work to ensure the protection of Victorians from bushfire it’s reasonable to ask, are EMV and IGEM “birds of a feather… “ and this review a case of “Caesar judging Caesar”?

To conclude, considering the work done from the lessons learned post-Ash Wednesday, there's an old adage, "if we don't learn from history we are doomed to repeat it". How many times has that been the situation since February 1983?

Review of the initial response to the 2015 Wye River-Jamieson Track fire

The Inspector-General for Emergency Management's report produced and issued by the Governnment of Victoria is now available (click here) for those interested.

I will study the report before commenting as I consider appropriate.

Obfuscation, sanitising, cabinet-in-confidence documents, burying, leaking — examples of some of the processes of government

It’s reasonable to expect that the Inspector–General for Emergency Management will have met the 19 February deadline and the Minister for Emergency Services the Honourable Jane Garrett will now have his report on the Wye River–Separation Creek fire.

The processes of government – how will the report be dealt with?

From my experience and I doubt that the processes have changed all that much, the responsible Minister will first seek the advice of others such as the Emergency Services Commissioner, CFA, DELWP and maybe Victoria Police. Actually how far down into these organisations advice will be sought is a moot point, given the early desire of the government to restrict investigation to an “internal process”.

Ministerial advisors will likely be asked for their advice and possibly government and media PR people. Another moot point, how many of these people will have the detailed knowledge to provide factual comment?

At what stage will the IGEM’s report be released to the public, will it be a sanitised version, etc? Might the government decide not to release the report, arguing that it is now a matter for the Coroner to consider, along with the advice received from the agencies?

Concerning the IGEM’s investigation, did he have any “riding instructions” from the Minister on what to investigate? Here, I’m reminded of the depth and detail of the terms of Reference of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (click here).

What did the IGEM investigate and report on, only the question of “inaccessibility” of the lighting strike as justification for falling back to a fuel burnout to contain the lightning strike? Did he investigate the actual point/s of breakout and related circumstances of the origin of the fire on Christmas Day that went onto Wye River–Separation Creek?

Did the IGEM extend his investigation further to consider issues beyond the lightning strike and burnout that contributed to the loss at Wye River–Separation Creek? Issues such as the quantity of fuel in the forest between the burnout and those two communities?

Fuel reduction in the forest

This link shows that back in 2007 DSE recognised the importance of fuel reduction in the Otway parks and reserves (click here). It speaks for itself. Were any burns relevant to protection of Wye River–Separation Creek carried out during autumn 2007?

This link is to the DSE Otway District Approved Fire Operations Plan 2008/09 to 2010/11 (click here). Again, were these burns completed?

No doubt koalas and many other creatures of the forest would have died horribly or suffered terrible injuries as the fire ripped through the forest on its way south.

Did the IGEM form an opinion on the validity of any reasons given for DELWP failing to meet any of its fuel reduction burning plans important to Wye River–Separation Creek?

Township protection

Did the IGEM consider the effectiveness of the Wye River–Separation Creek township protection plan and its implementation — if there is such a plan — including the performance of the Colac Otway Shire Municipal Fire Prevention Officer and the CFA Chief Officer in utilising their hazard removal powers according to section 41 of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958? (click here)? The Chief Officer was given this power following a recommendation from the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission:

Recommendation 54

The State amend the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 to enable the Chief Officer to delegate the power to issue fire prevention notices.

Section 41 fire prevention notices

Concerning issue of section 41 “fire prevention notices” did people from CFA head office who become involved in considering bushfire attack level exposure at BAL-FZ level according to Australian Standard AS 3959—2009 Construction of buildings in bushfire-prone areas visit Wye River–Separation Creek in the course of their duties? If yes, did they form any opinions on township protection and report any concerns they had to the CFA Chief Officer?

Did planning permit applications to erect dwellings inside the township boundaries that were rated at BAL–FZ arouse any concern in the CFA that something may be seriously wrong within the context of section 41(2)(a) Country Fire Authority Act 1958 regarding the vulnerability of existing buildings?

