Poor or no quality control? Poor staff work? Replacing non-performers?

In my blog postings of 20 January (click here), 3 February (click here) and 14 February 2016 (click here) I’ve been testing the government line that the lightning strike that eventually went on to devastate parts of Wye River–Separation Creek occurred in inaccessible county and the fuel burnout to contain the lightning strike fire was not responsible for the Christmas Day fire.

The lightning strike occurred on 19 December 2015 and it was eventually decided to burn out the fuel around the inaccessible lightning strike on 22 December, at least two (2) full days following the strike.

There’s a contradiction somewhere in the government’s line on how the lightning strike fire was managed.

According to the Emergency Management Commissioner we’re told it was inaccessible (click here). However, Minister Neville in her 11 February Facebook posting praises DELWP’s remote area firefighters who are promoted as going anywhere — “Great to see our DELWP Firefighter Rapel [sic] Crews showcased on The Today Show!” (click here).

The CFA has acknowledged that “The original lightning strike was in inaccessible country and couldn't be ringed by dozers so it was then burnt out to Jamieson Track.” But why not move on from the bulldozer on foot and use hand tools to create a mineral earth control line and drag hose to extinguish the lightning strike while it was still small?

Begs the question, if Victoria has the remote area firefighting capability praised by the Minister, why was the lightning strike considered inaccessible?

AND WHAT OF QUALITY CONTROL?

Bushfire and war fighting

I have always equated fighting bushfires as similar to war fighting. Fire is clearly the enemy capable of lying doggo, storming across ground in strong wind, destroying property, if not watched closely may get behind and trap firefighters, producing lots of heat, smoke and noise, and killing and maiming.

With time limited before weather conditions worsened as they were predicted and did Christmas Day, how was the initially small fire being managed?

Knowing the capability of DELWP in controlling remote area lightning strikes in Gippsland, was anyone oversighting the performance of the Incident Management Team?

If the firefighting effort was proving unsuccessful, what was done to improve performance as the clock ticked down? Was the Incident Controller qualified for that role? Was the Incident Controller experienced in forest firefighting and able to understand the appropriateness and the likelihood of success of action plans recommended for implementation? Was the Incident Management Team upgraded at any time?

And on war fighting with fire as the enemy, I’m reminded of a situation on the north coast of Papua New Guinea in 1942 when the Australians were pushing the Japanese back from Kokoda.

An example of determined leadership involving Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, United States Army (click here):

“Eichelberger's fears were realized when the overconfident 32nd Infantry Division suffered a serious reverse in the Battle of Buna-Gona. Harding was confident that he could capture Buna "without too much difficulty", but poor staff work, inaccurate intelligence, inadequate training and, above all, Japanese resistance, frustrated the American efforts. The Americans found themselves confronted by a network of well-sited and expertly prepared Japanese positions, accessible only through a swamp. The Americans' failure damaged their relationship with the Australians and threatened to derail MacArthur's entire campaign. Eichelberger and a small party from I Corps headquarters were hurriedly flown up to Port Moresby in a pair of C-47 Dakotas on 30 November. MacArthur ordered Eichelberger to assume control of the battle at Buna. According to Byers and Eichelberger, MacArthur told him "in a grim voice":

"I'm putting you in command at Buna. Relieve Harding. I am sending you in, Bob, and I want you to remove all officers who won't fight. Relieve regimental and battalion commanders; if necessary, put sergeants in charge of battalions and corporals in charge of companies—anyone who will fight. Time is of the essence; the Japanese may land reinforcements any night."

General MacArthur strode down the breezy veranda again. He said he had reports that American soldiers were throwing away their weapons and running from the enemy. Then he stopped short and spoke with emphasis. He wanted no misunderstandings about my assignment.

"Bob," he said, "I want you to take Buna, or not come back alive." He paused a moment, and then, without looking at Byers, pointed a finger. "And that goes for your chief of staff, too."

I’m not suggesting that the firefighting ‘grunts’ on the fireline were slacking, but wondering, was the leadership up to the task? Did the leadership have full knowledge of all the resources available and have free access to them? Was their performance being critically monitored?

Which brings me to pose the questions, does DELWP have the necessary knowledge to efficiently and effectively manage major fires in the Otways, or is it subject to debilitating government interference?

While reference to MacArthur and Eichelberger may seem overly dramatic and I’m not suggesting a reckless approach, like the Japanese fire proved to be a rampaging and take-all-in-its-path enemy and should have been treated as such right from the outset when the lightning struck.

Did we have the necessary “killer spirit” to get on top of the fire while it was still small?