"That was a decision to make and what they call 'burning out', taking fuel out of the ground, that otherwise would have been in itself a bigger fire, a more intense fire, and something they couldn't control.
"The strategy was right. The wind got them on Christmas Day when it flicked embers up over the burnt area, over the mineral (bare) earth firebreak.
But Mr Lapsley said back-burning was not responsible for the devastation caused by the bushfire on December 25th.
"On my initial investigation, I don't believe the burning did contribute," he said.
"I think the larger areas that were burnt were to the east and west of where this fire spotted from.
"On face value, I believe the spot fires came from where the original fire was and it was the hottest, most difficult part of the fire," he [Mr Lapsley] said.
Following on from my blog posting addressing “inaccessibility” on 20 January 2016 (click here), I find it very difficult to accept that the lightning strike could not be controlled, if not completely extinguished at an early stage while the weather was relatively mild in the days prior to Christmas Day.
Maybe the EmergencyAus video included with The Age story dated 29 January 2016 provides useful information on the “inaccessibly” of the lightning strike (click here).
This video includes a time-lapse view of the fire area from 6:08 PM on 21 December through to 1:24 PM on 26 December 2015 (click here).
The first question I asked myself, is the video credible?
I first attempted my own “due diligence” on the video and its authors before accepting it at face value. I’ve also assumed it is credible as it was published by Fairfax, but that’s for others to judge, too.
If the video lacks credibility the government should explain why. Simply stating that it’s not credible without explanation is unacceptable in this the 21st Century. If the video is wrong, publicly releasing the fire management planning documents and maps up to the “breakaway" of the fire on Christmas Day would be helpful in supporting the government’s assertion on how the fire broke away from the containment lines.
In working through the time lapse sequences below, the The Age story should be closely analysed, too.
Time lapse analysis of the EmergencyAus video
6:08 PM 21 December 2015
The first sequence timed 6:08 PM 21 December shows the extent of the fire at that time, apparently still at the “uncontrolled” stage. And, on inaccessibility, the following extract from Google Earth based on the video shows the lightning strike and following fire as not moving north onto the steep upslope beyond Jamieson Creek.
The following extract from Vicmap Topographic Map T7620-1-1-S is generally centred on Jamieson Creek in the area shown in the Google Earth extract. The arrow points into the area more broadly shown in the video at 6:08 PM on 21 December.
From the Google Earth photo and the topographic map extract, does the terrain south of Jamieson Creek look all that inaccessible to trained, experienced and well-equipped DELWP firefighters?
According to a story in the Canberra Times (click here) on 30 January 2016, competent remote area firefighters exist in the ACT.
11:04 PM 21 December 2015
A thin line of fire is now shown along Jamieson Track, which I have taken to be the early stage of the fuel “burnout”.
North of the gully below Jamieson Track a thin line of fire is shown extending further west from the previous sequence. Was this part of the “burnout” and if so from a bulldozer constructed control line capable of use by tankers?
9:40 PM 24 December 2015
At Christmas Eve, the burnout is shown as having extended east to the Great Ocean Road and bounded by Jamieson Creek and Jamieson Track.
At its western end the burnout appears to have progressed no further north than the gully below Jamieson Track. Was this due to the vegetation in the gully generally being too damp to burn?
12:44 PM 25 December 2015
This sequence in the video shows fire across or south of Jamieson Track. Examination of the video on a large LED television screen gives a better view of what appears to be the path of fire leaving Jamieson Track, the general direction of which would have been consistent with wind direction and speed recorded nearby at the Aireys Inlet BOM recording station (click here).
What failed to hold the fire north of Jamieson Track, was it really the old lighting strike fire somehow breaching the burnout, was the burnout incomplete, did the lightning strike fire trickle through an incomplete burnout?
Given the very adverse weather conditions predicted for this day, were sufficient resources, including sufficient tankers and “boots on the ground” patrolling along Jamieson Track and large helicopter water bombers immediately available to rapidly support ground crews suppressing any “smokers” that popped up?
1:38 PM 25 December 2015
This sequence adds weight to fire across Jamieson Track, which appears not to join up with the burnout further to the east. This is consistent with my earlier comments on wind direction and velocity in the area.
2:14 PM 25 December 2015
This sequence appears to show the fire “thickening” at or near the head of the gully at the western end of the burnout from the area shown in the 9:40 PM 24 December sequence.
The vulnerability of the Great Ocean Road north of Wye River is also apparent, preventing use of that route for people evacuating from further south and firefighting vehicles approaching from the north.
Serious issues for risks managers with statutory fire prevention responsibilities to have considered in advanced planning for the protection of Wye River–Separation Creek, and the Great Ocean Road as an important “lifeline”.
2:58 PM 25 December 2015
This sequence appears to reveal a second breakaway further west of the earlier breakaway and considerably further west of the fire area shown in the 6:08 PM sequence.
4:04 PM 25 December 2015
This sequence shows reveals a dramatic increase in the size of the below the breakaway shown in the 2:58 PM sequence and sadly the rest is very costly history.
CONCLUSION
Statements attributed to Inspector-General for Emergency Management in The Age (click here) (click here) on 23 January 2016 on the burnout:
Given the intensity of the fire and the property loss, I have difficulty conceiving of how the “eventual impacts on the Wye River and Separation Creek townships would have been far worse”. It was the development of the fire across public land between Jamieson Track and Wye River–Separation Creek, for which DELWP fuel reduction burning plans had not been implemented that influenced the intensity of the fire that eventually hit Wye River–Separation Creek.
There are a range of serious questions that need to be addressed about the cause of the Christmas Day fire and its subsequent development, if only to endeavour to assure Victorians that our bushfire emergency management arrangements and responsible senior managers are up to the task. In this posting I have raised some of those questions.
In this the 21st Century it’s no longer acceptable to conceal such matters within the bureaucracy of government and it's not consistent with the current mantra of “shared responsibility”.
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