The following photograph is of the remains of a house on the north side of Dunoon Road, Wye River, lost to the fire.

Same house prior to the fire. A risk assessment based township protection plan should have identified building design and construction vulnerability to ember attack alone.

Photographed in September 2013 the vegetation generally below the houses on the north side of Dunoon Road, many of which were lost.

Prior to the current bushfire season did the Municipal Fire Prevention Officer or the CFA Chief Officer — in fairness to the current CO who has only been in that position for a relatively short time, I’m referring to his predecessor — address the vegetation hazard utilising section 41 Country Fire Authority Act 1958?

Did the IGEM inquire if Emergency Management Victoria had any concerns about township protection in the context of a total PPRR (prevention, preparedness, response and recovery) approach to the protection of life and property at Wye River–Separation Creek?

Remote area firefighting

Finally, concerning a determined, all stops out attack on the lighting strike fire while it was still small, Joint Standard Operating Procedure SOP JO2.06 (click here) specifies “Readiness Arrangements – Aviation Resources (Bushfire), which includes rappel and hover exit crews.

Under the heading Responsibilities:

Regional Controllers may request from the Emergency Management Commissioner (EMC) or State Response Controller (SRC), the relocation or variation of the of aviation resources.

Did the IGEM investigate why a hover exit/rappel crew was not deployed as "first responders" into what was considered an inaccessible area while the fire was still small?

Poor or no quality control? Poor staff work? Replacing non-performers?

In my blog postings of 20 January (click here), 3 February (click here) and 14 February 2016 (click here) I’ve been testing the government line that the lightning strike that eventually went on to devastate parts of Wye River–Separation Creek occurred in inaccessible county and the fuel burnout to contain the lightning strike fire was not responsible for the Christmas Day fire.

The lightning strike occurred on 19 December 2015 and it was eventually decided to burn out the fuel around the inaccessible lightning strike on 22 December, at least two (2) full days following the strike.

There’s a contradiction somewhere in the government’s line on how the lightning strike fire was managed.

According to the Emergency Management Commissioner we’re told it was inaccessible (click here). However, Minister Neville in her 11 February Facebook posting praises DELWP’s remote area firefighters who are promoted as going anywhere — “Great to see our DELWP Firefighter Rapel [sic] Crews showcased on The Today Show!” (click here).

The CFA has acknowledged that “The original lightning strike was in inaccessible country and couldn't be ringed by dozers so it was then burnt out to Jamieson Track.” But why not move on from the bulldozer on foot and use hand tools to create a mineral earth control line and drag hose to extinguish the lightning strike while it was still small?

Begs the question, if Victoria has the remote area firefighting capability praised by the Minister, why was the lightning strike considered inaccessible?

AND WHAT OF QUALITY CONTROL?

Bushfire and war fighting

I have always equated fighting bushfires as similar to war fighting. Fire is clearly the enemy capable of lying doggo, storming across ground in strong wind, destroying property, if not watched closely may get behind and trap firefighters, producing lots of heat, smoke and noise, and killing and maiming.

With time limited before weather conditions worsened as they were predicted and did Christmas Day, how was the initially small fire being managed?

Knowing the capability of DELWP in controlling remote area lightning strikes in Gippsland, was anyone oversighting the performance of the Incident Management Team?

If the firefighting effort was proving unsuccessful, what was done to improve performance as the clock ticked down? Was the Incident Controller qualified for that role? Was the Incident Controller experienced in forest firefighting and able to understand the appropriateness and the likelihood of success of action plans recommended for implementation? Was the Incident Management Team upgraded at any time?

And on war fighting with fire as the enemy, I’m reminded of a situation on the north coast of Papua New Guinea in 1942 when the Australians were pushing the Japanese back from Kokoda.

