Obfuscation, sanitising, cabinet-in-confidence documents, burying, leaking — examples of some of the processes of government

It’s reasonable to expect that the Inspector–General for Emergency Management will have met the 19 February deadline and the Minister for Emergency Services the Honourable Jane Garrett will now have his report on the Wye River–Separation Creek fire.

The processes of government – how will the report be dealt with?

From my experience and I doubt that the processes have changed all that much, the responsible Minister will first seek the advice of others such as the Emergency Services Commissioner, CFA, DELWP and maybe Victoria Police. Actually how far down into these organisations advice will be sought is a moot point, given the early desire of the government to restrict investigation to an “internal process”.

Ministerial advisors will likely be asked for their advice and possibly government and media PR people. Another moot point, how many of these people will have the detailed knowledge to provide factual comment?

At what stage will the IGEM’s report be released to the public, will it be a sanitised version, etc? Might the government decide not to release the report, arguing that it is now a matter for the Coroner to consider, along with the advice received from the agencies?

Concerning the IGEM’s investigation, did he have any “riding instructions” from the Minister on what to investigate? Here, I’m reminded of the depth and detail of the terms of Reference of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (click here).

What did the IGEM investigate and report on, only the question of “inaccessibility” of the lighting strike as justification for falling back to a fuel burnout to contain the lightning strike? Did he investigate the actual point/s of breakout and related circumstances of the origin of the fire on Christmas Day that went onto Wye River–Separation Creek?

Did the IGEM extend his investigation further to consider issues beyond the lightning strike and burnout that contributed to the loss at Wye River–Separation Creek? Issues such as the quantity of fuel in the forest between the burnout and those two communities?

Fuel reduction in the forest

This link shows that back in 2007 DSE recognised the importance of fuel reduction in the Otway parks and reserves (click here). It speaks for itself. Were any burns relevant to protection of Wye River–Separation Creek carried out during autumn 2007?

This link is to the DSE Otway District Approved Fire Operations Plan 2008/09 to 2010/11 (click here). Again, were these burns completed?

No doubt koalas and many other creatures of the forest would have died horribly or suffered terrible injuries as the fire ripped through the forest on its way south.

Did the IGEM form an opinion on the validity of any reasons given for DELWP failing to meet any of its fuel reduction burning plans important to Wye River–Separation Creek?

Township protection

Did the IGEM consider the effectiveness of the Wye River–Separation Creek township protection plan and its implementation — if there is such a plan — including the performance of the Colac Otway Shire Municipal Fire Prevention Officer and the CFA Chief Officer in utilising their hazard removal powers according to section 41 of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958? (click here)? The Chief Officer was given this power following a recommendation from the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission:

Recommendation 54

The State amend the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 to enable the Chief Officer to delegate the power to issue fire prevention notices.

Section 41 fire prevention notices

Concerning issue of section 41 “fire prevention notices” did people from CFA head office who become involved in considering bushfire attack level exposure at BAL-FZ level according to Australian Standard AS 3959—2009 Construction of buildings in bushfire-prone areas visit Wye River–Separation Creek in the course of their duties? If yes, did they form any opinions on township protection and report any concerns they had to the CFA Chief Officer?

Did planning permit applications to erect dwellings inside the township boundaries that were rated at BAL–FZ arouse any concern in the CFA that something may be seriously wrong within the context of section 41(2)(a) Country Fire Authority Act 1958 regarding the vulnerability of existing buildings?

The following photograph is of the remains of a house on the north side of Dunoon Road, Wye River, lost to the fire.

Same house prior to the fire. A risk assessment based township protection plan should have identified building design and construction vulnerability to ember attack alone.

Photographed in September 2013 the vegetation generally below the houses on the north side of Dunoon Road, many of which were lost.

Prior to the current bushfire season did the Municipal Fire Prevention Officer or the CFA Chief Officer — in fairness to the current CO who has only been in that position for a relatively short time, I’m referring to his predecessor — address the vegetation hazard utilising section 41 Country Fire Authority Act 1958?

Did the IGEM inquire if Emergency Management Victoria had any concerns about township protection in the context of a total PPRR (prevention, preparedness, response and recovery) approach to the protection of life and property at Wye River–Separation Creek?

Remote area firefighting

Finally, concerning a determined, all stops out attack on the lighting strike fire while it was still small, Joint Standard Operating Procedure SOP JO2.06 (click here) specifies “Readiness Arrangements – Aviation Resources (Bushfire), which includes rappel and hover exit crews.

Under the heading Responsibilities:

Regional Controllers may request from the Emergency Management Commissioner (EMC) or State Response Controller (SRC), the relocation or variation of the of aviation resources.

Did the IGEM investigate why a hover exit/rappel crew was not deployed as "first responders" into what was considered an inaccessible area while the fire was still small?