An example of determined leadership involving Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, United States Army (click here):

“Eichelberger's fears were realized when the overconfident 32nd Infantry Division suffered a serious reverse in the Battle of Buna-Gona. Harding was confident that he could capture Buna "without too much difficulty", but poor staff work, inaccurate intelligence, inadequate training and, above all, Japanese resistance, frustrated the American efforts. The Americans found themselves confronted by a network of well-sited and expertly prepared Japanese positions, accessible only through a swamp. The Americans' failure damaged their relationship with the Australians and threatened to derail MacArthur's entire campaign. Eichelberger and a small party from I Corps headquarters were hurriedly flown up to Port Moresby in a pair of C-47 Dakotas on 30 November. MacArthur ordered Eichelberger to assume control of the battle at Buna. According to Byers and Eichelberger, MacArthur told him "in a grim voice":

"I'm putting you in command at Buna. Relieve Harding. I am sending you in, Bob, and I want you to remove all officers who won't fight. Relieve regimental and battalion commanders; if necessary, put sergeants in charge of battalions and corporals in charge of companies—anyone who will fight. Time is of the essence; the Japanese may land reinforcements any night."

General MacArthur strode down the breezy veranda again. He said he had reports that American soldiers were throwing away their weapons and running from the enemy. Then he stopped short and spoke with emphasis. He wanted no misunderstandings about my assignment.

"Bob," he said, "I want you to take Buna, or not come back alive." He paused a moment, and then, without looking at Byers, pointed a finger. "And that goes for your chief of staff, too."

I’m not suggesting that the firefighting ‘grunts’ on the fireline were slacking, but wondering, was the leadership up to the task? Did the leadership have full knowledge of all the resources available and have free access to them? Was their performance being critically monitored?

Which brings me to pose the questions, does DELWP have the necessary knowledge to efficiently and effectively manage major fires in the Otways, or is it subject to debilitating government interference?

While reference to MacArthur and Eichelberger may seem overly dramatic and I’m not suggesting a reckless approach, like the Japanese fire proved to be a rampaging and take-all-in-its-path enemy and should have been treated as such right from the outset when the lightning struck.

Did we have the necessary “killer spirit” to get on top of the fire while it was still small?

Seeking the truth on the cause of the Wye River-Separation Creek bushfire

Since my 3 February posting “Food for thought on the cause of the Wye River–Separation Creek Christmas Day bushfire devastation” (click here), I’ve been provided with information on what I referred to as a time-lapse view of the fire area that was produced by Ripe Intelligence (click here)

The origin of the information in the video

The information came from the Vic Emergency web site (click here). At the date of this posting a plot of the fire area may still be available as part of the advice continuing to be posted on that fire.

Timing of the information

The fire spread sequence timings referred to as “time–lapse views” are shortly after the data to prepare the video was progressively taken up and posted by Ripe Intelligence. The perimeter data on the Vic Emergency web site does not include an observed date/time.

The time it appears on the Vic Emergency web site can be influenced by how busy the people responsible for the mapping are e.g. they may be dealing with more than one fire and mapping may be slow coming from the field.

Information on the spread of the Wye River–Separation Creek fire would have been critical to timely warnings to the community on Christmas Day. Consequently, I’m confident that times of the fire spreading shown in the video would have been close to real-time.

What the video shows

I’m informed that the video (click here) is published as an “impact area” rather than a fire perimeter given the limitations in the collection process, accuracy and intended use of the data. And, that generally, unburnt area is not depicted by agencies when initially publishing this type of information. It is added as detailed data becomes available and time allows.

Data behind the video

In my pursuit of the truth concerning where the Wye River–Separation Creek fire originated and the true meaning of “inaccessible” Ripe Intelligence provided additional data on the spread of this fire.

Below are the “time lapse” sequences overlaid on Google Earth. Here, my objective is to better show the fire caused by the lightning strike initially relatively small and clearly on the southern side of Jamieson Creek.

Comparing the terrain with the extract from Vicmap Topographic Map T7620-1-1-S (below), which is generally centred on Jamieson Creek in the area shown in the Google Earth extracts covering the vicinity of the lightning strike, I’m not convinced that any of that area is inaccessible to well-equipped, well trained, experienced and determined firefighters.

The arrow on the map points into the area more broadly shown in the video at 6:08 PM on 21 December.

The first three photos from Google Earth that match the sequences in the EmergencyAus video show the fire as not having crossed to the north side of Jamieson Creek:

6:08 PM 21 December 2015

12:44 PM 25 December 2015

4:04 PM 25 December 2015

4:38 PM 25 December 2015

Western end of the fire has started to move northwards.

8:38 PM 25 December 2015

Fire is on the steep upslope between Jamieson Creek and Cumberland Track.

3:48 AM 26 December 2015

Fire developing north of Jamieson Creek.

1:24 PM 26 December 2015

Fire continuing to develop north of Jamieson Creek. Could this have led to "lookout Lorne, here I come"?

With the benefit of more information

The following photos are from the Vic Emergency website on 10 February 2016 as an example of the agencies having had time to develop a detailed map of the total fire perimeter.

They are worth close examination to see the linkage between the fire areas north and south of Jamieson Creek. Having studied the information provided above I'm convinced the lightning strike was south of Jamieson Creek and in accessible terrain. Local knowledge suggests that the vegetation along the bottom of the gully would have been sufficiently damp to prevent the fire spreading to the north during the relatively mild days following the lightning strike.

It also seems reasonable to suggest that the northern control line for the fuel burnout was the damp fuel along the Jamieson Creek.

How then did the fire cross to the northern side of Jamieson Creek? Probably "spotting activity", possibly the approaching wind change starting to have an effect high up on the convection column, as Tolhurst opined on in work he did for the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission: Report on the Physical Nature of the Victorian Fires occurring on 7th February 2009, final paragraph on page 6 (click here).

Where to from here?

A range of factors involved in initially controlling — or failing to control — the lightning strike to prevent the fire area growing to the extent where it broke out Christmas Day needs serious in-depth investigation.

And of course a key question:

Was the fire considered inaccessible if it could not be encircled by a bulldozer and tankers?

Food for thought on the cause of the Wye River–Separation Creek Christmas Day bushfire devastation.

From The Age story of 14 January 2016 (click here):

"That was a decision to make and what they call 'burning out', taking fuel out of the ground, that otherwise would have been in itself a bigger fire, a more intense fire, and something they couldn't control.

"The strategy was right. The wind got them on Christmas Day when it flicked embers up over the burnt area, over the mineral (bare) earth firebreak.

But Mr Lapsley said back-burning was not responsible for the devastation caused by the bushfire on December 25th.

"On my initial investigation, I don't believe the burning did contribute," he said.

"I think the larger areas that were burnt were to the east and west of where this fire spotted from.

"On face value, I believe the spot fires came from where the original fire was and it was the hottest, most difficult part of the fire," he [Mr Lapsley] said.

Following on from my blog posting addressing “inaccessibility” on 20 January 2016 (click here), I find it very difficult to accept that the lightning strike could not be controlled, if not completely extinguished at an early stage while the weather was relatively mild in the days prior to Christmas Day.

Maybe the EmergencyAus video included with The Age story dated 29 January 2016 provides useful information on the “inaccessibly” of the lightning strike (click here).

This video includes a time-lapse view of the fire area from 6:08 PM on 21 December through to 1:24 PM on 26 December 2015 (click here).

The first question I asked myself, is the video credible?

I first attempted my own “due diligence” on the video and its authors before accepting it at face value. I’ve also assumed it is credible as it was published by Fairfax, but that’s for others to judge, too.

If the video lacks credibility the government should explain why. Simply stating that it’s not credible without explanation is unacceptable in this the 21st Century. If the video is wrong, publicly releasing the fire management planning documents and maps up to the “breakaway" of the fire on Christmas Day would be helpful in supporting the government’s assertion on how the fire broke away from the containment lines.

In working through the time lapse sequences below, the The Age story should be closely analysed, too.

Time lapse analysis of the EmergencyAus video

6:08 PM 21 December 2015

The first sequence timed 6:08 PM 21 December shows the extent of the fire at that time, apparently still at the “uncontrolled” stage. And, on inaccessibility, the following extract from Google Earth based on the video shows the lightning strike and following fire as not moving north onto the steep upslope beyond Jamieson Creek.

The following extract from Vicmap Topographic Map T7620-1-1-S is generally centred on Jamieson Creek in the area shown in the Google Earth extract. The arrow points into the area more broadly shown in the video at 6:08 PM on 21 December.

From the Google Earth photo and the topographic map extract, does the terrain south of Jamieson Creek look all that inaccessible to trained, experienced and well-equipped DELWP firefighters?

According to a story in the Canberra Times (click here) on 30 January 2016, competent remote area firefighters exist in the ACT.

11:04 PM 21 December 2015

A thin line of fire is now shown along Jamieson Track, which I have taken to be the early stage of the fuel “burnout”.

North of the gully below Jamieson Track a thin line of fire is shown extending further west from the previous sequence. Was this part of the “burnout” and if so from a bulldozer constructed control line capable of use by tankers?

9:40 PM 24 December 2015

At Christmas Eve, the burnout is shown as having extended east to the Great Ocean Road and bounded by Jamieson Creek and Jamieson Track.

At its western end the burnout appears to have progressed no further north than the gully below Jamieson Track. Was this due to the vegetation in the gully generally being too damp to burn?

12:44 PM 25 December 2015

This sequence in the video shows fire across or south of Jamieson Track. Examination of the video on a large LED television screen gives a better view of what appears to be the path of fire leaving Jamieson Track, the general direction of which would have been consistent with wind direction and speed recorded nearby at the Aireys Inlet BOM recording station (click here).

What failed to hold the fire north of Jamieson Track, was it really the old lighting strike fire somehow breaching the burnout, was the burnout incomplete, did the lightning strike fire trickle through an incomplete burnout?

Given the very adverse weather conditions predicted for this day, were sufficient resources, including sufficient tankers and “boots on the ground” patrolling along Jamieson Track and large helicopter water bombers immediately available to rapidly support ground crews suppressing any “smokers” that popped up?

1:38 PM 25 December 2015

This sequence adds weight to fire across Jamieson Track, which appears not to join up with the burnout further to the east. This is consistent with my earlier comments on wind direction and velocity in the area.

2:14 PM 25 December 2015

This sequence appears to show the fire “thickening” at or near the head of the gully at the western end of the burnout from the area shown in the 9:40 PM 24 December sequence.

The vulnerability of the Great Ocean Road north of Wye River is also apparent, preventing use of that route for people evacuating from further south and firefighting vehicles approaching from the north.

Serious issues for risks managers with statutory fire prevention responsibilities to have considered in advanced planning for the protection of Wye River–Separation Creek, and the Great Ocean Road as an important “lifeline”.

2:58 PM 25 December 2015

This sequence appears to reveal a second breakaway further west of the earlier breakaway and considerably further west of the fire area shown in the 6:08 PM sequence.

4:04 PM 25 December 2015

This sequence shows reveals a dramatic increase in the size of the below the breakaway shown in the 2:58 PM sequence and sadly the rest is very costly history.

CONCLUSION

Statements attributed to Inspector-General for Emergency Management in The Age (click here) (click here) on 23 January 2016 on the burnout:

““The burn out strategy ahead of Christmas was "the most appropriate option available" and "there is no doubt in my mind that the eventual impacts on the Wye River and Separation Creek townships would have been far worse" had the fuel load between the main fire front and Jamieson Track not been significantly reduced prior to the spot fire occurring.”

Given the intensity of the fire and the property loss, I have difficulty conceiving of how the “eventual impacts on the Wye River and Separation Creek townships would have been far worse”. It was the development of the fire across public land between Jamieson Track and Wye River–Separation Creek, for which DELWP fuel reduction burning plans had not been implemented that influenced the intensity of the fire that eventually hit Wye River–Separation Creek.

There are a range of serious questions that need to be addressed about the cause of the Christmas Day fire and its subsequent development, if only to endeavour to assure Victorians that our bushfire emergency management arrangements and responsible senior managers are up to the task. In this posting I have raised some of those questions.

In this the 21st Century it’s no longer acceptable to conceal such matters within the bureaucracy of government and it's not consistent with the current mantra of “shared responsibility”.